State v. Jones
245 Or. App. 186
Or. Ct. App.2011Background
- Officer Parise patrolled a Salem restaurant parking lot known for drug activity and observed Jones in a parked car with lights off.
- Parise approached with spotlight/flashlight and knocked on the window; Jones spoke on a cell phone and was hesitant to respond.
- Parise asked if Jones was on parole or probation; Jones said he was on parole.
- Jones handed an inmate identification card instead of a license; dispatch confirmed parole status, bar prohibition, and license suspension.
- Parise arrested Jones for driving while suspended and an inventory search later yielded drugs leading to the methamphetamine charge.
- The central issue is whether the officer’s questioning and identification request constituted a stop and whether reasonable suspicion existed at that time.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When did the stop become constitutionally significant nullifying or allowing police action? | Jones contends the stop occurred early when Parise shined the light, knocked, and questioned him. | State argues the stop occurred only after dispatch confirmed the information. | Stop occurred after Jones handed ID and the dispatcher was contacted. |
| Whether reasonable suspicion existed when the stop occurred. | Parise’s suspicion that Jones violated parole was based on general experience and not a valid condition. | Parise’s belief could be objectively reasonable given parole restrictions. | Reasonable suspicion did not exist when Parise based it on parole status alone; it arose later when the inmate ID was produced and dispatch was contacted. |
| Was the later stop lawful given the new reasonable suspicion? | The stop was unlawful because the earlier interactions were not a seizure. | Once reasonable suspicion formed, the subsequent stop was lawful. | Once reasonable suspicion formed (upon inmate ID), the subsequent stop was permissible. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Holmes, 311 Or. 400 (1991) (reasonable suspicion standard for seizures under Article I, section 9; connection with criminal activity)
- Ashbaugh, 349 Or. 297 (2010) (stop when show of authority restricts freedom of movement; nonverbal cues matter)
- State v. Rutledge, 243 Or.App. 603 (2011) (distinguishes mere conversation from seizures; shows how stops are analyzed)
- State v. Hall, 339 Or. 7 (2005) (issuance of identification and dispatch run can constitute a stop depending on circumstances)
- State v. Harper, 197 Or.App. 221 (2005) (identification request without show of authority generally not a stop)