151 Conn.App. 590
Conn. App. Ct.2014Background
- Gemmell, after years apart, lived with Planeta until 2008; he moved to Texas and reportedly had no key to 45 Maple Street thereafter.
- An April 26, 2010 protective order against Gemmell in favor of Planeta required him to stay away and have no contact.
- On April 29, 2010 Gemmell was caught on surveillance entering 45 Maple Street; on April 30 he confronted Planeta, displayed a gun-like object, and forced her into her apartment.
- A prolonged 911 call and hostage negotiations ensued; Gemmell barricaded the door and was eventually taken into custody with a box cutter found on him.
- Gemmell was convicted after a trial of burglary in the first degree, home invasion, and several companion offenses, and received a 15-year sentence with a 10-year mandatory minimum.
- Gemmell challenged the convictions on multiple constitutional and statutory grounds, including the validity of the protective order, the home invasion charge, and sufficiency of the evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of the protective-order-based convictions | Gemmell argues post-April 30 protections preclude charges. | Gemmell contends the April 26 order is invalid for the April 30 conduct. | Convictions upheld; April 26 order valid evidence supports charge. |
| Constitutional or statutory basis to charge home invasion with protective-order violation | Protective-order violation should not support home invasion charge. | Statutes permit multiple charges from same encounter; home invasion viable. | Valid to convict both; protective order statutes do not bar home invasion. |
| Whether the home invaded was Gemmell's own home | Basement qualifies as home due to homeless status; home invasion not applicable. | Home invaded was Planeta's dwelling; home invasion proper. | Gemmell unlawfully entered Planeta's dwelling; basement not his home negating argument. |
| Application of Salamon to home invasion | Salamon may constrain when intent is merely incidental to another crime. | Salamon controls home invasion if intent to restrain is incidental. | Salamon does not govern home invasion; its gloss not applicable here. |
| Sufficiency of evidence for burglary first degree and home invasion | Evidence insufficient to prove elements beyond reasonable doubt. | Evidence fails to show unlawful entry or intended crimes. | Evidence sufficient; jury could reasonably find guilt beyond reasonable doubt. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Brown, 299 Conn. 640 (2011) (establishes two-step sufficiency review)
- State v. Pommer, 110 Conn. App. 608 (2008) (statutory interpretation framework)
- Battersby v. Battersby, 218 Conn. 467 (1991) (plain meaning governs; avoid reading in ambiguity)
- State v. Miranda, 64 A.3d 1268 (2013) (extratextual evidence not considered when language plain)
- State v. Otto, 43 A.3d 629 (2012) (application of sufficiency standard)
- State v. Russell, 922 A.2d 191 (2007) (credibility determinations bound on appeal)
- State v. Salamon, 949 A.2d 1092 (2008) (distinguishes kidnapping from unlawful restraint; not controlling here)
- State v. Ferris, 81 Conn. 97 (1908) (timing of crime proof relative to information filing)
- State v. Kitchens, 299 Conn. 447 (2011) (charge variance and sufficiency standards)
- State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672 (1992) (preservation and scope of constitutional claims)