State v. Krijger, 24 A.3d 42

Defendant Stephen J. Krijger was convicted after a jury trial of threatening in the second degree and breach of the peace in the second degree for statements to Kepple outside the New London Superior Court on July 21, 2008.
Kepple, Waterford town attorney, had represented the town in ongoing zoning-enforcement disputes with the defendant dating back to the 1990s over debris on his 18 Totoket Road property.
The town had obtained injunctive relief and a lien for cleanup costs; Kepple oversaw related contempt filings and enforcement activities through 2008.
During and after a court hearing about fines for a period of noncompliance, the defendant followed Kepple and Glidden, directed obscenities at Kepple, and stated, among other things, that more would happen to Kepple’s son and that he would be there to watch it happen.
Evidence included Kepple’s testimony, Glidden’s observations, and contemporaneous notes describing the defendant’s statements and their context, including the defendant’s anger and facial expressions.
The defense challenged whether the statements were true threats or protected speech, and the trial court provided a jury instruction on true threats.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the statements were true threats not protected by the First Amendment	Krijger’s statements, given their context and impact, conveyed a serious intent to harm and thus were true threats.	The statements were ambiguous, spontaneous, and lacked explicit means or intent to harm, thus protected speech.	True threats; not protected by the First Amendment.
Whether the context and listener reaction support a true-threat finding	Listeners’ reactions and the surrounding circumstances show the statements were interpreted as threats.	Ambiguity and the lack of explicit violence show no true threat, despite reactions.	Context and listener reaction support a true-threat conclusion.
What standard of review applies to First Amendment challenges to true-threat convictions in Connecticut	Independent de novo review is proper to determine whether speech is a true threat.	Lower court findings should govern if not clearly voided by First Amendment protections.	Court conducts independent review of the statements and circumstances to determine true-threat status.
Whether the specific words used, even if ambiguous, can constitute a true threat when directed at a particular individual	Ambiguity does not negate the threat given the targeted recipient and the speaker’s anger.	Ambiguity and lack of explicit imminent harm undermine a true-threat finding.	Ambiguity does not preclude a true-threat finding given the context and targeted recipient.

State v. DeLoreto, 265 Conn. 145 (2003) (establishes the objective true-threat standard in Connecticut)
State v. Cook, 287 Conn. 237 (2008) (protects speech unless it is a true threat; discusses indirect threats)
State v. Gaymon, 96 Conn. App. 244 (2006) (explicit threats accompanied by conduct support conviction)
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (true threats doctrine; effect on fear and disruption)
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (context matters; political hyperbole generally protected)
Claiborne Hardware Co. v. NAACP, 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (emotional rhetoric in civil rights context; protected speech when not inciting action)
DiMartino v. Richens, 263 Conn. 639 (2003) (reiterates independent review for First Amendment questions in Connecticut)