State v. Carter
100 N.E.3d 1215
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Defendant Demetrius H. Carter was convicted of rape (first-degree), three counts of kidnapping (first-degree), and two counts of gross sexual imposition (fourth-degree) based on his daughter B.C.’s testimony about multiple incidents of unwanted sexual contact.
- B.C. disclosed several incidents where she awoke to Carter touching and pressing against her at various family residences; she later sent a text to her mother prompting a report to police.
- B.C. was interviewed by a Department of Children and Family Services social worker (Hennessey) and examined by a certified pediatric nurse practitioner/SANE (Loyke) at the Cleveland Care Clinic.
- At trial Hennessey testified she made referrals based on B.C.’s "credible, consistent disclosures;" Loyke testified she believed B.C.’s disclosure and recommended counseling despite a normal medical exam.
- Carter appealed, raising six assignments of error; the appellate court found the third assignment (improper witness opinion on victim credibility) dispositive and reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Carter's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether testimony expressing belief in the victim’s disclosure was admissible | Expert witnesses may describe disclosures and factors relevant to referrals and treatment; such testimony assists factfinder | Testimony by Hennessey and Loyke that disclosures were "credible" or that they "believed" the victim improperly bolstered credibility and invaded the jury’s role | Hennessey’s procedural/testimony was admissible as treatment/referral and under Evid.R.703/803(4); Loyke’s explicit statement that she "believed" the disclosure was improper and prejudicial; reversal and new trial ordered |
| Whether the improper testimony was harmless error | The victim testified and was cross-examined; some corroboration existed (referrals, normal exam) | The case was a credibility contest hinging on victim testimony; Loyke’s opinion was not merely cumulative and materially bolstered credibility | Error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because Loyke’s belief statement materially impacted credibility and no substantial medical corroboration existed |
| Standard for admitting expert/lay testimony about victim statements | Expert may describe patterns, symptoms, or factors relevant to diagnosis/treatment and may assist evaluation of disclosure | Expert may not testify to the ultimate issue of veracity; only the factfinder may assess credibility | Court reaffirmed limits: experts can assist but not opine on witness veracity (Boston rule) |
| Remedy when expert impermissibly opines on credibility | Any error can be harmless if overwhelming corroborative evidence exists | If not harmless, conviction must be reversed and remanded for new trial | Because factors for harmlessness were not met, conviction reversed and remanded |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Boston, 46 Ohio St.3d 108 (1989) (expert testimony may not express opinion on veracity of a child declarant)
- State v. Stowers, 81 Ohio St.3d 260 (1998) (experts may give testimony that assists factfinder in assessing child’s veracity without directly opining on truthfulness)
- State v. Maupin, 42 Ohio St.2d 473 (1975) (trial court discretion in qualifying expert witnesses)
- Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217 (1983) (abuse of discretion standard for appellate review)
- State v. Lytle, 48 Ohio St.2d 391 (1976) (harmless-error standard: prosecution must prove error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt)
- State v. Brown, 65 Ohio St.3d 483 (1992) (no reasonable possibility that unlawful testimony contributed to conviction means error is harmless)
- State v. Eastham, 39 Ohio St.3d 307 (1988) (impermissible expert credibility testimony infringes jury role)