State v. Hoerle
297 Neb. 840
| Neb. | 2017Background
- Jared S. Hoerle crashed his motorcycle; responding officer observed signs of intoxication and Hoerle admitted drinking. A hospital phlebotomist drew Hoerle’s blood at the officer’s request after a preliminary breath test indicated impairment.
- The officer read the postarrest chemical test advisement, which (incorrectly) told Hoerle that refusal to submit to a chemical blood test was a separate crime; Hoerle cooperated and did not resist the blood draw.
- At trial the parties stipulated the blood alcohol concentration was .195; a jury convicted Hoerle of DUI (enhanced for being .15+ with two priors).
- The day after conviction, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Birchfield v. North Dakota, holding warrantless blood draws incident to arrest are not permitted and questioning the voluntariness of consent given after advisements that refusal is criminal.
- Hoerle moved for a new trial arguing the warrantless blood test was unconstitutional under Birchfield; the district court denied the motion. Hoerle appealed; the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied to pre-Birchfield warrantless blood draws.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Birchfield renders Hoerle’s warrantless blood draw inadmissible and requires a new trial | Hoerle: post-conviction Birchfield establishes the blood draw violated the Fourth Amendment and consent was coerced by the criminal-refusal advisement, so evidence must be excluded | State: officer relied on the statutory advisement and existing practice; admission should stand under the good-faith exception because statute not clearly unconstitutional at the time | Court: Birchfield does not categorically invalidate consent given after a mistaken criminal-refusal advisement; examine totality of circumstances, but here good-faith exception applies to pre-Birchfield draws, so no new trial |
| Whether consent given after an advisement that refusal is a crime is per se involuntary | Hoerle: the advisement coerced consent, making it involuntary under Birchfield | State: consent may be valid; voluntariness requires totality analysis and officers may reasonably rely on statute | Court: voluntariness is determined by totality of circumstances; Birchfield did not create a per se rule that such consent is always involuntary |
| Whether the exclusionary rule must be applied to pre-Birchfield warrantless blood draws obtained pursuant to then-applicable statute | Hoerle: evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be suppressed after Birchfield | State: suppression is unwarranted because officer acted in objectively reasonable reliance on the statute (good-faith exception) | Court: applied good-faith exception—officer’s reliance on statute was objectively reasonable and statute had not been declared unconstitutional at the time |
| Whether suppression would serve the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule | Hoerle: suppression necessary to remedy Fourth Amendment violation and deter future constitutional violations | State: suppressing evidence obtained under objectively reasonable statutory reliance would have minimal deterrent value | Court: suppression would not advance deterrence because officer was enforcing the law as written; exclusionary rule inapplicable under the circumstances |
Key Cases Cited
- Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (U.S. 2016) (warrantless breath tests permissible incident to arrest; warrantless blood tests are not; voluntariness of consent must be assessed under totality of circumstances)
- Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (U.S. 2014) (an officer’s reasonable mistake of law can make police action reasonable under the Fourth Amendment)
- Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (U.S. 1998) (exclusionary rule need not be applied in noncriminal proceedings when deterrence benefits do not outweigh social costs)
- United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (U.S. 1984) (established the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule for reliance on a warrant later found invalid)
- Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (U.S. 1987) (good-faith reliance on a statute later declared unconstitutional may preclude suppression of evidence)
