OPINION
¶ 1 A jury found Ramon Joyner guilty of possession of a narcotic drug, possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and resisting arrest. It also found that he had prior convictions for armed robbery and attempted armed robbery. He was sentenced to a mitigated, enhanced, eight-year term of imprisonment for possession of a narcotic drug and presumptive, enhanced, 3.75-year terms of imprisonment for each of the other convictions, all to be served concurrently.
¶2 On appeal, Joyner maintains his sentences for the possession convictions are illegal. He argues that, as a matter of law, his prior convictions for armed robbery and attempted armed robbery do not fall within the statutory definition of “violent crime” in A.R.S. § 13-604.04, and he is therefore eligible for mandatory probation. See A.R.S. § 13-901.01. On this record, we agree.
Procedural Background
¶ 3 The state alleged in Joyner’s indictment that he was “ineligible for probation pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-901.01” based on his past convictions for attempted armed robbery and armed robbery, “which was a violent crime.” After the guilty verdicts were rendered, the state presented the jury with evidence of Joyner’s prior criminal convictions, including charging documents, plea agreements, sentencing minute entries, and presentence reports for both offenses. The jury found Joyner had been previously convicted of armed robbery and attempted armed robbery, which were identified in the verdict forms by specific cause numbers.
¶ 4 At sentencing, neither the parties nor the trial court addressed the potential application of § 13-901.01, and the presentenee report simply noted, “[n]o probation available.” 1 The court “reaffirm[edj” the convictions and the jury’s findings that Joyner had *137 two prior felony convictions before imposing sentence.
Standard of Review
¶ 5 Because Joyner did not raise the issues he raises now at sentencing, we review his claims only for fundamental error.
See State v. Henderson,
Sentencing Pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-901.01
¶ 6 Section 13-901.01 is the codification of a voter initiative commonly known as Proposition 200 that “significantly changed the legal consequences for defendants convicted of certain nonviolent, first- and second-time drug offenses.”
2
State v. Rodriguez,
Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, any person who is convicted of the personal possession or use of a controlled substance or drug paraphernalia is eligible for probation. The court shall suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the person on probation.
¶ 7 There are limited exceptions to this mandatory probation requirement, however. A court is not required to place a defendant on probation when a defendant has been convicted for a third time of personal possession of a controlled substance,
see
§ 13 — 901.01(H)(1);
State v. Guillory,
¶8 Here, the trial court implicitly found Joyner was ineligible for mandatory probation under § 13-901.01(B) (and, by reference, § 13-604.04) because of Joyner’s prior convictions for armed robbery and attempted armed robbery. Citing
State v. Crawford,
Determination of Violent Nature of Prior Conviction
a. Based on Statutory Definition
¶ 9 Division One of this court has held that a court may consider the statutory definition of an offense to discern whether the elements required for conviction necessarily establish the commission of a violent crime under § 13-901.0KB).
Cherry,
¶ 10 In this case, by contrast, Joyner is correct that his prior conviction for armed robbery, as defined in § 13-1904, does not necessarily establish he used a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument because armed robbery may be committed with a simulated deadly weapon — and a “simulated deadly weapon” may be neither deadly nor dangerous.
See, e.g., State v. Bousley,
b. Consideration of Underlying Facts Prohibited
¶ 11 In
Cherry,
Division One of this court suggested, in dictum, that analyzing the statutory elements of an offense is the only means of concluding a prior offense was violent as defined in §§ 13-901.01 and 13-604.04, reasoning that “whether [a] prior conviction is a violent crime for purposes of A.R.S. § 13-901.01 is a question of law for the trial judge.”
Analysis of the prior conviction “is purely a legal question; it does not depend on the merits of alternative versions of the facts.” [State v.] Ault, 157 Ariz. [516,] 520, 759 P.2d [1320,] 1324 [ (1988) ]. The scope of a trial court’s review of the prior conviction is limited, however, to the statutory elements of the offense, without consideration of other evidence.
¶ 12 As the court noted in
Cherry,
in other contexts in which sentencing statutes require a trial court to determine the nature of a prior conviction, the court may consider only the statutory elements necessary for the conviction.
5
Id.
This limitation “guarantees that a criminal defendant’s due process rights will not be violated,”
State v. Schaaf,
¶ 13 For example, to find that a defendant had been previously convicted of a felony “involving the use or threat of violence on another person,” an aggravating circumstance found in former A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(2), 1988 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 155, § 1, the court must have concluded that “the particular crime [could have been] perpetrated only with the use or threat of violence----If ‘the defendant [could] commit or be convicted of the crime without the use or threat of violence, the prior conviction c[ould] not qualify as a statutory aggravating circumstance’ ” under that statute.
Schaaf,
¶ 14 Similarly, a sentencing court may not consider the facts underlying a foreign prior conviction to determine whether it would constitute a felony in Arizona under A.R.S. § 13-604(N),
see, e.g., Crawford,
¶ 15 We see no reason why this same analysis should not apply here. We recognize, as the state suggests, that it is unlikely the voters who enacted Proposition 200 intended that a defendant with prior convictions for armed robbery and attempted armed robbery be eligible for mandatory probation.
6
But our supreme court has emphasized that this rule — that the nature of a prior conviction may only be determined by the statutory elements of the offense — is required “[t]o protect ‘a criminal defendant’s due process rights.’ ”
Roque,
c. Evidence that Prior Conviction Was for Violent Offense
¶ 16 Nonetheless, the state argues that the trial court was entitled to consider documents related to Joyner’s prior convictions without subjecting Joyner to “ ‘what amounts to a second trial’ on a prior conviction ... because the relevant evidence is already in the record.” None of the Arizona cases construing §§ 13-604 or 13-703 has addressed whether documents associated with a plea of guilty may be used to delimit the nature of a prior conviction when, as here, an offense has been broadly defined by statute. But some have addressed whether a court may rely on charging documents or jury instructions that narrow the elements of an offense in such a way that, even if the statutory definition is broad, a court can still be certain that the fact of conviction necessarily established every element required to prove the sentencing factor. In
State v. Thompson,
¶ 17 Most recently, our supreme court addressed limitations on evidence a court may consider to determine whether a prior conviction in another jurisdiction involves “ ‘an offense which if committed within this state would be punishable as a felony’ ” for purposes of sentence enhancement pursuant to § 13-604(N) and (W).
Crawford,
¶ 18 In
Crawford,
the state relied on
Thompson
in arguing that the trial court could have considered Crawford’s federal indictment for possessing a credit card stolen from the United States mail to establish conduct punishable as a felony in Arizona.
¶ 19 The supreme court emphasized the general rule that a sentencing court must focus “solely on the elements of the foreign statute,”
Crawford,
¶ 20 The court in
Crawford
noted that the “cases interpreting § 13-604 are consistent with our case law involving the use of foreign convictions in capital sentencing.”
Id.
¶ 8,
citing Roque,
¶21 In contrast, some capital eases addressing whether a defendant had prior Arizona convictions for crimes involving violence, an aggravating factor under former § 13-703(F)(2), suggest that jury instructions and forms of verdict may be considered-not as extrinsic evidence of the facts underlying the conviction, but as intrinsic evidence of what the jury necessarily decided by its verdict. For example, in
State v. Walden,
¶ 22 In
State v. McKinney,
[Defendant]’s prior conviction is not disqualified merely because the statutory definition of the crime permits it to be committed with a reckless mental state. It is disqualified because the instructions and the non-specific form of verdict ... did not narrow the mental state of the charge____ Had [defendant’s instructions or form of verdict specified that the mental state for his second degree murder conviction was *142 based on either an intentional or knowing mens rea, the conviction would have qualified, regardless of the fact that the crime’s statutory definition allows for conviction under a lesser mental state.
Id.; see also State v. Schackart,
¶ 23 Federal courts have faced similar evidentiary issues when required to determine whether a defendant’s prior state conviction warrants sentence enhancement pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).
See, e.g., Taylor v. United, States,
¶ 24 Relevant to our discussion in this case, the Supreme Court has recently clarified this analysis of federal law and has extended its application to prior state convictions arising out of bench trials and guilty pleas.
Shepard v. United States,
analogs to jury instructions^] ... a bench-trial judge’s formal rulings of law and findings of fact, and in pleaded cases[,] ... the statement of factual basis for the charge, shown by a transcript of plea colloquy or by written plea agreement presented to the court, or by a record of comparable findings of fact adopted by the defendant upon entering the plea.
Id.
at 20,
¶25 We conclude the reasoning of the Supreme Court in
Shepard
may be applicable to cases involving prior Arizona convictions. Although its adoption would be an extension of current Arizona law, it is consistent with
McKinney
and
Walden
and the underlying rule for determining the nature of prior Arizona convictions: Recognizing that “Evidence of a prior conviction is reliable, the
*143
defendant having had his trial and exercised his full panoply of rights which accompany his conviction,”
Gillies,
¶ 26 We need not decide this issue today, however. Even if
Walden’s
rule permitting consideration of jury instructions to narrow a statutory definition were clearly applicable to a determination of whether prior convictions were for violent crimes under §§ 13-901.01 and 13-604.04, and even if that rule were extended to allow similar review, in determining the existence of prior convictions resulting from bench trials or pleas of guilty, of only those “conclusive records made or used in adjudicating guilt,”
Shepard,
¶ 27 First, the charging documents that led to Joyner’s prior convictions, although referring to the use of a gun, are not reliable evidence of the elements established by his convictions because they were not incorporated by reference in the judgments of conviction.
Cf. Thompson,
¶ 28 The other documentary evidence suggested by the state, including the release papers and presentence reports prepared for Joyner’s prior convictions, although suggestive of the facts underlying his prior crimes, do not prove what statutory elements were established by the judgments of conviction. Nor is the sentencing court’s direction in the armed robbery sentencing minute entry that Joyner “forfeit the firearm related to this cause” the kind of conclusive record that would reliably narrow the basis for Joyner’s armed robbery conviction. In addition, transcripts of Joyner’s plea colloquys for the prior convictions were not provided to the trial court and are not included in the record on appeal.
¶ 29 Thus, the state failed to establish that Joyner has a prior conviction for a violent crime under § 13-901.01(B). Accordingly, Joyner was entitled to suspension of the imposition of sentence and placement on mandatory probation for his possession offenses.
11
See
§ 13-901.01(A). Because this provision is mandatory, Joyner’s prison sen-
*144
tenees are illegal,
see State v. Carbajal,
d. Prejudice
¶ 30 The state asserts Joyner cannot establish the prejudice required by
State v. Henderson,
¶ 31 To establish that a fundamental error is also prejudicial, a defendant must show that, but for the error, a reasonable fact-finder “could have reached a different result.”
Id.
¶ 27,
¶ 32 On this record, the trial court erred by finding that Joyner had a prior conviction for a violent crime. But for this error, Joyner would have been placed on probation for the possession convictions. Instead, he was sentenced to an eight-year prison term and two, concurrent, 3.75-year prison terms. Joyner has shown prejudice.
Reliance on Prior Convictions for Enhanced Sentence
¶ 33 Joyner also argues that none of his convictions should have resulted in enhanced prison terms because neither the judge nor the jury expressly found that his prior convictions constitute historical prior felony convictions under former A.R.S. § 13-604(V)(2), now (W)(2). See 2003 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 11, § 1; 2005 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 188, § 1. We find no prejudicial error in the trial court’s reliance on Joyner’s prior convictions to enhance his sentence for resisting arrest. Although Joyner is correct that the verdict forms for the prior convictions did not include the offense dates, the verdicts specifically identified the county in which the convictions were entered and the cause number of each conviction. Certified copies of the conviction records for those cause numbers were admitted into evidence and established that Joyner’s prior offenses were committed in 2000 and led to two convictions, one for armed robbery, a class two felony, and another for attempted armed robbery, a class three felony. Joyner never challenged the admission or veracity of these documents. We disagree with Joyner’s assertion that the jury was required to expressly find the prior convictions constituted historical prior felony convictions under § 13-604(W)(2). As Joyner notes, § 13-604(P) provides that only a trial court may find that prior convictions constitute historical prior felony convictions. That determination requires the court to apply the statutory provisions to the facts of the prior convictions. Joyner’s prior convictions unequivocally fall within the provisions of § 13-604(W)(2)(b). Joyner was therefore correctly sentenced on his conviction for resisting arrest pursuant to § 13-604(C). We find no fundamental error in this sentence.
Conclusion
¶ 34 For the reasons stated, we affirm Joyner’s convictions and his sentence for resisting arrest, but vacate his sentences for possession of a narcotic drug, possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia and remand the case to the trial court for resentencing on those convictions.
Notes
. Although Joyner had argued in a sentencing memorandum that “on the current state of the record probation is still mandatory ... [because] the jury never made any finding with respect to the 'violent' nature” of his prior convictions, he appears to have abandoned this argument at the sentencing hearing. Moreover, Joyner never raised the argument he now makes on appeal: that, as a matter of law and statutory definition, a conviction for armed robbery cannot constitute a conviction for a "violent crime” as defined in A.R.S. § 13-604.04(B).
. The initiative was titled "Drug Medicalization, Prevention, and Control Act of 1996.” 1997 Ariz. Sess. Laws, p. 2895.
. Section 13-1904, A.R.S., provides:
A. A person commits armed robbery if, in the course of committing robbery as defined in § 13-1902, such person or an accomplice:
1. Is armed with a deadly weapon or a simulated deadly weapon; or .
2. Uses or threatens to use a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument or a simulated deadly weapon.
Section 13-1902(A), A.R.S., provides:
A person commits robbery if in the course of taking any property of another from his person or immediate presence and against his will, such person threatens or uses force against any person with intent either to coerce surrender of property or to prevent resistance to such person taking or retaining property.
'Deadly weapon’ means anything designed for lethal use, including a firearm,” A.R.S. § 13-105(13), and " ‘[d]angerous instrument' means anything that under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used or threatened to be used is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury,” § 13-105(11).
. We are constrained by the plain language of §§ 13-604.04 and 13-1904. Using other definitions, robbery and armed robbery have been “repeatedly found [to be] ... crime[s] of violence.”
State v. Lee,
. Because § 13-604.04 calls for a conclusion about the nature of a prior offense, we distinguish it from sentencing factors that are established by mere proof that a prior conviction exists and liken it to those recidivist sentencing factors that require some additional analysis.
Compare, e.g.,
A.R.S. § 13 — 703(F)(2) (prior conviction for enumerated "serious offense”)
with
former § 13-703(F)(2), 1988 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 155, § 1 (prior felony "involving the use or threat of violence on another person”);
see also State
v.
Heath,
. In fact, Division One of this court has also assumed robbery is among the violent crimes that exclude a defendant from the benefits of mandatory probation under Proposition 200.
Gray v. Irwin,
. In light of this holding, we do not address Joyner’s alternative argument that he is entitled to a jury trial on the question.
.
State v. Hannah,
.
Schackart; State v. McKinney,
. The tide of Joyner's armed robbery information stated that the offense was a dangerous felony, but the information did not include allegations of dangerousness pursuant to § 13-604. If the dangerous nature of the armed robbery had been properly alleged and proved and ultimately incorporated in the judgment of conviction for that offense, the court could have relied on the judgment because, “[a]lthough ‘dangerous’ and ‘violent’ are separate concepts, they share a similar definition."
State v. Benak,
. We reject the state’s suggestion that, under A.R.S. § 13-702(C)(11), "a court may take into account all the defendant’s criminal activity and history in determining sentences, even if the defendant has not been convicted or charged for that conduct.” The trial court did not aggravate Joyner’s sentences pursuant to § 13-702. To find a defendant ineligible for mandatory probation under § 13-901.01(B), a court must find the defendant has a prior conviction or is currently under indictment for a violent crime as defined in § 13-604.04.
State v. Gomez,