State v. Hart
144 A.3d 609
| Md. | 2016Background
- Kenneth Hart was tried on four possession/distribution counts; after two days of trial the jury began deliberations and sent a note saying it was split on Count 1 and asked what to do.
- The court informed counsel of the note and attempted to bring Hart (in custody) back; while waiting defense counsel asked for a "preview" of the note and consented to limited inquiry in Hart’s absence.
- Counsel was later informed Hart had been taken to a hospital for a medical emergency; the court nevertheless summoned the jury foreperson, questioned the foreperson in open court, then received a partial verdict finding Hart guilty on three counts.
- The court declared a mistrial sua sponte as to Count 1 (the allegedly deadlocked count). Defense counsel objected to proceeding beyond fact-finding without Hart present.
- The trial court later acknowledged error in accepting the partial verdict in Hart’s absence and ordered a new trial on the convicted counts but denied dismissal of Count 1; the intermediate appellate court reversed and held double jeopardy barred retrial of Count 1. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Hart's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Did Hart have a right to be present when the judge questioned the jury foreperson about the deadlock, and was that right waived by counsel? | The foreperson colloquy was permissible and counsel previewed the note, effectively waiving Hart’s presence. | The colloquy "pertained to the action" under Rule 4-326 and Hart had a right to be present; counsel only consented to a limited factual inquiry, not to further proceedings. | Court: Hart had a right to be present; defense counsel consented only to a limited fact-gathering colloquy and did not waive Hart’s presence for the court’s ultimate response. |
| 2) Did Hart have a right to be present at the declaration of mistrial and, if so, was proceeding harmless error? | The judge acted within discretion because the jury was deadlocked; any absence was harmless. | Hart’s involuntary absence meant Rule 4-231 required his presence; declaring mistrial without him was prejudicial and barred retrial absent manifest necessity. | Court: Hart had a right to be present; proceeding in his involuntary absence without adequate inquiry and without exploring reasonable alternatives was error and not harmless. |
| 3) If the mistrial was erroneous, is retrial barred or should dismissal be denied? | Retrial should be allowed because a genuinely deadlocked jury justified mistrial. | Retrial is barred by double jeopardy because no manifest necessity supported the mistrial declared in Hart’s involuntary absence. | Court: Manifest necessity did not exist under these facts; double jeopardy bars retrial of Count 1. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Harris, 428 Md. 700 (discussing defendant’s right to be present for communications between court and jury)
- Grade v. State, 431 Md. 85 (communications between judge and jury pertaining to action are stages where presence is required)
- Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201 (circumstances where counsel can waive defendant’s right to be present)
- Denicolis v. State, 378 Md. 646 (communications from jury in defendant’s absence presumptively prejudicial absent record showing otherwise)
- Fennell v. State, 431 Md. 500 (manifest necessity analysis for mistrial and need to explore alternatives)
- Cornish v. State, 272 Md. 312 (retrial barred where reasonable alternatives to mistrial existed)
- Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (Supreme Court discussion of "manifest necessity" standard for mistrial)
- Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766 (trial judge’s discretion in mistrial decisions entitled to deference)
