State v. Jahnell Weaver (069185)
219 N.J. 131
| N.J. | 2014Background
- June 26, 2004: At a Camden graduation party an argument between Jahnell Weaver and Edward Williams escalated; five shots were fired, Williams died and Amyr Hill was seriously injured. Witnesses placed Weaver and co-defendant Khalil Bryant at the scene and indicated one of them fired the shots.
- Five months later (Nov. 2004) police recovered the murder weapon at Bryant’s residence in connection with a different shooting in Winslow Township; ballistics matched the Camden weapon. Bryant pled guilty to charges from the Winslow incident.
- In 2005 Bryant told the Camden-investigating officer that he had possessed the gun the night of the Camden shooting and that “someone” (redacted in his statement) gave it to him afterward; pretrial counsel agreed to redact Bryant’s reference to Weaver.
- Weaver’s defense: third-party guilt (Bryant, not Weaver, was the shooter). Weaver sought to introduce Bryant’s later shooting and use of the same gun (reverse 404(b)) and moved to sever trials; the trial court excluded that evidence under Cofield and denied severance.
- At trial the jury heard a redacted version of Bryant’s 2005 statement and other eyewitness testimony; Weaver was convicted on all counts and given a lengthy sentence; Bryant was acquitted of murder but convicted on weapon-related counts. Weaver appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed; the New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Weaver's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of defensive (reverse) 404(b) evidence (Bryant’s later use of the murder weapon) | Evidence was propensity evidence and properly excluded under Cofield | Reverse 404(b) should be judged by simple relevance (not Cofield); evidence tends to exculpate Weaver and was admissible | Court: Reverse 404(b) governed by relevance (N.J.R.E. 401) with Rule 403 balancing; trial court erred in applying Cofield and should have admitted the evidence defensively |
| Severance of joint trial | No prejudice once reverse 404(b) was excluded; joinder appropriate and efficient | Severance required because Weaver’s third-party guilt defense was antagonistic/corely irreconcilable with Bryant’s defense and could not be presented jointly if reverse 404(b) admitted | Court: Because defensive 404(b) evidence should have been admitted, severance should have been granted; denial was erroneous |
| Admission of redacted co‑defendant statement (Bryant’s 2005 statement using “someone”) and Confrontation Clause | Redacted statement was non‑incriminating on its face; admissible; any error harmless given other evidence | Redaction was ineffective once testimony established Bryant received the gun that night; admission violated Weaver’s Sixth Amendment right to confront Bryant | Court: Admission violated confrontation principles (Bruton/Gray). The timing detail eliminated the inferential gap and pointed to Weaver; error was not harmless |
| Cumulative error | Errors harmless individually; conviction should stand | Combined evidentiary & severance errors plus confrontation violation denied a fair trial | Court: Cumulative effect of errors was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; new trial required |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328 (1992) (establishes four‑prong test for prosecution’s 404(b) other‑crimes evidence)
- State v. Garfole, 76 N.J. 445 (1978) (defendant’s defensive use of other‑crimes evidence governed by relevance standard)
- State v. Cook, 179 N.J. 533 (2004) (reaffirming relaxed relevancy standard for reverse 404(b) with Rule 403 balancing)
- Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (co‑defendant’s confession that directly incriminates defendant inadmissible in joint trial)
- Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987) (redaction that removes all references to defendant can avoid Bruton when statement is not incriminating on its face)
- Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185 (1998) (blank spaces or explicit deletions that point to defendant violate Confrontation Clause)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (testimonial hearsay inadmissible against defendant unless declarant testifies or is cross‑examined)
