Plaintiff was injured when one negligent driver and then, in short succession, another negligent driver collided with the truck in which plaintiff was a passenger. The underinsured motorist benefits available to plaintiff under the terms of the insurance policy that she purchased from defendant depend on the meaning of the term “accident” as that term was used in that policy and is used in corresponding Oregon financial responsibility statutes. We conclude that the legislature intended that the term “accident” have its ordinary meaning and that plaintiff presented evidence from which a jury could find that her injuries had been incurred in more than one “accident.” Consequently, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
The procedural facts in this case are idiosyncratic and are set forth in detail in the Court of Appeals opinion. Wright v. Turner,
The undisputed facts relevant to that question are as follows. In 2004, plaintiff was a passenger in a truck traveling north on Interstate 5 in a storm of hail and rain. As the truck was descending a steep grade, a vehicle ahead, driven by Turner, spun out of control and collided with the truck. The truck came to a stop on the median strip of the highway, resting against a concrete barrier that blocked the driver’s side door. The driver of the truck climbed out her window, told plaintiff to remain inside the truck, and went to check on Turner. The driver then returned
During that interval, a number of other vehicles passed the truck without colliding with it. At some point, a second vehicle, driven by Oliver, collided with the truck, pushing it farther down the highway.
Plaintiff had purchased underinsured motorist insurance (UIM) from defendant Mutual of Enumclaw. Her policy comported with the requirements of ORS 806.070 and ORS 742.502 through 742.508, which establish required amounts of coverage for Oregon drivers. Her policy provided coverage for damages caused by underinsured motorists up to a limit of $500,000 “for bodily injury and property damage resulting from any one automobile accident * * * regardless of the number of * * * vehicles involved in the automobile accident.” (Emphasis added.)
Plaintiff filed an action against three defendants— Turner, Oliver, and her insurer, Mutual of Enumclaw. She alleged that both Turner and Oliver had been negligent and that they did not have sufficient insurance to cover her damages; she therefore alleged that Mutual of Enumclaw was liable under the terms of its policy up to a limit of $1 million. Plaintiff settled with Turner and Oliver for the total amount of their insurance policies, and the case was dismissed as to them. Defendant Mutual of Enumclaw (defendant) filed an answer admitting that both Turner and Oliver were negligent, but contesting plaintiff’s damages as well as the extent of its liability for those damages. As noted, the trial court entered judgment against defendant for $979,540.
On appeal, the parties and the Court of Appeals considered whether plaintiff had been injured in one “accident” to be a matter of contractual interpretation and applied the methodology for interpreting insurance policies set out in Holloway v. Republic Indemnity Co. of America,
Persuaded by Baggett, the Court of Appeals concluded that plaintiff had not met her burden to show that the two collisions had distinct causes and that the second collision was “not merely proximately derivative” of the first. Wright,
In this court, plaintiff argues that the Court of Appeals was correct to interpret the contractual term one “accident” as the California court did in Baggett, but that the Court of Appeals erred in its application of that interpretation to the facts in this case. Defendant urges that we adopt the reasoning of the Court of Appeals in its entirety.
Although both parties approach the problem as one of contractual interpretation, we think it necessary to correct course. The contractual provision at issue here is a statutorily required provision, and, as a result, “we attempt to determine the legislature’s intention in enacting that statute rather than the parties’ contractual intention in entering into the insurance contract.” Fox
Oregon statutes require all drivers in the state to demonstrate minimum levels of financial responsibility for any damages that they may cause while operating a motor vehicle. See Viking Ins. Co. v. Perotti,
The minimum required coverage in ORS chapter 742 is defined by reference to the financial responsibility requirements specified in ORS chapter 806. ORS 806.070 establishes a schedule of payments and requires that insurance policies must provide for payment of at least those amounts to meet the financial responsibility requirements of ORS chapter 806. The schedule of payments is $25,000 for bodily injury to or death of one person in “any one accident,” and $50,000 for bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in “any one accident.” ORS 806.070. Thus, Oregon automobile insurance policies must provide liability, UM, and UIM coverage that meets minimum levels of recovery for damages sustained as a result of “any one accident.”
Accordingly, the policy that plaintiff purchased from defendant was required by statute to provide a minimum level of UIM coverage for damages caused in “any one accident.” Because the insurance policy that defendant issued to plaintiff was required to meet the statutory minimum coverage for “any one accident,” the legislature’s intended definition of that phrase and the term “accident,” as used in that context, controls the meaning of that phrase and, in particular, that term. See Moore,
Neither ORS 806.070 nor related statutes define “accident.” The predecessor to ORS 806.070, former ORS 486.015 (1951), was enacted in 1951 when the legislature simultaneously enacted a number of statutes requiring that individuals responsible for accidents demonstrate their ability to pay certain minimum compensation to those harmed in “any one accident.”
At that time, the relevant dictionary definition of “accident” was “[a]n event that takes place without one’s foresight or expectation; an undesigned, sudden, and unexpected event. * * * Hence, often, an undesigned and unforeseen occurrence of an afflictive or unfortunate character; a mishap resulting in injury to a person or damage to a thing; a casualty ***.” Webster’s Second New Int’l Dictionary 15 (unabridged ed 1959) (first printing 1936). Similarly, Black’s Law Dictionary 30 (4th ed 1957) (first printing 1951) included a definition of “accident” as “an unusual, fortuitous, unexpected, unforeseen or unlooked for event, happening or occurrence * * * any unpleasant or unfortunate occurrence, that causes injury, loss, suffering or death [.]” In the specific context of automobiles, Black’s defined “accident” as “an untoward and unforeseen occurrence in the operation of the automobile which results in injury to the person or property of another.” Id. at 31.
As the Court of Appeals explained in the context of interpreting plaintiff’s insurance policy, those broad definitions provide an “understanding of the general nature of any automobile ‘accident’ — that is, what distinguishes an ‘accident’ from a ‘non-accident.’” Wright,
The context of former ORS 486.015 (1951) also is of assistance. That statute required minimum coverage for damages “because of bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in any one accident.”
That still does not tell us, definitively, what the legislature meant by the term “accident,” and we turn to legislative history. As noted, the legislature first required that individuals responsible for accidents demonstrate their ability to pay certain minimum compensation to those harmed in “any one accident” in 1951, with the enactment of former ORS 486.015 (1951).
The committee discussions at the time that the legislature passed former ORS 486.015 (1951) suggest that that statute was based on similar financial responsibility laws passed in other states, which in turn were based on a model act. One of the sponsors of the bill
After the passage of former ORS 486.015 in 1951, subsequent legislatures continued to use the term “accident.” In 1959, the legislature first required that all motorists in Oregon carry insurance against damages caused by uninsured motorists.
As that history reveals, when the legislature originally used the term “accident,” it took it from statutes in other states and a model act intended for nationwide enactment. We therefore assume that the legislature contemplated that that term would reflect its national understanding, and we think it fair to consult, for their persuasive value, judicial
In 1951, when the legislature first used the term “accident,” there were two leading cases defining that term for the purpose of determining the number of accidents that had occurred. See Lee R. Russ and Thomas Segallas, 12 Couch on Insurance 3d at §§ 172:12,172:13 (3d ed 1995) (discussing cases); The Meaning of the Word “Accident” in a Liability Insurance Policy, 26 Fordham L Rev 506, 508-510 (1957) (same). Anchor Cas. Co. v. McCaleb, 178 F2d 322 (5th Cir 1949), involved the explosion of an oil well that caused damage to a number of property owners. The defendant insurance company argued that only one accident had occurred and that the recovery of all the injured plaintiffs therefore was subject to the policy limit of $5,000 for each “accident.” McCaleb, 178 F2d at 324. The Fifth Circuit held instead that “‘accident,’ as used in the policy, must be construed from the point of view of the person whose property was injured. * * * If one cause operates upon several at one time, it cannot be regarded as a single incident, but the injury to each individual is a separate accident.” Id. at 324-25. Commentators have referred to that interpretation as the “effects theory,” meaning that the number of accidents is determined from the perspective of the person injured and that there are as many accidents as there are persons injured. See, e.g., 12 Couch on Insurance § 172:13.
As we already have explained, we know from the context in which “accident” was used in former ORS 486.015 (1951) that the Oregon legislature did not intend that “accident” be interpreted in accordance with the “effects theory.” That is so because the legislature explicitly provided that more than one person may be injured or killed in one “accident.”
The other leading case in 1951 was Hyer v. Inter-Insurance Exchange of Auto. Club ofS. Cal., 77 Cal App 343,
In reaching that conclusion, the court considered a hypothetical situation in which, rather than being separately owned, the Overland and the Cadillac were owned by one person who was using one car to tow the other when the “two automobiles were damaged in sudden and unexpected crashes happening in continuous sequence as a connected chain of events, but springing from a single initial cause.” Id. Clearly, the court reasoned, it “would no more be correct to say of such a case that there were two accidents than it would be to predicate two or more accidents of a general freight train wreck, merely because two or more cars in the train might have been demolished in the same catastrophe.” Id. The court concluded that the same rule should apply when the two cars were owned by two different people but were damaged, as in the hypothetical, in a “continuous sequence as a connected chain of events.” Id. Accordingly, the court concluded that only one accident had taken place.
Labeling the analysis in Hyer as the “cause theory” of interpretation is useful in distinguishing the court’s reasoning in Hyer from the reasoning in McCaleb and the “effects
When a disputed statutory term is undefined, we assume that it partakes of its ordinary meaning. State v. Moss,
We also conclude that, in applying that term, the legislature intended that a factfinder consider the cause or causes of successive collisions in determining whether more than one “accident” occurred. That does not necessarily mean, however, that the legislature intended to equate the number of accidents with the number of causes. Hyer did not address the circumstance in which injuries result from multiple distinct causes, nor do the parties cite any case decided before 1951 that interpreted the term “accident” in that context.
Instead, both parties cite more recent cases applying the “cause theory.” One of those cases is Baggett — the case from which the Court of Appeals drew its contractual interpretation. As noted, in Baggett, the court interpreted the term “accident” to mean a “single uninterrupted course of conduct” giving rise to injury and explained that, when the “original cause is interrupted or replaced by another cause, there is more than one ‘accident.’” Wright,
In Baggett, the plaintiffs’ decedent was struck from behind by a tortfeasor. The two vehicles came to a stop in the center lane of the highway. While the drivers were examining the vehicles, and within a minute of the first collision, a second vehicle struck the stopped vehicles, killing the decedent. Baggett, 209 Cal App 3d at 1390. The decedent’s heirs alleged that the initial tortfeasor was negligent in: (1) driving his vehicle; (2) stopping his vehicle without displaying hazard or operating lights, setting out reflective devices or flares, or directing traffic around the stopped vehicles; and (3) guiding the decedent to a position of danger. Id. The court stated that the governing interpretation of the term one “accident” was as follows:
“In determining whether, under a particular set of circumstances, there was one accident or occurrence, the so-called ‘causation’ theory is applied. Hence a single uninterrupted course of conduct which gives rise to a number of injuries or incidents of property damage is one ‘accident’ or ‘occurrence.’ On the other hand, if the original cause is interrupted or replaced by another cause, then there is more than one ‘accident’ or ‘occurrence.’”
Baggett, 209 Cal App at 1393 (quoting State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Kohl, 131 Cal App 3d 1031, 1035, 182 Cal Rptr 720 (1982)).
To illustrate the distinction between one and more than one accident, the court in Baggett compared cases in which one negligent act had caused multiple collisions and courts had concluded that one accident had occurred with another case in which a court had concluded that two accidents had occurred, Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Rawls, 404 F2d 880, 881 (5th Cir 1968). Baggett, 209 Cal App at 1393. In Rawls, the agreed facts established that the insured had collided first with the Rawls vehicle and then with a second vehicle, and that the two impacts were separated in both time and distance. The court stated:
“These impacts occurred 2 to 5 seconds apart and 30 to 300 feet apart. There were two distinct collisions, or more than a single sudden collision. There is no evidence that the [insured’s] automobile went out of control after striking the rear end of [Rawls’] automobile. On the contrary, the only reasonable inference is that [the insured] had control of his vehicle after the initial collision.”
404 F2d 880.
Unlike the court in Rawls, in Baggett, the court apparently decided that the two collisions were part of “a single uninterrupted course of conduct.” 209 Cal App at 1393. Without extensive analysis, the court in Baggett concluded that the “policy provisions limiting maximum liability ‘for any one auto accident’ unambiguously contemplate two consecutive collisions as occurred here to be one accident.” Id. at 1396.
Other courts applying the “cause theory” of interpretation also have considered whether the damages at issue resulted from one “uninterrupted and continuing cause,” or whether there was an intervening cause that resulted in two accidents. So, for instance, in State Auto Property & Cas. Co. v. Matty, 286 Ga 611,
Similarly, in Illinois Nat. Ins. Co. v. Szczepkowicz, 185 Ill App 3d 1091, 1096,
“[t]wo separate, distinct collisions occurred five minutes apart [,]*** there was no single force, nor an unbroken or uninterrupted continuum that, once set in motion, caused multiple injuries [and] *** the second collision did not result from continuous or repeated exposure either to the same or to substantially the same conditions.”
Id. at 1096-97. The court distinguished the case before it from cases where one vehicle “ricochets” off another in such a way that two collisions comprise a single accident. Id. at 1096. See, e.g., Truck Ins. Exchange v. Rohde, 49 Wash 2d 465, 470,
Those cases had not been decided in 1951. Accordingly, they do not aid us in our task of statutory interpretation except to illustrate the various contexts in which a factfinder may be called on to apply the ordinary meaning of the term “accident” and whether more than one “accident” took place. One interpretation of those cases is that there are as many accidents as there are causes of injury. We do not believe, however, that those cases necessarily stand for that proposition or that the legislature intended “accident” to have that meaning.
Cause is a slippery concept with various meanings in various contexts. Whether an act or omission is a cause in fact of an injury is a legal concept that is used in determining a person’s tort liability. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 41 at 264-65 (5th ed 1984). Just as the number of persons who are injured does not determine the number of accidents, neither does the number of tortfeasors
Instead, we believe that the legislature intended that a factfinder consider the particular facts of each case and determine whether a person’s injuries were incurred in one uninterrupted event, happening, or occurrence or whether an initial event, happening, or occurrence was interrupted in some way — such as by time or different causal act— permitting a factfinder to conclude that there was more than one distinct event, happening, or occurrence and therefore more than one “accident.” As demonstrated by the cases discussed above, when separate acts are distinct factual causes of successive collisions, that may be an indication that there was a break in the chain of events sufficient to permit a jury or a court to conclude that more than one accident had occurred. However, that will not always be true.
Whether the circumstances in a particular case establish more than one “accident” ordinarily will be a question of fact. A court may determine that question as a matter of law only when a reasonable jury could reach only one conclusion. See Jones v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
As noted, the undisputed evidence was that Turner, driving negligently, spun out of control and collided with the truck in which plaintiff was a passenger. The truck came to a stop on the median strip of the highway, resting against a concrete barrier that blocked the driver’s side door. Before the second collision occurred, the driver had time to climb out her window, check on Turner, return to the truck, and ask plaintiff to retrieve her cell phone. During that interval, a number of other drivers passed the truck without mishap; however, Oliver, who also was driving negligently, did not, and a second collision occurred.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that plaintiff had the burden to prove the availability of coverage for two accidents and that she had failed to “adduce prima facie evidence that the second collision was not merely proximately derivative of the causation of the first” because “the record is completely devoid of any evidence regarding the cause of the second collision.” Id. at 37. We reach a different conclusion.
We do not fully understand the Court of Appeals’ further reasoning that the evidence showing more than “one accident” nevertheless was deficient because plaintiff failed to prove that the second collision was “not merely proximately derivative” of the first. Id. The fact that Turner’s negligence set the injurious events in motion and therefore
We doubt that the Court of Appeals intended to introduce the concept of “proximate” or “legal” cause (as opposed to “cause in fact” or “factual” cause), into the “accident” analysis, but we think it advisable to specifically caution that “proximate cause” has no bearing on the question of how many accidents occurred. In Hyer, the court mentioned “proximate cause” and courts in other jurisdictions continue to use that concept to refer to whether a tortfeasor may be held legally responsible in tort for the consequences of a negligent act. “Proximate cause” is defined as a “cause that is legally sufficient to result in liability; an act or omission that is considered in law to result in a consequence, so that liability can be imposed on the actorBlack’s Law Dictionary 234 (8th ed 2004). As Prosser explains, “legal responsibility must be limited to those causes which are so closely connected with the result and of such significance that the law is justified in imposing liability. Some boundary must be set to liability for the consequences of any act ***.” Prosser and Keeton § 41 at 264. In Oregon, we determine that boundary by whether the consequential injury is foreseeable. Lasley v. Combined Transport, Inc.,
We conclude that plaintiff presented evidence that was at least sufficient to give rise to a jury question on that issue.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
Notes
Neither the amount of time that passed between the two collisions nor the distance between the two impacts was established at trial.
ORS 742.502 provides, in part:
“(1) Every motor vehicle liability policy insuring against loss suffered by any natural person resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall provide in the policy or by indorsement on the policy uninsured motorist coverage ***.
“(2)(a) A motor vehicle bodily injury liability policy shall have the same limits for uninsured motorist coverage as for bodily injury liability coverage unless a named insured in writing elects lower limits. The insured may not elect limits lower than the amounts prescribed to meet the requirements of ORS 806.070 for bodily injury or death. Uninsured motorist coverage shall include underinsurance coverage for bodily injury or death caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle with motor vehicle liability insurance that provides recovery in an amount that is less than the insured’s uninsured motorist coverage. Underinsurance coverage shall be equal to uninsured motorist coverage less the amount recovered from other motor vehicle liability insurance policies.”
ORS 806.070 has been renumbered several times, but not substantively altered for our purposes, except to increase the minimum amounts of coverage required for damages resulting from “any one accident.”
Former ORS 486.015 (1951) provided, in part:
“(2) ‘Proof of financial responsibility’ means proof of ability to respond in damages for liability, on account of accidents occurring subsequent to the effective date of the proof, arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a vehicle * * * in the amount of
“(a) $5,000 because of bodily injury to or death of any one person in any one accident;
“(b) Subject to that limit for one person, $10,000 because of bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in any one accident; and
“(c) $1,000 because of injury to or destruction of the property of others in any one accident.”
Because no audio recording is available, we quote from the minutes.
Former ORS 736.317 (1959), now codified at ORS 742.504, provided, in part: “No policy insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death * * * arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle * * * shall be issued or delivered in this state * * * unless the policy includes [coverage] * * * for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles * * *. Coverage shall not be less than the amounts or limits prescribed for a policy meeting the requirements of ORS chapter 486.”
Like Oregon, many of the states that adopted the model policy on which Oregon’s UM statute was based also used the limiting phrase “one accident” by reference to their already-existing financial responsibility statutes. See, e.g., Cal Ins Code § 11580.2 (1959) (policies must provide UM coverage “at least equal to financial responsibility requirements”); 111 Comp Stat § 143(a) (1959) (same); Ga Code Ann § 56-407A (1959) (UM policy limited to damages caused by “one accident”). See also James H. Donaldson, Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 34 Ins Counsel J 57, 58 (1967) (discussing particular state provisions); Alan I. Widiss, Perspectives on Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 62 NW U L Rev 497,499 n 10 (1967) (“Insurance companies are now required to offer uninsured motorist coverage in 40 states.”).
Former ORS 743.792 (1967) provided, in part:
“(7)(a) The limit of liability stated in the declarations as applicable to ‘each person’ is the limit of the insurer’s liability for all damages because of bodily injury sustained by one person as the result of any one accident, and, subject to the above provision respecting each person, the limit of liability stated in the declarations as applicable to ‘each accident’ is the total limit of the company’s liability for all damages because of bodily injury sustained by two or more persons as the result of any one accident.”
Former ORS 743.789 (1981), now codified as ORS 742.502, provided, in part, that “Underinsurance coverage shall be equal to uninsured motorist coverage less the amount recovered from other motor vehicle liability insurance policies.”
It is not necessary for us to decide whether the Court of Appeals was correct in its allocation of the burden of proof, and we do not address that question. We reason from the undisputed evidence presented at trial.
Plaintiff asks that we decide the number of accidents that occurred in this case as a matter of law, and the Court of Appeals noted that “the parties agree® that, as framed on this record, the determination of whether plaintiff’s injuries were the result of a single ‘accident’ * * * is purely legal and does not implicate any material factual dispute.”