329 Conn. 272
Conn.2018Background
- On Aug. 19, 2011 at Jake's Martini Bar, Brian Jordan struck Erdan Sejdic with a glass, causing a severe head wound; Jordan was charged with second‑degree assault by means of a dangerous instrument.
- Jordan asserted self‑defense at trial; his testimony claimed Sejdic became suddenly aggressive and lunged at him, forcing Jordan to swing the glass to escape.
- The state moved in limine to exclude Sejdic's later convictions (June 2012 and March 2013) for violent or disruptive conduct, arguing they occurred after the charged incident and were dissimilar; the trial court granted the motion.
- At trial, the jury convicted Jordan; the Appellate Court affirmed, holding the exclusion was an abuse of discretion but harmless error.
- The Connecticut Supreme Court granted certification on (1) whether subsequent convictions can be used to show the victim was the initial aggressor and (2) whether exclusion was harmless; it held there is no per se bar to admitting subsequent convictions but affirmed the conviction as any error was not harmful.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Jordan) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether subsequent convictions are per se inadmissible to show victim was initial aggressor | Subsequent convictions may be confusing and causally related to the charged incident (e.g., PTSD), so they should be excluded as a matter of law | Subsequent convictions for similar violent conduct are probative of the victim's violent character and tendency to initiate confrontations and therefore admissible | No per se bar; subsequent convictions may be admissible to show victim initiated the confrontation, subject to relevance and Rule 4‑3 balancing |
| Whether the trial court abused discretion in excluding Sejdic’s subsequent convictions as dissimilar | The convictions were not sufficiently similar (domestic in nature; breach of the peace not necessarily violent) | The subsequent convictions shared motive (jealousy/possessiveness regarding White) and were probative of Sejdic’s propensity to initiate violent confrontations | Appellate Court and Supreme Court: exclusion was an abuse of discretion insofar as some convictions were sufficiently similar, though the record was sparse on specifics |
| Whether exclusion of the convictions was harmful (entitled defendant to new trial) | Any error was harmless because the state’s evidence showed Jordan was initial aggressor and eyewitness testimony contradicted Jordan’s account | Exclusion substantially prejudiced Jordan because the convictions would corroborate his self‑defense claim that Sejdic was prone to initiate violence | Held harmless: the court had fair assurance the verdict was not substantially affected; independent witnesses including bartender and Jordan’s own witness contradicted Jordan’s escalation claim |
| Whether exclusion violated Jordan’s constitutional right to present a defense | State did not argue constitutional violation; trial court preserved other avenues (defendant testified; could have presented reputation/opinion evidence) | Exclusion deprived Jordan of ability to fully present his defense (evidence of victim’s violent character through convictions) | No constitutional violation: right to present a defense is not unlimited; the exclusion was evidentiary and not so restrictive as to deny the defense (other evidence presented) |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Whitford, 260 Conn. 610 (discusses rules permitting victim's violent character evidence after foundation)
- State v. Miranda, 176 Conn. 107 (limits admissible record to specific violent convictions and entrusts probative-value assessment to trial court)
- State v. Abdalaziz, 248 Conn. 430 (trial court discretion in admitting some convictions and excluding others)
- State v. Carter, 228 Conn. 412 (harm from excluding convictions where little other testimony exists)
- United States v. Keiser, 57 F.3d 847 (federal approach: specific-act evidence admissible only if known to defendant to show state of mind)
- Commonwealth v. Christine, 125 A.3d 394 (Pa. Supreme Court: declined to adopt categorical exclusion of subsequent convictions; left open possible admissibility)