Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for delivery of methamphetamine. He argues that the police officer’s questioning that led to the discovery of the drugs was the result of an illegal stop and, for that reason, the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We are therefore called on to determine, first, when the interaction between the arresting officer and defendant became a constitutionally significant seizure and whether, at that point, the police officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. We affirm.
The facts are not disputed; the only issue before us is whether the trial court “applied legal principles correctly to those facts.”
State v. Ehly,
As Parise approached, he saw that defendant was talking on his cell phone. Defendant once or twice looked back at Parise as he approached but otherwise ignored him. Parise knocked on defendant’s car window. Defendant was hesitant to respond to the initial knock, but eventually he opened the door. Parise then asked defendant if he might hang up and talk to him, but “didn’t * * * force him or direct [defendant] to hang up the phone.” Eventually, defendant agreed to talk with the officer.
Defendant told Parise that he had just driven to the restaurant and was about to go inside. Parise immediately asked defendant if he was on parole or probation. Defendant responded that he was on parole. At that point, Parise developed the suspicion that defendant might be in the process of violating the conditions of his parole because, in Parise’s *189 experience, people on probation and parole are often not allowed to enter establishments that serve alcohol.
Parise asked defendant for his identification. Instead of a driver’s license, defendant handed Parise an Oregon State Penitentiary inmate identification card. Without moving away from his position next to defendant by the open car door, Parise radioed defendant’s information to dispatch; dispatch confirmed that defendant was on parole, not allowed to enter bars or consume alcohol, and that his driver’s license was suspended. Parise arrested defendant for driving while suspended, and a subsequent inventory search (not challenged at trial or on appeal) revealed the evidence that led to this drug charge.
Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that the officer seized him without reasonable suspicion. The trial court denied the motion, and defendant was tried on stipulated facts, reserving his right to appeal the court’s decision. This is that appeal.
The underlying rule of law that governs this case is that a law enforcement officer violates a person’s right under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution to be free from unreasonable seizure of his or her person if the officer stops the person without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or arrests him or her — a more significant limitation on the person’s freedom than a stop — without probable cause to believe that criminal activity is afoot.
1
State v. Holmes,
As we recently explained in
State v. Rutledge,
*190 “The fundamental distinction between encounters between police and citizens that Oregon courts describe as ‘mere conversation,’ which have no constitutional significance, and those encounters [including ‘stops’] that are seizures, which implicate Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, is that a seizure involves the imposition, by physical force or some show of authority, of some restraint on the individual’s liberty. State v. Ashbaugh,349 Or 297 , 308-09,244 P3d 360 (2010).”
In. Ashbaugh, the Supreme Court held that a stop occurs
“(a) if a law enforcement officer intentionally and significantly restricts, interferes with, or otherwise deprives an individual of that individual’s liberty or freedom of movement; or (b) if a reasonable person under the totality of the circumstances would believe that (a) above has occurred.”
Applying those principles, defendant contends that he was stopped when the officer, having shined his spotlight into defendant’s car, knocked on his window, asked him to end his phone call and answer questions, and asked him if he was on probation or parole. In the alternative, defendant contends that he was stopped when the officer subsequently asked him for identification or, at the very latest, when the officer, having asked for and obtained defendant’s identification, called it in to dispatch; at that time, defendant would reasonably have believed that he was “the investigatory subject of a pending warrant check” and therefore not free to leave.
State v. Hall,
We disagree with defendant’s primary contention. Perhaps since Holmes, but in any event at least since Ashbaugh, questions from a police officer to a citizen — even questions an ordinary citizen would regard as offensive, such *191 as, “Are you on probation?” or “May I search your purse?” — do not amount to a stop if the officer’s words are conversational in tone and there is no accompanying nonverbal show of authority such as the presence of multiple officers, drawn weapons, or the like:
“Although it is possible to restrict a person’s liberty and freedom of movement by purely verbal means, * * * that is [not] what happened here [when the officer, having been told by the defendant that she was not carrying drugs, asked to search her purse]. Certainly, the content of [the officer’s] questions did not cause defendant to be seized: As we repeatedly have observed, even though [the officer] asked defendant a question that one private citizen ordinarily would not ask another, [the] defendant does not point to anything about [the officer’s] words that would be perceived as ‘show of authority that restricted] her freedom of movement.’ ”
Ashbaugh,
*192
The outcome of this case, then, depends on whether, at that time, the officer had reasonable suspicion. To satisfy the reasonable suspicion requirement, an officer must subjectively believe that the suspected person has
“a
connection with criminal activity,” and that belief must be objectively reasonable.
State v. Cloman,
We agree that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion that defendant was violating his parole or probation. It is true that “reasonable suspicion” is a relatively low barrier. “Certainty about the significance of particular facts is not required for a police officer to hold a reasonable belief that they indicate criminal conduct.”
State v. Briggs,
“The extent to which an officer must explain the basis of his or her ‘training and experience’ knowledge * * * varies from case to case across a broad spectrum. At one extreme is knowledge such as the fact that a person who stole property is likely to keep it at his or her home — knowledge that, in fact, need not be justified by any reference to training and experience. At the other end of the spectrum is knowledge such as, for example, the fact that anhydrous ammonia is a *193 precursor chemical used in the manufacture of methamphetamine and that a brass fitting that has been in contact with that substance will turn blue. Knowledge at that end of the spectrum * * * requires more of a foundation than the bare assertion of training and experience.”
State v. Daniels,
Very shortly thereafter, however, the situation changed. In response to a request for identification, defendant handed the officer an Oregon State Penitentiary inmate identification card. At that point, defendant was behind the wheel of an automobile, albeit a parked one. Parise knew that defendant had driven to the parking lot where he was
*194
located. Parise could reasonably have inferred that, if defendant had possessed a valid driver license, he would have given him that document instead of an inmate identification card.
See, e.g., State v. Cohan,
Thus, the officer had reasonable suspicion in this case when defendant handed him the inmate identification card. The stop occurred an instant or two later, when defendant heard Parise contact dispatch. Because the stop occurred after the development of reasonable suspicion, it was not unlawful, and the court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress.
Affirmed.
Notes
On appeal, defendant also argues that the evidence must be suppressed because it derived from a violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. He did not make that argument before the trial court, so we decline to address it on appeal.
State v. Wyatt,
As Judge De Muniz observed when he was on this court, “Although most people do not feel free to walk around an officer or ignore an officer’s questions, under
Holmes
those feelings do not appear to be relevant in determining whether an objectively reasonable person believes that his or her freedom of movement has been significantly restricted.”
State v. Underhill,
See n 2 above.