State v. Crawley, 2012 Minn. LEXIS 388

Melissa Crawley was convicted under Minn.Stat. § 609.505, subd. 2 for informing a police officer that another officer had committed police misconduct, knowing the information was false.
The charged conduct involved Crawley telling a Winona County sergeant that an officer forged her signature on a medical release form.
The court of appeals reversed, holding § 609.505, subd. 2 unconstitutional for punishing false police-misconduct speech only when it is critical of police.
The Minnesota Supreme Court granted review to determine whether the statute is a permissible content- or viewpoint-based regulation of speech and whether it can be narrowed to reach only unprotected speech.
The Court ultimately narrows the statute to reach only defamatory, unprotected speech and upholds its constitutionality under RA.V. exceptions, but remands for a new trial because Crawley was convicted before the narrowing construction.
The majority conducts a de novo statutory construction and applies the RA.V. framework to assess content discrimination within unprotected speech.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is § 609.505(2) a content-based regulation of speech?	Crawley argues it targets speech based on content/viewpoint.	State contends it is a content-neutral time/place/manner restriction.	Yes; it is content-based.
Can § 609.505(2) be narrowly construed to reach only unprotected defamation speech?	Narrowing is not allowed to salvage the statute.	Narrowing to defamation preserves constitutionality.	Yes; narrowing to defamation preserves constitutionality.
Is the statute's application viewpoint-discriminatory under the First Amendment?	Discriminates against anti-government (viewpoint) speech.	Not viewpoint-discriminatory under the narrowed defamation scope.	Not viewpoint-discriminatory under the narrowing construction.
Does § 609.505(2), as narrowed, survive strict scrutiny under RA.V. exceptions and First Amendment standards?	Viewpoint and content-based restrictions within unprotected categories are impermissible.	RA.V. exceptions validate targeted regulation; secondary effects justify the law.	Yes; the narrowed statute satisfies RA.V. exceptions and is constitutional.
Should Crawley receive a new trial on remand due to pre-narrowing conviction?	Conviction premised on un-narrowed statute.	Remand for new trial consistent with narrowing.	Remanded for new trial under narrowed construction.

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (U.S. 1992) (content distinctions within unprotected categories with RA.V. exceptions)
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (U.S. 1942) (fighting words narrowly drawn to immediate offense)
United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (U.S. 2010) (traditional unprotected speech categories; limits on handling)
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (U.S. 1964) (defamation standard for public officials; actual malice concept)
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (U.S. 1974) (defamation standards and breathing room for speech)
United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (U.S. 2012) (knowing falsehoods are not categorically unprotected; speech protection considerations)
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (U.S. 1986) (secondary effects doctrine for content-based regulation tied to public-order effects)
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (U.S. 1973) (overbreadth doctrine and limiting construction)
S.L.J. v. Minnesota, 263 N.W.2d 412 (Minn. 1978) (state court articulation of fighting-words narrowing approach)