State v. Coffelt, 1 CA-CR 16-0272

Defendant Charles Coffelt convicted of possession of methamphetamine for sale (Class 2), possession of drug paraphernalia (Class 6), and possession of marijuana (Class 6).
At sentencing the State introduced a certified judgment showing a 1991 manslaughter conviction (charged from 1990) as a historical prior felony; the minute entry labeled that prior manslaughter as non-dangerous.
The sentencing judge, who had presided over Coffelt's 1991 trial, relied on his recollection of trial facts (alleged shooting) to reclassify the manslaughter as a "dangerous" offense and sentenced Coffelt as a category-two repetitive offender to a mitigated nine-year term for the methamphetamine conviction.
Coffelt appealed, arguing (1) the court erred in treating the 1991 manslaughter as a dangerous offense absent a jury finding and (2) the judge should have recused sua sponte because he had presided over the earlier trial.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions but concluded the judge erred in recharacterizing the prior conviction as dangerous (requiring vacatur of the sentence) and rejected Coffelt's recusal claim.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the 1991 manslaughter conviction could be treated as a "dangerous" historical prior felony for enhanced sentencing without a jury finding	State: The 1991 manslaughter qualified as dangerous based on the facts (use/exhibition of a firearm) and supported sentencing as a category-two offender	Coffelt: The prior conviction was recorded as non-dangerous and, because manslaughter did not require proof of dangerousness, it could not be reclassified by the judge's recollection absent a jury finding or admission	Court: Reclassification was error; manslaughter/indictment did not necessarily establish dangerousness and the judge could not rely on personal recollection to elevate the prior conviction without a jury finding; sentence vacated and remanded for resentencing under proper statutory range
Whether the judge should have sua sponte recused for cause because he presided over the prior trial	Coffelt: Prior involvement created a reasonable question about the judge's impartiality requiring recusal	State: No timely Rule 10.1 motion; the judge's conduct did not demonstrate bias requiring sua sponte recusal	Court: No fundamental error; adverse rulings and sentencing comments alone do not establish bias; judge did not improperly refuse to consider mitigation; no recusal required

Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (constitutional rule that facts increasing penalty must be found by a jury)
State v. Derello, 199 Ariz. 435 (App. 2001) (standard of review for prior-conviction classification involves mixed question of law and fact)
State v. Joyner, 215 Ariz. 134 (App. 2007) (dangerousness must be submitted to jury unless inherent in charged offense)
State v. Parker, 128 Ariz. 97 (1981) (judicial finding of dangerousness requires jury or admission)
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (judicial rulings ordinarily do not establish bias)
State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561 (2005) (standard for fundamental error review)