State v. Evans, 506 P.3d 819

Background:

Wayne Evans was convicted in 1996 of multiple felonies (30 convictions, 24 labeled dangerous) and received aggravated sentences after the judge found aggravating factors, including prior felonies.
Direct appeal and multiple prior PCR/habeas proceedings were unsuccessful; convictions and aggravated sentences were affirmed and became final.
In 2020 Evans filed a successive Rule 32 PCR asserting: (a) right to jury findings for aggravators (Apprendi/Blakely), (b) statutes unconstitutionally vague (citing Rehaif/Davis), (c) ineffective assistance of prior PCR counsel (invoking Martinez), and (d) actual innocence; he also sought an evidentiary hearing.
The superior court dismissed the petition as precluded or not colorable; it found no new substantive rule applicable and that Evans failed to allege new, clear-and-convincing evidence of innocence.
On review the Court of Appeals held that new rules are retroactive on collateral review only if substantive, a sentence is unauthorized under Rule 32.1(c) only if substantively defective at the time of the offense, and denied relief.

Issues:

Issue	Evans's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether Apprendi/Blakely entitlement to jury findings for aggravators allows Rule 32.1(g) relief	Apprendi/Blakely create a new rule requiring jury findings for aggravators that should overturn his aggravated sentences	Apprendi/Blakely announced procedural rules and do not apply retroactively on collateral review to final cases	Court: Apprendi/Blakely are procedural, not substantive; not retroactive under Rule 32.1(g); claim fails
Whether Evans can challenge sentence as "not authorized by law" under Rule 32.1(c)	The sentencing enhancements were unconstitutional because a judge, not a jury, found aggravating facts so the sentence is unauthorized	The substantive law at the time (A.R.S. §13-702(B)) authorized judge-found aggravation; Rule 32.1(c) examines law in effect when the offense occurred	Court: Apply law at time of offense; sentence was authorized then, so no Rule 32.1(c) relief
Whether Rehaif/Davis create a new constitutional rule rendering Arizona’s dangerous-crime statute vague (Rule 32.1(g))	Rehaif/Davis show statutory interpretation/vagueness problems that would overturn convictions/sentences	Rehaif/Davis interpreted federal statutes and do not announce new constitutional rules applicable to state convictions	Court: Those cases did not establish a new constitutional rule; Evans’s Rule 32.1(g) claim fails
Whether Martinez or other new authority allows him to raise new ineffective-assistance claims against trial/appellate counsel	Martinez and later changes excuse prior default due to alleged ineffective PCR counsel, permitting new IAC claims	Martinez governs federal habeas; Arizona Rule 32 and case law do not permit using Martinez to revive precluded state claims or to attack initial PCR counsel for non-pleading defendants	Court: Martinez does not help in state PCR; IAC claims precluded and, on the merits, Evans cannot show prejudice regarding prior-felony findings
Whether Evans stated a free-standing actual-innocence claim and was entitled to an evidentiary hearing	Evans argues record shows insufficient evidence of gun possession for most counts and thus raises actual innocence under Rule 32.1(h)	No new evidence was presented; Rule 32.1(h) requires new facts showing no reasonable juror would convict; claims are record-based and precluded	Court: Evans offered only record arguments, not new clear-and-convincing evidence; claim not colorable and no evidentiary hearing required

Key Cases Cited

Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987) (new rules apply to cases on direct review)
Edwards v. Vannoy, 141 S. Ct. 1547 (2021) (new procedural rules do not apply retroactively on collateral review)
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (distinguishing substantive vs. procedural enhancement rules)
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (Apprendi line; held procedural limits on judge-found enhancements)
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998) (new substantive rules may be applied retroactively on collateral review)
State v. Towery, 204 Ariz. 386 (2003) (describing finality and Rule 32.1(g) retroactivity analysis under Arizona law)
Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) (cause to excuse procedural default in federal habeas due to ineffective initial-review collateral counsel)
Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019) (interpreting mens rea requirement of a federal firearms statute)
Davis v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (holding a federal residual clause void for vagueness)
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995) (standard for gateway actual-innocence claims in federal habeas)
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) (actual innocence alone is not an independent ground for federal habeas relief)