State v. Gonzalez, 214 Conn.App. 511

In October 2017 Gonzalez pleaded guilty and in December 2017 was sentenced to five years incarceration followed by five years of special parole.
Effective October 1, 2018, Public Act 18-63 §2 amended Conn. Gen. Stat. §54-125e(b) to forbid imposing special parole unless the court determines, based on specified factors, that it is necessary to ensure public safety.
In July 2020 Gonzalez filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing §2 of P.A. 18-63 applied retroactively because it was procedural or merely clarified the prior statute.
The trial court denied the motion (Feb. 23, 2021), concluding P.A. 18-63 changed the substantive availability of a punishment and thus did not apply retroactively, relying on Supreme Court precedent and the criminal savings statutes.
On appeal the Appellate Court affirmed, applying its decisions in State v. Omar and State v. Smith and Supreme Court guidance in Kalil/Bischoff: amendments that repeal or replace punishment are presumptively prospective unless the legislature clearly states otherwise.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether §2 of P.A. 18-63 is procedural (thus presumptively retroactive)	State: change is substantive; savings statutes bar retroactivity	Gonzalez: amendment is procedural and therefore applies retroactively	Held: substantive. Omar controls: P.A.18-63 repealed/replaced a punishment; presumption against retroactivity applies and §2’s plain text forbids retroactivity
Whether P.A. 18-63 was intended as a clarification (so retroactive)	State: legislature changed/narrowed the law, not clarified it	Gonzalez: legislative history and amendatory language show clarification	Held: not a clarification. Smith controls: amendment narrowed plain statutory authority and did not merely clarify; not retroactive
Whether Appellate Court should revisit precedent or consider legislative history despite plain text	State: bound by Kalil/Bischoff and savings statutes; plain-text analysis governs	Gonzalez: asks to overrule Smith and apply multifactor/legislative-history test (Estate of Brooks/Evans)	Held: Court declined to revisit Smith; when text is plain, extratextual history is not considered; bound by Supreme Court precedent requiring plain-language analysis

State v. Omar, 209 Conn. App. 283 (Conn. App.) (applied plain-meaning/savings-statute analysis to P.A. 18-63 and held it not retroactive)
State v. Smith, 209 Conn. App. 296 (Conn. App.) (held P.A. 18-63 changed/narrowed §54-125e rather than clarified it)
State v. Bischoff, 337 Conn. 739 (Conn.) (plain-meaning rule governs retroactivity for amendments defining/prescribing punishment)
State v. Kalil, 314 Conn. 529 (Conn.) (criminal savings statutes apply to changes in punishment; presumption against retroactivity)
State v. Nathaniel S., 323 Conn. 290 (Conn.) (procedural/automatic-transfer statute held retroactive; contrasted with P.A. 18-63)
Estate of Brooks v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 325 Conn. 705 (Conn.) (multifactor test for whether an amendment is clarifying)
State v. Evans, 329 Conn. 770 (Conn.) (considered legislative history in a stare decisis context; court distinguished its applicability here)
State v. Victor O., 320 Conn. 239 (Conn.) (describes purpose and nature of special parole)