State v. Gonzales, 150 N.M. 494

Defendant drove drunk on the interstate, sideswiping a car and then rear-ending another with two minors in the back seat; Manuel died at the scene and Deandre was lightly injured.
The grand jury indicted Defendant on two counts of negligent child abuse by endangerment, including one count resulting in death, along with aggravated driving while intoxicated and leaving the scene of an accident.
Defendant moved to dismiss the child abuse charges, arguing the statute cannot criminalize negligent conduct unless a child was in the accused’s vehicle or the accused knew of the child’s presence on the road.
The State argued that criminal negligence under the endangerment statute does not require awareness of a specific child and permits risk to the general public, including children.
The district court held that the statute (30-6-1(D)(1)) requires only that the defendant know or should know the conduct created a substantial or foreseeable risk, not awareness of a particular child, and trial proceeded.
Ultimately, the court reversed some convictions and remanded on the basis of the mental-state requirement and the direction of the risk toward identifiable children; the State’s theory led to a double jeopardy issue regarding vehicular homicide.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does 30-6-1(D)(1) require awareness of a particular child?	State: endangerment liability can arise from public risk; no specific child awareness needed.	Gonzales: must be aware of danger to a particular child when endangering them.	Yes; awareness of a particular child is required.
Must the risk be directed at a child rather than the general public for endangerment?	State: risk to the public suffices if injuries may follow.	Gonzales: risk must be directed at an identifiable child.	Risk must be directed at an identifiable child.
Is the State required to show the defendant knew of the danger to a child to sustain negligent child abuse by endangerment?	State: knowledge of a general risk is enough.	Gonzales: knowledge of a specific child’s danger is required.	Knowledge of a specific child’s danger required.
Does double jeopardy bar retrial for vehicular homicide after reversal on negligent child abuse by endangerment?	State: vehicular homicide is a separate offense; retrial permissible.	Gonzales: if negligent child abuse convictions are reversed, retrial on vehicular homicide is barred.	Double jeopardy bars retrial for vehicular homicide.

Santillanes v. State, 130 N.M. 464 (2001-NMSC-018) (criminal negligence standard for child abuse; must prove negligence to a criminal standard)
Chavez v. State, 146 N.M. 434 (2009-NMSC-035) (factors to assess substantial and foreseeable risk to children; magnitude of risk matters)
Schoonmaker v. State, 143 N.M. 373 (2008-NMSC-010) (criminal negligence requires knowledge or should-know of danger; magnitude of risk as inference)
Trujillo v. State, 132 N.M. 649 (2002-NMCA-100) (endangerment requires placing a child in direct line of danger)
Clemonts v. State, 139 N.M. 147 (2006-NMCA-031) (proximate danger to children must be direct, not merely near a dangerous situation)
State v. Meadors, 134 N.M. 139 (2003-NMSC-020) (cognate lesser-included offense test; strict elements approach)
State v. Reed, 125 N.M. 552 (1998-NMSC-030) (insufficient evidence to prove culpable mental state; offense must be supported by facts)