246 P.3d 1280
Wash. Ct. App.2011Background
- Jarvis, a special education teacher, was convicted in district court of fourth degree assault for dragging a student across the floor and swinging him into a bathroom during a lockdown drill.
- The drill occurred January 10, 2008; the class had an established procedure to wait in the bathroom during drills, though no written rules existed.
- C.B., a student with Down Syndrome, resisted coming out from under a desk; Jarvis dragged him about 25 feet and then swung him into the bathroom.
- Jarvis was convicted and the superior court affirmed on RALJ review; she sought discretionary review challenging vagueness, sufficiency of evidence, and jury instructions.
- Jarvis proposed jury instruction on consent and a defense of force to prevent danger by a mentally disabled person; the trial court rejected them.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed, addressing vagueness, sufficiency of evidence, and instructional issues.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Vagueness of fourth degree assault statute as applied | Jarvis argues statute is vague in context of facts. | State contends ordinary person would understand prohibited conduct. | Statute not vague under the facts; conduct constitutes assault. |
| Sufficiency of evidence of criminal intent | Jarvis contends no criminal intent shown beyond moving the student. | State argues intent to touch was proven; malicious intent not required. | Sufficient evidence of intentional, harmful or offensive touching; intent to touch suffices. |
| Error in excluding proposed instruction four (consent defense) | Consent defense should negate assault; instruction four was proper. | There was no consent evidence; instruction not supported. | Abuse of discretion to require instruction four; no consent evidence; rejected. |
| Error in excluding proposed instruction seven (defense to prevent danger) | RCW 9A.16.020(6) supports lawful force to prevent danger to disabled person. | No imminent danger present; statute requires imminent danger. | RCW 9A.16.020(6) requires imminent danger; instruction seven rejected. |
Key Cases Cited
- City of Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wash.2d 171 (1990) (due process requires fair warning; vagueness evaluated on facts)
- State v. Sigman, 118 Wash.2d 442 (1992) (case-by-case vagueness analysis for non-First Amendment challenges)
- State v. Thorne, 129 Wash.2d 736 (1996) (statutes presumed constitutional; burden on challenger)
- City of Sumner v. Walsh, 148 Wash.2d 490 (2003) (statutory vagueness standards; standard of proof for vagueness)
- State v. Monschke, 133 Wash.App. 313 (2006) (well-settled common law meaning informs vagueness review)
- State v. Stevens, 158 Wash.2d 304 (2006) (common law definition of assault applied to fourth degree)
- State v. Walden, 67 Wash.App. 891 (1992) (unlawful touching can be charged as assault with criminal intent)
- State v. Garcia, 20 Wash. App. 401 (1978) (touching may be unlawful due to lack of consent or privilege)
- State v. Thomas, 98 Wash.App. 422 (1999) (unlawful touching standard and consent considerations)
- State v. Hall, 104 Wash. App. 56 (2000) (intent to touch sufficient for assault; malicious intent not required)
- State v. Keend, 140 Wash.App. 858 (2007) (criminal intent in assault is intent to commit the act, not malice)
- State v. Penn, 89 Wash.2d 63 (1977) (defense of others requires imminent danger; reasonable belief suffices)