Richards v. Badger Mutual InsuranceRichards v. Badger Mutual Insurance
Lead Opinion
¶ 1. We are asked to review a decision of the court of appeals that reversed the circuit court's decision,
¶ 2. We conclude as follows: (1)
¶ 3. An ill-conceived idea between teenagers to "get some beer" one evening culminated in tragedy the next morning when an intoxicated Robert Zimmerlee, 19, failed to stop for a stop sign and smashed into the driver's side of Christopher Richards' vehicle, killing him instantly. Chris' wife, Michelle Richards (Richards), sought to recover damages. She initially pursued a negligence claim against Zimmerlee and his insurer. The parties settled on a Pierringer
¶ 4. The parties have stipulated to the facts in this case. Events leading to the accident unfolded the prior evening, when Schrimpf and Zimmerlee decided to "go get some beer." Schrimpf was employed at a West Allis restaurant, and he said that one of his co-workers, Pratchet, would be able to purchase the beer for them because she was of-age.
¶ 5. Zimmerlee and Schrimpf drove together to Schrimpf s employer, where Pratchet was working that
¶ 6. From the restaurant, Zimmerlee, Schrimpf, and Pratchet traveled together to a nearby grocer, where Pratchet purchased an 18-pack of beer for Zim-merlee and Schrimpf with money Zimmerlee provided. The two dropped Pratchet off at a bus stop and Zim-merlee and Schrimpf went their separate ways for several hours, with the beer remaining in Zimmerlee's car.
¶ 7. Later that evening, Schrimpf and Zimmerlee reconnected, and with 18-pack in tow, arrived at Spencer's party between 12 midnight and 1:00 a.m. While Schrimpf drank "some" of the beer, Zimmerlee consumed "maybe half' of the 18 beers.
¶ 8. At approximately 7:30 a.m., the duo left Spencer's party. Schrimpf sat in the passenger seat, and Zimmerlee took the wheel of his car. They proceeded only half a block before colliding with Chris Richards' vehicle.
¶ 9. Two days before trial was set to commence, the parties entered into a settlement agreement. By the terms of that settlement agreement, the jury trial was waived and the parties agreed to allow the circuit judge to decide the question of whether Zimmerlee, Schrimpf, and Pratchet acted in accordance with a common scheme or plan that caused damage to Chris and Michelle Richards. The circuit court answered that question in the affirmative and held the parties jointly and severally liable for Richards' damages.
¶ 10. There is no dispute that Zimmerlee was negligent in the operation of his vehicle and that his
¶ 11. The parties also agreed to the apportionment of causal negligence among them: Zimmerlee at 72 percent; Schrimpf at 14 percent; and Pratchet at 14 percent. The parties stipulated to Richards' damages and that Schrimpfs and Pratchet's combined causal negligence resulted in $500,000 of the total damages, or $250,000 each. Accordingly, the parties agreed that Richards was to be paid $250,000, as Schrimpfs share of the total damages, regardless of the outcome of this lawsuit. If the final court decision in this case concluded that the parties did not act in accordance with a common scheme or plan that resulted in Richards' damages, Richards would not receive the 14 percent of the damages that remained unpaid. If, however, it was concluded that the parties did act in accordance with such common scheme or plan that caused Richards' damages, then Schrimpf and Pratchet would be jointly and severally liable to Richards and, therefore, Schrimpf, and thereby Badger Mutual, would be required to pay Richards an additional $250,000 to cover the remainder of the damages.
¶ 12. What the parties dispute is whether the foregoing stipulated facts give rise to joint and several liability under
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
¶ 14. The outcome of this case hinges on the interpretation and application of
B. The Parties' Positions
¶ 15. Both parties posit that
1. Richards' position
¶ 16. Richards argues that the parties agree that Zimmerlee, Schrimpf, and Pratchet acted in accordance with a common scheme or plan to purchase beer. She
¶ 17. Furthermore, Richards argues that cannons of statutory interpretation preclude this court's consideration of the title of
2. Badger Mutual's position
¶ 18. In response, Badger Mutual argues that, while Richards correctly asserts that the statute is unambiguous, Richards nevertheless misapprehends the statute's meaning. First, Badger Mutual contends that "Concerted action" is the title for the theory of liability described in
¶ 19. Second, Badger Mutual acknowledges that while Schrimpfs conduct was a substantial factor in causing the accident, it did not also constitute concerted action, as is required before it falls within
C. Interpretation of
1. General principles
¶ 20. Statutory interpretation "begins with the language of the statute." State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County,
¶ 21. However, if a statute is "capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more senses[,]" then the statute is ambiguous. Id., ¶ 47. When a statute is ambiguous, we may resort to extrinsic sources, such as legislative history, to assist our understanding of the statute's meaning. Id., ¶ 48.
2. Statutory history
¶ 22. A review of statutory history is part of a plain meaning analysis. Id., ¶ 69. Statutory history
¶ 23. The early common law rule of contributory negligence that existed prior to 1931, when the predecessor to
¶ 24. In 1931, the legislature established statutory comparative negligence.
¶ 26. The current version of
Comparative negligence. .. . The negligence of the plaintiff shall be measured separately against the negligence of each person found to be causally negligent. The liability of each person found to be causally negligent whose percentage of causal negligence is less than51% is limited to the percentage of the total causal negligence attributed to that person. A person found to be causally negligent whose percentage of causal negligence is 51% or more shall be jointly and severally liable for the damages allowed.
Under revised subsection (1), a contributorily negligent plaintiff is precluded from recovering more of his or her damages from a tortfeasor than the tortfeasor's causal negligence bears to the total causal negligence. Id. For those tortfeasors, the common law rule of joint and several liability is abrogated. See id. Only when a tortfeasor is at least 51 percent causally negligent will the tortfeasor be jointly and severally liable for all damages attributed to all tortfeasors in the comparisons made under subsection (1). Therefore, in many cases involving joint tortfeasors and a contributorily negligent plaintiff, there no longer is joint and several liability.
¶ 27. In amending
Concerted action. Notwithstanding sub. (1), if 2 or more parties act in accordance with a common scheme or plan, those parties are jointly and severally liable for all damages resulting from that action, except as provided in s. 895.043(5).8
Subsection (2), which the legislature chose to title "Concerted action," retains the common law rule of joint and several liability, if "that action" is taken in accordance with a common scheme or plan resulting in
3. Ambiguity
¶ 28. Richards urges us to interpret
¶ 29. When confronted with an ambiguous statute, we may resort to extrinsic sources to help uncover the statute's meaning. Id., ¶ 48. The legislative history now available that relates to the creation of subsection (2) of
This bill modifies the comparative negligence system in several ways. The bill requires that the negligence of the plaintiff be measured separately against each of the joint tort-feasors. Under this bill, a joint tort-feasor's liability is limited to the percentage of the total causal negligence attributed to that party.
The bill specifies that the changes in the rule of joint and several liability do not apply to parties whose concerted action results in damages ...
Drafting File for 1995 Wis. Act 17, Analysis by the Legislative Reference Bureau of 1995 S.B. 11, Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wis. The LRB's analysis supports our conclusion that the 1995 changes to
¶ 30. The title is not part of a statute according to
4. Wisconsin appellate decisions
¶ 31. Four published appellate opinions offer potential guidance on the meaning of
¶ 32. Danks provides only the briefest interpretation of
¶ 33. Danks had several theories under which he attempted to impose liability on Stock Building Supply. One of those theories was concerted action liability, in which Danks contended that the lifting of the truss was undertaken in accordance with a common scheme or plan pursuant to
¶ 34. However, Danks does interpret
Subsection (2) simply modifies subsection (1) of the statute to provide that all defendants who are legally responsible for causing a plaintiffs damages, and who acted in concert in so doing, are jointly and severally liable for the plaintiffs damages, irrespective of whether a given defendant's apportioned causal negligence is less than 51%.
Id. Danks continues to conclude that "
¶ 35. Collins precedes Danks and the 1995 revisions of
The concerted action theory of liability rests upon the principle that "those who, in pursuance of a common plan or design to commit a tortious act, actively take part in it, or further it by cooperation or request, or who lend aid or encouragement to the wrongdoer, or ratify and adopt his acts done for their benefit, are equally liable with him. Express agreement is not necessary, and all that is required is that there be a tacit understanding."
Id. (quoting W. Prosser, Handbook of The Law of Torts § 46, at 292 (4th ed. 1971)). However, we declined to apply the concerted action theory when the plaintiff, who sought damages from former manufacturers of the drug diethylstilbestrol (DES) that caused an aggressive form of cervical cancer, could not identify the specific manufacturer of the DES that was taken by her mother. Id. at 186.
¶ 36. Collins explained that the concerted action theory required an agreement among the parties. Id. at 185. The allegation of Collins was that the "defendants failed to adequately test [DES] or to give sufficient
¶ 37. Collins is helpful to our analysis. For example, the specificity of the subject matter of the common plan in Collins that we concluded was necessary to support the concerted action theory of liability is important to our consideration of the specificity of the subject matter of the common plan at issue in the case before us. That is, the action that harmed Collins must have been that which was undertaken to further the drug companies' agreement. Id. In addition, Collins equated "concerted action," the title of
¶ 38. Bruttig also tackled the topic of concerted action. There the plaintiff, Brian Bruttig who was a minor, and two friends, also minors, engaged in a game of "snowmobile tag." Brian was injured and recovery was denied because his liability was greater than that of either of the other two tortfeasors. Bruttig,
¶ 39. The court of appeals noted that the concerted action theory of liability has never been "explicitly adopted" in Wisconsin. Id. at 280. It also noted that Brian had not raised this theory of liability in the circuit court. Therefore, it rejected his argument to apply it on appeal. Id. at 281.
¶ 40. Bruttig's discussion is helpful, as it reviews Brian's claim that the three boys "acted in concert," which terms are similar to the title of subsection (2): "Concerted action." Bruttig acknowledges that the theory that Brian is proffering is "a separate theory of liability, that of 'concerted action.'" Id. at 280. This is significant because
¶ 41. Our review of Wisconsin case law that touches on the concerted action theory of liability concludes with Ogle. In Ogle, we held that both negligent participants in a "drag race" were equally liable for a fatal collision resulting from their negligence, even though only one of the tortfeasors struck a third automobile causing injury. Ogle,
¶ 42. In Ogle, two cars were racing at a high rate of speed in the same direction down a highway, when the lead car collided with the plaintiffs car. Id. at
We think when there is an understanding to reach a common destination and in doing so illegal speed is used and the cars are driven so closely together as to be practically in tandem, or to constitute a unit, that we have a situation of mutual stimulation where the negligence of each participant is so related to the negligence of the other participants that the participants should each be chargeable with the causal negligence of the other as to speed and their percentage of causal negligence should be equal.
Id. at 135. The mutual agreement to use excessive speed to reach an agreed upon destination formed the basis for the tortfeasors' concerted action. Id.
¶ 43. This court went on to explain in Ogle that the usual rule of apportioning causal negligence between tortfeasors whose negligence combined or concurred in causing injury does not apply with "mutual fault" for the injury that occurred. Id. Rather, the tortfeasors in Ogle each assumed the fault of the other and causal negligence was apportioned equally between them. Id. Badger Mutual argues that the concept of equal fault for tortfeasors in concerted actions is significant to the case before us because the parties have agreed to apportioned causal negligence. Richards maintains it has no relevancy.
5. Learned treatises
¶ 44. Because discussions of the concerted action theory of liability in Professor Prosser's The Law of Torts, as well as those provided by The Restatement (Second) of Torts, are so prominent in the cases that discuss the concerted action theory of liability, we
The original meaning.. . was that of vicarious liability for concerted action. All persons who acted in concert to commit a trespass, in pursuance of a common design, were held liable for the entire result. In such a case there was a common purpose, with mutual aid in carrying it out; in short, there was a joint enterprise, so that "all coming to do an unlawful act, and of one party, the act of one is the act of all of the same party being present." Each was therefore liable for the entire damage done .... [SJince each was liable for all, the jury would not be permitted to apportion the damages.
W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts § 46, at 322-23 (5th ed. 1984) (quoted citations omitted). This historic framework for concerted action is helpful to our understanding of the mutuality of agreement that is necessary in order to have a common scheme or plan under the concerted action theory of liability, as well as to understanding the statutory terms used to express the concerted action theory of liability.
¶ 45. Section 876 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is also helpful. It provides:
Persons Acting in Concert
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he
(a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common design with him, or
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.
Comment on Clause (a): Parties are acting in concert when they act in accordance with an agreement to cooperate in a particular line of conduct or to accomplish a particular result. The agreement need not be expressed in words and may be implied and understood to exist from the conduct itself. Whenever two or more persons commit tortious acts in concert, each becomes subject to liability for the acts of the others, as well as for his own acts. The theory of the early common law was that there was a mutual agency of each to act for the others, which made all liable for the tortious acts of any one.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876, at 315-16 (1979). The Comment to Clause (a) is particularly helpful in its description of mutual agency and that it was mutual agency that made all the actors liable for one another's tortious acts.
¶ 46. From our review of Wisconsin cases and learned treatises, wherein principles of concerted action are discussed, terms similar to those in
¶ 47. Our conclusion that
6. Application of
¶ 48. There are two possible scenarios under the stipulated facts and the arguments made by Richards wherein she seeks to hold Schrimpf jointly and severally liable under
¶ 49. Concerted action liability is a separate theory of liability that does not apply to all who are proved to be causally negligent. Danks,
¶ 51. In regard to the actions of Zimmerlee, Schrimpf, and Pratchet, it is undisputed that they agreed to purchase beer. When Schrimpf asked Pratchet to purchase beer and Zimmerlee drove her to the grocery and gave her the money that she used to purchase the beer, they acted "in accordance with a common scheme or plan." Their procurement of beer was tortious.
¶ 52. In regard to concluding that there was concerted action between Zimmerlee and Schrimpf result
¶ 53.' In addition, pursuant to the parties' stipulation, Zimmerlee was 72 percent causally negligent in the death of Chris Richards; Schrimpf was 14 percent causally negligent, and Pratchet was 14 percent causally negligent. The apportioned negligence here reflects Schrimpfs and Pratchet's respective several liability. However, with a concerted action theory of liability, each party assumes the causal negligence of the other so that all are equally liable. See Ogle,
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 55. We conclude as follows: (1)
By the Court. — The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Notes
The Honorable Patricia D. McMahon of Milwaukee County presiding.
AJI further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2005-06 version, unless otherwise noted.
Pierringer v. Hoger,
The parties stipulated that Richards' total damages equal $1,785,714.29.
Wisconsin Stat. § 895.043(5) provides: "The rule of joint and several liability does not apply to punitive damages."
The amicus brief of Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers cites Fuchsgruber v. Custom Accessories, Inc.,
Badger Mutual's position is similar to that of the court of appeals, which concluded that Wis. Stat;
The understanding of concerted action liability as explained by Wisconsin appellate courts is consistent with the discussions by New York appellate courts. For example, Blakeslee v. Wadsworth,
Wisconsin Civil Jury Instruction 1740 quotes § 876 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as well as the "Comment to Clause (a)" of that section. Moreover, the instruction quotes Collins v. Eli Lilly Co.,
Schrimpfs involvement with Zimmerlee after the parties purchased the beer resembles the involvement of the defendants in Blakeslee. There, the drivers of two vehicles alternately changed lanes on a highway, and the rear driver crashed after dipping his tires onto the right-hand shoulder of the highway. Blakeslee,
Dissenting Opinion
¶ 56. (dissenting). The issue presented is whether the defendants
¶ 57. I agree with Judge Fine's short, simple and cogent dissent in the court of appeals. Judge Fine wrote that
¶ 58. I agree with Judge Fine that the court of appeals' majority opinion "overly complicated a simple matter by attempting to read the tea leaves of cases and concepts that are not on point.. . ,"
¶ 59. The plain language of
(2) Concerted action. Notwithstanding sub. (1), if 2 or more parties act in accordance with a common scheme or plan, those parties are jointly and severally liable for all damages resulting from that action, except as provided in s. 895.043(5).
¶ 60. The parties, the circuit court, and the majority opinion
¶ 61. The parties, the circuit court, and the majority opinion
¶ 62. Under these circumstances, the plain language of
¶ 63. The majority opinion errs, as Judge Fine stated, in concluding that the question whether a common scheme or plan has resulted in damages for purposes of joint and several liability under
¶ 64. The end! No more need be said.
¶ 65. I write more, however, because in addition to ignoring the text of the statute, the majority opinion rests, as Judge Fine recognizes, on "concepts that are not on point." The majority opinion errs by listening to the siren song of concerted action. The majority opinion errs by applying the common law doctrine of "concerted action" in a context in which it does not apply. The concept of concerted action in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 and in the cases (upon which the majority opinion relies) is not on point in interpreting and applying
¶ 66. Concerted action in the Restatement and in the cases is a substantive rule of tort liability to determine which of multiple actors are causally negligent and liable to an injured plaintiff. Concerted action under the Restatement and in these cases relates to a theory of liability.
¶ 68. The majority opinion compounds its mistake of applying the substantive doctrine of concerted action by treating the doctrine as one departing from Wisconsin's law of causation. According to the majority
¶ 69. The majority opinion declares that for purposes of joint and several liability under
¶ 70. The majority opinion's reasoning is explained in a simple way in the third-party brief of the Wisconsin Insurance Alliance and Property Casualty
¶ 71. I do not know on what basis the majority opinion determines that the common-law doctrine of concerted action (or
¶ 73. Several factors support the position I espouse.
¶ 74. First, the text of
¶ 75. Wisconsin Stat.
¶ 76. The phrase "concerted action" does not appear in the text of
¶ 77.
(1) Comparative negligence. Contributory negligence does not bar recovery in an action by any person or the person's legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property, if that negligence was not greater than the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the person recovering. The negligence of the plaintiff shall be measured separately against the negligence of each person found to be causally negligent. The liability of each person found to be causally negligent whose percentage of causal negligence is less than 51% islimited to the percentage of the total causal negligence attributed to that person. A person found to be causally negligent whose percentage of causal negligence is 51% or more shall be jointly and severally liable for the damages allowed.
(2) Concerted action. Notwithstanding sub. (1), if 2 or more parties act in accordance with a common scheme or plan, those parties are jointly and severally liable for all damages resulting from that action, except as provided in s. 895.043(5).
¶ 78. As I see it,
¶ 79. Second, the court of appeals in Danks v. Stock Building Supply, Inc.,
Wisconsin Stat.§ 895.045(1) sets forth Wisconsin's law of comparative negligence, specifying when a negligent plaintiff may recover from a negligent defendant. It also spells out Wisconsin law regarding joint and several liability among defendants, specifying when a given defendant may become liable for all damages assessed against multiple tortfeasors. Thus§ 895.045(2) applies only after a judge or jury has determined, under applicable substantive law, that more than one tortfeasor is liable in some measure to the plaintiff. Subsection (2) simply modifies subsection (1) of the statute to provide that all defendants who are legally responsible for causing a plaintiffs damages, and who acted in concert in so doing, are jointly and severally liable for the plaintiffs ■damages, irrespective of whether a given defendant’s apportioned causal negligence is less than 51%.
¶ 80. Third, other states have similarly interpreted "concerted action" in joint and several liability statutes. The North Dakota Supreme Court, for example, held that its joint and several liability statute with a special provision for "concerted action" "does not create an independent basis of liability, rather it deals with the allocation of damages among those already at fault."
¶ 81. Fourth, my interpretation of
When persons are liable because they acted in concert, all persons are jointly and severally liable for the share of comparative responsibility assigned to each person engaged in concerted activity.
¶ 82. Comment a explains that § 15 applies when the "governing law determines that concerted activity took place and that the tortious acts of one or more of the participants in the concerted activity was a legal cause of the plaintiffs indivisible injury."
¶ 84. For the reasons set forth, I dissent.
¶ 85. I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH BRADLEY and LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR. join this opinion.
Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co.,
See majority op., ¶ 51.
See majority op., ¶ 10.
Wisconsin Stat. § 125.035(4)(a) provides in full as follows:
In this subsection, "provider" means a person, including a licensee or permittee, who procures alcohol beverages for or sells, dispenses or gives away alcohol beverages to an underage person in violation of s. 125.07(l)(a).
Schrimpf and Pratchet's act of procurement was proscribed by
When a person is a "provider" for purposes of
See majority op., ¶ 11.
The parties stipulated that the plaintiffs total damages were $1,785,714.29. The parties further stipulated that the underage driver-defendant's share of the causal negligence was 72 percent, Schrimpfs share was 14 percent, and Pratchet's share was 14 percent.
The plaintiff has settled all claims against the driver, recovering $1,285,714.29 and satisfying 72 percent of the plaintiffs damages. The plaintiff has recovered $250,000 (that is, 14 percent of her total damages) from Schrimpf. The plaintiff seeks in the current action to recover $250,000 from Schrimpf for the remaining 14 percent causal negligence attributable to Pratchet.
Compare majority op., ¶ 11 (conceding that Schrimpf and Pratchet's negligent act of procuring alcohol for the underage driver resulted in 28 percent of damages to the plaintiff for purposes of liability to the plaintiff) with majority op., ¶ 54 (concluding that Schrimpf and Pratchet's procurement of alcohol for the underage driver did not result in damages to the plaintiff for purposes of
Section 876 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1979) is a specific application of the rule stated in § 875 of the Restatement, which provides as follows:
Each of two or more persons whose tortious conduct is a legal cause of a single and indivisible harm to the injured party is subject to liability to the injured party for the entire harm.
Comment c explains that § 875 is consistent with the rules of causation in negligence; any one of a number of persons whose tortious conduct is a substantial factor in causing harm is liable for the harm in the absence of a superseding cause.
Section 876 of the Restatement provides in relevant part as follows:
For'harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he ... does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common design with him....
The Wisconsin cases upon which the majority relies similarly treat the common law doctrine of "concerted action" as a rule to determine causal negligence. See Bruttig v. Olsen,
The test of cause in Wisconsin is whether the defendant's negligence was a substantial factor in producing the injury. It need not he the sole factor or the primary factor, only a 'substantial factor.' The phrase 'substantial factor' denotes that the defendant's conduct has such an effect in producing the harm as to lead the trier of fact, as a reasonable person, to regard it as a cause, using that word in the popular sense. There may be several substantial factors contributing to the same result. Clark v. Leisure Vehicles, Inc.,
Non-party Brief of Wisconsin Insurance Alliance & Property Casualty Insurance Association of America at 5.
See majority op., ¶ 51.
Several states apparently have adopted the concept of "concerted action” as an exception to the modification of joint and several liability. Richard W Wright, Allocating Liability Among Multiple Responsible Causes: A Principled Defense of Joint and Several Liability for Actual Harm, and Risk Exposure, 21 U. C. Davis L. Rev. 1141, 1168 (1987-88). See, e.g.,
See Hurt v. Freeland,
Hurt v. Freeland,
North Dakota has a statute similar to
When two or more parties found to have contributed to the injury, the liability of each party is several only, and is not joint, and each party is liable only for the amount of damages attributable to the percentage of fault of that party, except that any persons who act in concert in committing a tortious act or aid or encourage the act, or ratifies or adopts the act for their benefit, are jointly liable for all damages attributable to their combined percentage of fault. Under this section, fault includes negligence, malpractice, absolute liability, dram shop liability, failure to warn, reckless or willful conduct, assumption of risk, misuse of product, failure to avoid injury, and product liability, including product liability involving negligence or strict liability or breach of warranty for product defect.
Restatement (Third) of the Law of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 15, cmt. a at 129 (2000).
Id.
Restatement (Third) of the Law of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 15, reporters' note at 131 (2000).
Restatement (Third) of the Law of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 15 at 129 (2000).
The Iowa statute provided that joint and several liability attaches only to those persons, excluding the plaintiff, who are found 50 percent or more at fault. The statute was silent about concerted action.