State v. Kelley
167 A.3d 961
| Conn. | 2017Background
- Defendant Kelley was sentenced to 9 years, execution suspended after 4 years, followed by 5 years probation beginning September 19, 2008 (scheduled to expire Sept. 2013).
- In October 2009 Kelley was arrested on drug charges; an arrest warrant for violation of probation under § 53a-32 was issued in December 2009 and a probation violation charge remained pending.
- While the violation was pending, Kelley was arrested on additional charges (robbery, etc.); the probation violation and robbery charges were tried together in May 2014.
- After trial the court found a probation violation, revoked probation, and imposed the previously suspended five-year sentence.
- Kelley argued on appeal that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to revoke probation because the original probation term had expired before the revocation hearing.
- The Appellate Court affirmed; the Supreme Court granted certification and affirmed, holding the issuance of the arrest warrant in 2009 interrupted (tolled) the probation term until final determination in 2014.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Kelley's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did court have subject matter jurisdiction to revoke probation after original expiration date? | Warrant issued pursuant to §53a-32 tolled probation under §53a-31(b), so term had not expired and court retained jurisdiction. | Probation expired as scheduled; therefore court lost jurisdiction and could not revoke probation after expiration. | Held: Court had jurisdiction; issuance of warrant in 2009 interrupted the probation term until final determination in 2014. |
| Does failure to dispose/schedule a violation within 120 days under §53a-32(c) nullify the warrant’s tolling effect? | No; §53a-31(b) tolling is triggered by issuance of warrant and continues until final determination regardless of §53a-32(c) timing compliance. | Yes; because the court did not comply with the 120-day requirement (and no record of good cause), the warrant was no longer "pursuant to §53a-32" and tolling should not apply. | Held: Noncompliance with the 120-day guideline does not affect the statutory interruption; legislative history shows the 120-day provision was intended as a guideline, not a sanction on probation length. |
| What is effect of §53a-31(b) interruption on conditions of probation during pendency? | Interruption tolls running of sentence but defendant must continue to comply with probation conditions per §53a-31(c). | (Not separately argued) | Held: During the interruption the probation conditions remain in force; court may revoke or continue probation upon adjudication. |
| If ambiguity existed, should rule of lenity apply to construe against the state? | Statutes are unambiguous; legislative history confirms intent that 120-day limit not affect tolling. | Any ambiguity should be resolved in defendant’s favor under rule of lenity. | Held: No ambiguity after statutory text and legislative history review; rule of lenity not applicable. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Fowlkes, 283 Conn. 735 (Conn. 2007) (standard of review and distinction between jurisdiction and statutory authority)
- State v. Lutters, 270 Conn. 198 (Conn. 2004) (application of rule of lenity requires remaining ambiguity after statutory construction)
- State v. Kevalis, 313 Conn. 590 (Conn. 2014) (discussed §53a-32 timing in different statutory context; relied on as dictum)
- State v. Smith, 207 Conn. 152 (Conn. 1988) (probation is statutory in nature and governed by statute)
- State v. Kelley, 164 Conn. App. 232 (Conn. App. 2016) (Appellate Court decision affirming tolling effect of warrant under §53a-31(b))