State v. Daniel W., 180 Conn. App. 76

Background

Defendant Daniel W. was convicted after a jury trial of multiple counts of first‑degree sexual assault, fourth‑degree sexual assault, risk of injury to a child, conspiracy, and attempt charges based on long‑running sexual abuse of his sister‑in‑law’s daughter (A) beginning when she was seven and continuing until about age twelve.
A regularly stayed overnight at the defendant’s home; many assaults occurred while she was sleeping in a room with the defendant’s daughter present; some incidents involved the defendant’s wife J participating or encouraging.
After the defendant’s arrest for abusing another girl (C), A disclosed to a church youth‑group mentor/social worker (Williams) in 2014; Williams reported to DCF and police.
At trial the state introduced: (a) testimony from C about separate uncharged abuse (propensity evidence), (b) Williams’ testimony both as a constancy‑of‑accusation witness and as an expert on delayed disclosure, and (c) three letters from the defendant to J that the jury could read as corroborating admissions.
The trial court admitted C’s testimony under the DeJesus propensity exception, allowed Williams to testify as an expert on delayed disclosure, and the jury found the defendant guilty; the defendant appealed arguing improper admission of uncharged misconduct, improper expert testimony, and prosecutorial improprieties at trial/closing.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admissibility of uncharged sexual‑misconduct evidence (C) under DeJesus / Conn. Code Evid. §4‑5(b)	State: C’s testimony was not too remote, involved similar initial advances (overnight guest, touched vagina under/over clothes while sleeping, possible photos), and victims were similarly situated (access via J/M, similar ages); probative value outweighed prejudice.	Defendant: Abuse of A was more severe/frequent than C; dissimilarity and undue prejudice outweighed probative value.	Affirmed: court did not abuse discretion — incidents sufficiently similar in initial conduct, victims similarly situated, timing proximate, and testimony not unduly prejudicial.
Permitting Williams (youth mentor/social worker) to testify about delayed disclosure as an expert after she gave constancy testimony	State: Williams had relevant education (BA, MSW), training as mandated reporter, and practical experience (13–14 disclosures) — qualified to explain why children delay reporting.	Defendant: Williams was unqualified (limited experience and no prior expert designation) and her expert testimony impermissibly exceeded constancy‑of‑accusation scope.	Mixed: appellate court declined to review the constancy‑scope claim as unpreserved; on qualifications, affirmed — trial court reasonably found Williams qualified and the testimony admissible.
Prosecutorial improprieties in cross‑examination and closing (shifting burden / implying defendant must explain accusers’ motives)	State: Cross and argument were proper efforts to undermine defendant credibility; trial court instructions corrected any confusion; strong corroborating evidence reduced prejudice.	Defendant: Prosecutor’s questions and remarks suggested the defendant had burden to explain why A and C would lie, diluting state’s proof requirement.	Affirmed: even assuming some impropriety, it was not severe or frequent, defense did not object, jury instructions cured potential confusion, and the state’s case was strong so defendant was not deprived of a fair trial.

Key Cases Cited

State v. DeJesus, 288 Conn. 418 (Conn. 2008) (recognizing limited propensity exception for evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct and setting admissibility criteria)
State v. Troupe, 237 Conn. 284 (Conn. 1996) (limits on constancy‑of‑accusation testimony)
State v. Acosta, 326 Conn. 405 (Conn. 2017) (uncharged misconduct timeliness and similarity analysis)
State v. Antonaras, 137 Conn. App. 703 (Conn. App. 2012) (analyzing initial advances and rebuffed victims in similarity inquiry)
State v. Gupta, 297 Conn. 211 (Conn. 2010) (consolidation/admissibility issues where one complainant’s misconduct differed materially)