State v. Canton
2013 UT 44
Utah2013Background
- In April 2007 Reinaldo Canton (New Mexico resident) was arrested in Utah after arranging to meet an undercover agent posing as a 15‑year‑old; federal charges under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) followed.
- A federal magistrate released Canton and allowed him to return to New Mexico to await federal trial; Canton cooperated with investigators and made several Utah appearances for federal proceedings.
- Canton suffered a serious medical event and the federal prosecution was dismissed without prejudice in May 2009.
- In June 2009 Utah charged Canton with state enticement of a minor (Utah Code § 76‑4‑401) based on the same 2007 conduct.
- Canton moved to dismiss under Utah’s two‑year criminal statute of limitations (Utah Code § 76‑1‑302), arguing the tolling provision (§ 76‑1‑304(1)) should not apply because he was still “legally present” in Utah during the federal proceedings; he alternatively raised a Utah Constitution (Art. I, § 24) uniform‑operation challenge.
- The district court denied dismissal; Canton entered a conditional guilty plea preserving the tolling/constitutional issues and appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Canton) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning of “out of the state” in the criminal tolling statute (§ 76‑1‑304(1)) | “Out of the state” means physical absence from Utah’s territorial boundaries; physical presence in another state tolls limitations. | A defendant is not “out of the state” if still subject to Utah’s legal authority (i.e., cooperating with federal authorities and appearing in federal proceedings)—a concept of “legal presence.” | The Court held the phrase refers to physical territorial absence; Canton’s “legal presence” theory rejected. |
| Incorporation of a legal term‑of‑art (civil‑law precedents) to avoid tolling | Tolling language is territorial; precedents interpreting civil tolling in narrow statutory contexts do not create a broad “legal presence” term of art that applies here. | Relies on civil‑tolling cases (Snyder, Lund) to argue legal presence/susceptibility to service avoid tolling. | The Court held prior civil cases were narrowly grounded (Nonresident Motor Vehicle Act) and do not create a general legal‑presence exception; physical absence controls. |
| Constitutionality under Utah Constitution Art. I § 24 (uniform operation) | The statute’s classification (those who leave vs. those who remain) is rationally related to legitimate objectives; uniformly applied to the class. | Applying tolling to out‑of‑state but cooperating defendants is overbroad and denies uniform operation; the statute should distinguish compliant vs. non‑compliant absentees. | The Court rejected the uniform‑operation challenge: Canton failed to show an impermissible classification; rational‑basis review applies and the classification is constitutional. |
Key Cases Cited
- Olseth v. Larsen, 158 P.3d 532 (Utah 2007) (civil‑tolling precedent: tolling applies to out‑of‑state defendants unless statutory agent for service exists)
- Snyder v. Clune, 390 P.2d 915 (Utah 1964) (interpreting civil tolling in light of Nonresident Motor Vehicle Act)
- Lund v. Hall, 938 P.2d 285 (Utah 1997) (civil tolling analysis tied to statutory agent/service context)
- FCC v. AT&T, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177 (U.S. 2011) (textual interpretation principle: words together may assume more particular meaning)
- VCS, Inc. v. Utah Cmty. Bank, 293 P.3d 290 (Utah 2012) (legislative purpose often balances multiple objectives; statute interpretation should account for competing aims)
- State v. Angilau, 245 P.3d 745 (Utah 2011) (framework for assessing classifications under Utah’s uniform‑operation clause)