State v. Franko, 142 Conn. App. 451

Franko was convicted of kidnapping in the second degree under CT Gen. Stat. § 53a-94(a) after a jury trial.
Franko appeals the trial court’s denial of a motion in limine to exclude prior uncharged misconduct evidence.
The charged conduct occurred November 10, 2008 in Stamford; the victim was forced from the car and transported on the Merritt Parkway toward the defendant’s residence, with physical force and intimidation.
Prior uncharged misconduct included verbal threats, property damage, two instances of sexual assault, and improper access to registration information; the court admitted most of the evidence with a limiting instruction and barred one piece (keying the victim’s son’s car).
The trial court applied the two-part admissibility test under § 4-5(b) and balanced probative value against prejudice, giving limiting instructions to the jury.
The appellate court held the evidence was admissible under § 4-5(b) to prove intent, motive, malice, corroboration, and to complete the story, and that admission was not harmful given the strength of the prosecution’s case.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether prior uncharged misconduct was relevant under § 4-5(b)	State contends evidence showed intent to abduct and corroborated testimony.	Franko argues evidence was irrelevant or speculative and too remote.	Yes, relevant under § 4-5(b) for intent and corroboration.
Whether probative value outweighed prejudicial effect	Evidence aided establishing intent, motive, malice, corroboration, and story completeness.	Prejudicial impact was excessive and inflamed the jury.	Court did not abuse discretion; probative value outweighed prejudice.
Whether admission was harmless error if improper	Error was non-constitutional; state case supported by strong evidence.	Admission biased the jury against Franko.	Harmless error; substantial evidence supported conviction notwithstanding the admission.
Whether limiting instructions mitigated prejudice	Limiting instructions and final charge curtailed improper use.	Instructions could not cure prejudice from sexual misconduct evidence.	Limiting instructions were adequate to mitigate prejudice.
Whether the court properly balanced and applied § 4-5(b) in a sexual misconduct context	Prior sexual misconduct can be probative to intent where same victim and circumstances.	Sexual misconduct evidence is highly prejudicial and should be tightly constrained.	Court properly applied balancing; did not abuse discretion.

State v. Johnson, 65 Conn. App. 470 (2001) (abuse of discretion standard for evidentiary rulings; standard of review)
State v. Randolph, 284 Conn. 328 (2007) (two-part admissibility test for prior misconduct; relevance and balancing)
State v. Orr, 291 Conn. 642 (2009) (harmful error standard; determining prejudice)
State v. Lynch, 123 Conn. App. 479 (2010) (limiting instructions; prejudice mitigation on appeal)
State v. Irizarry, 95 Conn. App. 224 (2006) (prior acts of misconduct illuminate intent; same-victim reasoning)
State v. Pascual, 305 Conn. 82 (2012) (intent and victim-state-of-mind evidence in kidnapping context)
State v. DeJesus, 288 Conn. 418 (2008) (sexual misconduct evidence in admissibility context)
State v. Sawyer, 279 Conn. 331 (2006) (harmless error standard for improper admission of evidence)
State v. Ellis, 270 Conn. 337 (2004) (sexual misconduct evidence; varying degrees of brutality; prejudice concerns)
State v. Romero, 269 Conn. 481 (2004) (prejudicial value vs. probative value in prior misconduct context)
State v. Messam, 108 Conn. App. 744 (2008) (limiting instruction and prejudice considerations)
State v. Pereira, 113 Conn. App. 705 (2009) (limiting instructions; probative value vs. prejudice)