State v. Dinkins
2012 WI 24
Wis.2012Background
- Dinkins, a homeless ex-offender, was required to register as a sex offender under Wis. Stat. § 301.45(2)(a) and to provide the address where he would be residing at least 10 days before release.
- Dinkins could not obtain housing prior to discharge, and DOC staff documented his residence as 'To be determined by Agent' on the registration form.
- DOC staff attempted to locate housing and involved family, but Dinkins remained unable to secure a residence; the DOC considered GPS monitoring and potential housing placement.
- The State charged Dinkins with knowingly failing to provide the address, a Class H felony under § 301.45(6)(a)1, after he could not supply a residence.
- The circuit court found Dinkins attempted to comply but could not, and convicted him; the court anticipated DOC placement for housing.
- The court of appeals reversed, prompting the Wisconsin Supreme Court to address whether homelessness can excuse criminal liability and how 'unable' is to be interpreted under § 301.45(2).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether homelessness exempts registration liability | State: homelessness is not a defense and registrants must provide some location. | Dinkins argued the statute requires criminal liability only when information exists; homelessness prevents providing an address. | Homeless registrants are not exempt, but liability depends on whether information exists. |
| Meaning of 'unable' in § 301.45(2)(d) and (2)(f) | State: registrants not able to provide information even if homeless can be addressed via alternative procedures. | Dinkins contends 'unable' should excuse criminal liability when information does not exist despite reasonable efforts. | A registrant is 'unable' when the information does not exist despite reasonable efforts; liability should not attach in that scenario. |
| Whether listing a park bench suffices as 'residing' information | State: a registrant can comply by noting any address where he will reside, including on-street locations. | Dinkins and the State cannot rely on such a guess; it undermines the statute's purpose. | Listing a park bench or on-street location is not sufficient; it would undermine public safety and monitoring purposes. |
| Whether the DOC must seek assistance under § 301.45(2)(d) and (9) before prosecution | State: 'may' seek assistance; prosecution permitted without it. | Dinkins argues the DOC had a duty to request assistance to develop a plan before prosecuting. | The statute envisions mandatory assistance to promote monitoring; improper interpretation led to wrongful conviction. |
| Proper application of § 301.45(6) given the context of homelessness | State: statutory language criminalizes failure to provide information; context does not immunize homeless individuals. | Dinkins argues the context requires avoidance of criminal liability when address information cannot be provided. | Applying the statute contextually, a homeless offender who cannot provide an address due to nonexistence cannot be convicted under § 301.45(6). |
Key Cases Cited
- Kalal v. State, 271 Wis. 2d 633 (2004) (statutory interpretation: plain meaning and context; avoid absurd results)
- State v. Leitner, 253 Wis.2d 449 (2002) (interpretation of statutory context and purpose)
- State v. Bollig, 232 Wis.2d 561 (2000) (registration purpose; public safety and monitoring)
- State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 271 Wis.2d 633 (2004) (modern standard for statutory interpretation)
- State v. Richards, 309 Wis.2d 541 (2008) (standard of review and statutory interpretation principles)