Dеfendant appeals from a conviction, after a stipulated facts trial, for possession of methamphetamine, ORS 475.894. She argues that her consent to a search of her handbag was the result of an illegal stop and that the trial court therefore errеd in denying her motion to suppress.
See State v. Hall,
We state the facts, most of which are not disputed, in accordance with the trial court’s explicit and implicit findings.
State v. Ehly,
The deputies issued a citation to defendant, and she was indicted for unlawful possession of methamphetamine. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress on the ground that the deрuties did not stop her; it found that there was nothing about their conduct that would lead a reasonable person to believe that he or she was not free to leave. The court also suggested that Norris had reasonable suspicion that would justify a stop if one hаd occurred. We conclude that Norris stopped defendant when he questioned her about the contents of the purse while exercising control over it and that he did not have reasonable suspicion to justify the stop.
The fundamental distinction between encounters between police and citizens that Oregon courts describe as “mere conversation,” which have no constitutional significance, and those encounters that are seizures, which implicate Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, is that a seizurе involves the imposition, by physical force or some show of authority, of some restraint on the individual’s liberty.
State v. Ashbaugh,
“(a) if a law enforcement officer intentionally and significantly restricts, interferes with, or otherwise deprives an individual of that individual’s liberty or freedom of movement; оr (b) if a reasonable person under the totality of the circumstances would believe that (a) above has occurred.”
*607
Defendant points to three separate events during her encounter with Norris, each of which, she asserts, constituted a stop. She first argues that Norris’s asking for her name and date of birth would lead her, and any reаsonable person, to believe that she was not free to go but was the subject of an investigation. The problem with that argument is that Norris did not ask for defendant’s identification, and there is no evidence indicating that he was using the information she gave him to investigate her, suсh as checking for warrants, things that could have constituted a sufficient show of authority to turn the encounter into a stop.
See, e.g., State v. Ayles,
*608
Defendant next asserts that Norris stopped her when he asked her to get out of the car so that he could search it. So far as the evidence shows, Norris simply needed defendant to move so he could do his job of conducting a consent search of the car. That is no different in principle from a janitor asking a person to move from a portion of a floor that the janitor is sweeping. In neither case is there any implication that the officer or janitor is asserting any authority to limit where the person may go or what the person may do after complying with the request. In
State v. Amaya,
Finally, defendant argues that Norris’s questioning of her about the contents of her purse, including asking whether “there was just a marijuana pipe or a meth pipe in her purse,” was a stop. Defendant contends that the state incorrectly casts the encounter as mere conversation because Norris was accusing her of criminаl activity through his questions and maintained control over her purse. By themselves, the questions Norris posed were insufficient to constitute a stop because, although they were unrelated to the initial traffic stop, they were not and would not appear to a reasonable person as an exercise of authority that interfered with defendant’s freedom of movement. In that respect, this case is like
State v. Jones,
The crucial difference between this case and Jones, however, is that Norris had defendant’s purse in his possession when he asked the crucial question, after defendant had asserted her authority over the purse by telling Norris that he could not look in it. Norris’s control over the purse substantially limited defendant’s freedom to come or go. Norris acted because defendant’s response to his question аbout the ownership of the purse raised his suspicions about its contents. Those suspicions were why he told defendant that he would only give her a citation if the purse contained a marijuana or methamphetamine pipe, and his statement led to the production of the evidence at issue.
The Supreme Court has held that taking a person’s identification to check for warrants and questioning the person about illegal activity constitutes a stop. The court noted that it is doubtful that a person in that position would think that he оr she was free to leave.
State v. Thompkin,
*610
Norris testified that defendant “was nervous and had some anxiety about me looking in her purse, so I figurеd there was probably something inside her purse that she didn’t want me to find.” He also stated that “all of her actions, the whole totality of the stop, and who she’s with” led him to suspect her. For Norris’s concerns to constitute reasonable suspicion that would justify a stop, he had to be able to point to specific and articulable facts, interpreted in the light of the existing circumstances and his experience, that defendant had committed a crime.
Ehly,
The things that Norris mentioned do not meet the
Ehly
test. As a practical matter, defendant’s refusal to permit Norris to searсh her purse may have raised his suspicions, but as a legal matter it can play no role. A person’s assertion of a constitutional right cannot support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
See State v. Foland,
The final question is whether the evidence sought to be suppressed is sufficiently related to the unlawful stop. We conclude that a sufficient connection exists between the illegal stop and defendant’s consent to the search of her purse, under the criteria that the Supreme Court established in
Hall,
Reversed and remanded.
Notes
The trial court did not make a finding regarding where the purse was located during the encounter, but defendant testified without contradiction that Norris picked up her purse. The testimony of the two deputies indicated that Norris had control of the purse as well; Norris was in the midst of his search of the vehicle on the passenger side when he found the purse and then questioned defendant.