INTRODUCTION
T1 The State charged sixteen-year-old Ricky Angilau with murder and other offenses in an adult criminal court. On interlocutory appeal, Mr. Angilau asks this court to dismiss the case in the district court on the basis that the automatic waiver statute 1 *748 underpinning district court jurisdiction is unconstitutional. Mr. Angilau challenged the constitutionality of the statute on multiple grounds. Because we find no state or federal constitutional basis for voiding the automatic waiver statute, we affirm the district court's determination that the statute is constitutional. 2
BACKGROUND
12 The State alleges the following facts. In January 2009, sixteen-year-old Ricky An-gilau arranged to fight another juvenile near school property. On his way to the fight, Mr. Angilau showed a friend a gun that he was carrying. While fighting, Mr. Angilau grew tired, pulled out the gun, and fired one shot in the air. He then lowered the gun, pointed it at a group of onlookers, and fired another shot that killed Esteban Manuel Sai-di, another minor. Mr. Angilau fled, throwing the gun over the fence of a house he passed.
1 3 On January 26, 2009, the State charged Mr. Angilau in the district court under the automatic waiver statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701(1)(a) (2008), with murder, obstruction of justice, carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, and possession of a firearm on school premises. Mr. Angilau moved to dismiss the criminal information for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that the automatic waiver statute is unconstitutional. Mr. Angilau also argued that this statute cannot be harmonized with various other statutes in Utah's Juvenile Court Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78A, 6-101 to 1210 (2008 & Supp.2010).
{4 The district court held that the automatic waiver statute is constitutional and interpreted relevant law in a manner to preserve the statute's operability. Mr. Angilau sought and received an interlocutory appeal of the district court's ruling.
15 After oral arguments, the Utah Legislature significantly revised the relevant statutes. See 2010 Utah Laws 88. Both parties stipulated that the amendments mooted statutory issues and some constitutional issues in this case, but differed on what constitutional issues remain. See supra note 2.
T6 This court has jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-3-102(8)(h) (Supp.2010).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
T7 "The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law that we ... review for correctness." Merrill v. Utah Labor Comm'n,
*749 ANALYSIS
T8 Mr. Angilau, although a sixteen-year-old minor at the time, was charged as an adult with multiple offenses, including murder. The district court asserted jurisdiction under Utah's automatic waiver statute, which states in relevant part that "[the district court has exclusive original jurisdiction over all persons 16 years of age or older charged with ... an offense which would be murder or aggravated murder if committed by an adult." Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701(1) (Supp.2010)
3
Mr. Angilau argues that the statute is unconstitutional on multiple grounds.
4
Because we find no constitutional basis for voiding the automatic waiver statute, we uphold the district court's decision that it is constitutional. As explained above, we begin with the presumption that the statute is constitutional, Merrill v. Utah Labor Comm'n,
I. THE AUTOMATIC WAIVER STATUTE DOES NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS AS APPLIED TO MR. AN-GILAU
19 Mr. Angilau makes several arguments claiming that he is entitled to fundamental elements of due process in determining whether he should be under the jurisdiction of an adult or juvenile court. We examine his arguments under both the substantive and procedural due process doctrines.
A. The Automatic Waiver Statute Does Not Violate Substantive Due Process Under Either the Utah or Federal Constitution
110 "When undertaking a substantive due process analysis under both article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, this court applies a rational basis test unless the governmental action implicates a fundamental right or interest." State v. Candedo,
%¢11 Mr. Angilan argues that this case involves a fundamental right requiring a heightened standard of serutiny. But, as will be discussed throughout this opinion, we conclude that Mr. Angilau has no fundamental right to treatment in the juvenile system. See, e.g., State v. Mohi,
1 12 The essential function of the automatic waiver statute at issue in this case is to automatically place the oldest juvenile offenders who have allegedly committed the most serious crimes (murder or aggravated murder) under the jurisdiction of adult crimi *750 nal courts. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701(1)(a) 6 Because there are longer sentences available in adult courts, convicted defendants can be removed from society for a greater period of time than would be possible in juvenile proceedings. Protection of society from dangerous individuals is unquestionably a legitimate government purpose, and potentially longer incarceration is rationally related to that purpose. The qualifications regarding age and severity of crime are not arbitrary, because they reasonably relate to the degree of threat to society that an individual might pose. Older children, for example, are generally bigger, stronger, and harder to restrain than younger children. And children who have allegedly committed murder would generally be considered more dangerous to society than those who allegedly committed less violent acts. Nor are those qualifications discriminatory in ways objectionable under the Utah or federal constitutions. See infra Part II. Therefore, the automatic waiver statute passes a rational basis standard of review under substantive due process.
B. The Automatic Waiver Statute Does Not Violate Procedural Due Process Under Either the Utah or Federal Constitution
118 "Utah's constitutional guarantee of due process is substantially the same as the due process guarantees contained in the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. Therefore, our analysis of questions concerning procedural due process under [both state and federal] constitutions are also substantially the same." Bailey v. Bayles,
T14 Mr. Angilau argues he had a liberty interest at stake because of the longer and harsher sentences available in adult criminal court, and because of the possibility of being incarcerated in adult institutions. The incarceration question is a distinct and separate issue, which we do not address here, because it is not the subject of the automatic waiver statute.
7
The statute at issue controls jurisdiction but mentions nothing regarding location or conditions of incarceration. As far as the "harsher" sentences available in adult court are concerned, they do not implicate a liberty interest for Mr. Angilau, because he was never entitled to juvenile jurisdiction once he met the criteria in the automatic waiver statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A, 6-701(1)(a). One cannot hold an interest in something to which one was never entitled. See Mohi,
115 Mr. Angilau attempts to use a footnote from our decision in Mohi to show that all juveniles must first receive some procedural due process in the juvenile court before they may be prosecuted as adults. Mr. Angi-lau's reliance on this footnote is misplaced, because both federal cases cited therein are *751 distinguishable from this case. The footnote in Mohi states:
Whether the legislature can try all juveniles as adults without any opportunity for review may raise federal constitutional questions. See, e.g., Kelley v. Kaiser,992 F.2d 1509 (10th Cir.1993). "Having created the juvenile court system, under Kent, it is the State's decision to seek to treat a juvenile as an adult that, in and of itself triggers the need for a hearing." Id. at 1515 (emphasis added) (citing Kent v. United States,383 U.S. 541 [86 S.Ct. 1045 ,16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966) J).
Id. at 1008 n. 19. The critical difference between Kent and Kelley, and this case, is that in the federal cases the juvenile court was at least initially presumed to have proper jurisdiction over the minors involved and transfer to adult court was at issue. See Kent,
16 Kent, for example, involved waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction where the juvenile court had original jurisdiction over the child. See
{17 Kelley involved a statute that had been declared unconstitutional in a previous case on equal protection grounds based on gender discrimination. The offending statute defined delinquent children as males under sixteen and females under eighteen who violated the law. See
{18 By contrast, in Utah's statutory scheme, the legislature has bypassed the juvenile system entirely, giving original jurisdiction to adult courts under certain cireum-stances (none of which involve the type of discrimination that was at issue with the statute in Kelley ). Because Mr. Angilau was sixteen years old and was charged with murder, he fell under Utah's automatic waiver statute and was immediately subject to the district court's jurisdiction. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701(1)(a). He did not possess any initial statutory rights associated with juvenile court protections and thus could not be deprived of rights he never held. 9
119 Because Mr. Angilau held no initial right (statutory or constitutional) to be brought before a juvenile court, there was no need for a hearing before charging him in adult court. The automatic waiver statute, therefore, does not violate procedural due process.
II. THE AUTOMATIC WAIVER STATUTE DOES NOT VIOLATE THE UTAH CONSTITUTION®S UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAWS PROVISION OR FEDERAL EQUAL PROTECTION
T20 Mr. Angilau has challenged the constitutionality of the automatic waiver statute under both the Utah Constitution's uniform operation of laws provision and the United States Constitution's Equal Protection Clause. Because the uniform operation of laws provision offers the same, if not more, protections than the federal Equal Protection *752 Clause, we need only address whether the statute conflicts with Utah's Constitution on this point.
The uniform operation of laws provision and the Equal Protection clause address similar concerns in determining the constitutionality of a statute. Both have as their basic concept the settled concern of the law that the legislature be restrained from the fundamentally unfair practice of creating classifications that result in different treatment being given [to] persons who are, in fact, similarly situated. The two provisions are substantially parallel. Accordingly, because our review [of] legislative classifications under article I, section 24 [of the Utah Constitution] ... is at least as exacting and, in some circumstances, more rigorous than the standard applied under the [Fourteenth Amendment of the} federal constitution, we evaluate the constitutionality of the statute under Utah law.
Merrill v. Utah Labor Comm'n,
The essence of the uniform operation of laws principle is that legislative classifications resulting in differing treatment for different persons must be based on actual differences that are reasonably related to the legitimate purposes of the legislation. [PJersons similarly situated should be treated similarly, and persons in different cireumstances should not be treated as if their circumstances were the same.
Id. T6 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
T21 When determining the constitutionality of a statute under the uniform operation of laws provision, we ask (1) what classifications the statute creates; (Z2) "whether different classes ... are treated disparately;" and (8) if there is disparate treatment between classes, "whether the legislature had any reasonable objective that warrants the disparity." State v. Schofield,
A. The Automatic Waiver Statute Creates a Classification
122 The automatic waiver statute creates a classification premised on the alleged offender's age together with the offense(s) charged. The plain language of the statute specifies that minors who are sixteen years of age or older and are charged with murder or aggravated murder will automatically be under the district court's "exclusive original jurisdiction." 10 Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701(1)(a). The juvenile statutory scheme provides that children under sixteen who commit murder or aggravated murder will at least begin under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, as will sixteen~ and seventeen-year-olds who commit lesser offenses. 11 See id. § T8A-6-101 to 1210.
B. The Automatic Waiver Statute Provides Disparate Treatment of am Identifiable Class
T23 "Disparate treatment exists when the statutory scheme work[s] a discriminatory hardship on an identifiable group of persons who were singled out for treatment different from that to which other iden
*753
tifiable groups were made subject." Drej,
C. The Legislature Has Reasonable Objectives That Warrant the Disparate Treatment
124 Having determined the statute creates a classification with disparate treatment, we must decide the level of scrutiny to apply in analyzing whether the legislature has reasonable objectives that warrant the disparate treatment. Mr. Angilan argues that the statute implicates "fundamental or critical rights" deserving of heightened seru-tiny. See Gallivan,
[ 25 While life and liberty are indeed fundamental rights, the automatic waiver statute does not rob minors of any of the constitutional protections in that regard that are available to all persons subject to the district court's jurisdiction, regardless of age. Although juvenile courts may provide more statutory protection for an individual's life and liberty than required by the United States and Utah constitutions, persons who do not qualify for statutorily created extra protections have no standing to claim an interest in those extra protections absent improper discrimination. See supra Part T.B.
126 As for a minor's right to education, this is a fundamental right, but it is not relevant to this opinion. See Utah Const. art. X, § 1; Logan City Sch. Dist. v. Kowallis,
127 Because Mr. Angilau has failed to identify a fundamental right or suspect class at issue in the statute, we will not use a heightened standard of serutiny. We proceed with the three-part inquiry under a rational basis review. 12
1. The Classification in the Automatic Waiver Statute Is Reasonable
128 "Broad deference is given to the legislature when assessing 'the reasonableness of its classifications and their relationship to legitimate legislative purposes."" ABCO Enters. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n,
2. The Objectives of the Automatic Waiver Statute Are Legitimate
129 In determining whether legislative objectives are legitimate, "we are not limited to considering those purposes that can be plainly shown to have been held by some or all legislators. We will sustain a classification if we can reasonably conceive of facts which would justify the distinctions.... [IJt is enough that they may be reasonably imputed to the legislative body." Blue Cross & Blue Shield,
1 30 While we need identify only one possible legitimate purpose behind the legislation at issue, in this case there are multiple legitimate objectives. The State suggests that the statute serves purposes of public safety, appropriate sanctions, and individual accountability-the first purposes mentioned in the Juvenile Court Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-102(5)(a) (2008). This is not an exhaustive list of possible legitimate objectives behind the statute, but these purposes are clearly within the bounds of legitimate governmental concern.
3. There Is a Reasonable Relationship Between the Classification and the Legislative Purpose
T31 "In the last step of the three-part inquiry, we determine whether the legislature's classification is reasonably related to its legitimate objectives." Merrill,
132 The legislature certainly could have chosen more lenient means to further these same objectives-such as requiring certification hearings for these minors, thus permitting any falsely accused or developmentally impaired children, for example, to remain in the juvenile system. But there is no require
*755
ment that an otherwise permissible classification be the best of all alternatives. Here the statute "clearly applies equally to all persons within the classes it creates and the disparate treatment given the statutory classes is based on differences that have a reasonable tendency to further the objectives of the statute. It is therefore uniform both on its face and in operation." Schofield,
III. THE AUTOMATIC WAIVER STAT UTE DOES NOT VIOLATE UTAHS PROHIBITION ON THE ENACTMENT OF SPECIAL OR PRIVATE LAWS
133 Mr. Angilaun argues that the automatic waiver statute violates article VI, section 26 of Utah's constitution, because that provision "forbids the legislature to enact laws that create unnatural classifications, which separate out people who are not legitimately particularized or separated from the group of which they are a natural or intrinsic part."
14
Because the analysis that satisfies the uniform operation of laws provision also satisfies this provision of the constitution, see Grand Cnty. v. Emery Cnty.,
IV. WE FIND NO VALID BASIS AMONG MR. ANGILAUS ARGUMENTS FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT FOR ALL MINORS TO BE PROSECUTED IN JUVENILE COURT
T 34 The rest of Mr. Angilau's arguments are predicated on the notion that Utah should recognize a constitutional right for all juveniles to be treated in juvenile court. These arguments are rather cursorily briefed and have not identified a single case or court that has adopted such a premise. In the absence of a textual basis or persuasive authority derived from other sources, we are not prepared to recognize such a right in this case.
1 35 Mr. Angilau argues this right could be supported by multiple provisions of the Utah and federal constitutions. Under the Utah Constitution he argues article I, section 7 (the due process provision) could support this right, because it "has previously been interpreted to require a full panalopy of procedural rights in contexts such as this one, wherein both life and liberty are at stake."
15
As discussed earlier in this opinion, Mr. Angilau has no more life and liberty interests at stake than any adult facing criminal charges, and he is subject to the same breadth of constitutional protections as apply to those adults. See supra Part I. His argument under federal due process fails for similar reasons. See Bailey v. Bayles,
*756
{86 Under both article I, section 24 (the uniform operation of laws provision) and article VI, section 26 (the prohibition of special or private laws) of the Utah Constitution, Mr. Angilau makes arguments regarding the prohibition of unnatural or unreasonable classifications among children. However, as de-seribed at length earlier in this opinion, we cannot conclude that the relevant classifications are unreasonable. See supra Parts II-III. His federal equal protection argument fails for similar reasons. See Merrill v. Utah Labor Comm'n,
37 Under article I, section 9 (the unnecessary rigor provision) of the Utah Constitution, Mr. Angilau argues that "[cllassifica-tions which remove children from juvenile court, and risk their placement in adult detention facilities, without regard to their actual cases and circumstances, are by nature overbroad and unduly harsh, and dehumanize and degrade those individual children who need and deserve to be protected by the juvenile court system." Again, this court views the questions of conditions and location of confinement as separate from that of jurisdiction, and we do not consider them here. The statute at issue says nothing regarding conditions or location of incarceration of minors under district court jurisdiction-those issues are addressed by other statutes in the Juvenile Court Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-101 to -1210.
[ 38 Under article I, section 27 (the provision stating that "[flrequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free government"), Mr. Angilau argues that because the State "has a well-developed juvenile court system to protect its children and strengthen family units .... [this State must uniformly protect the rights of children prosecuted in juvenile court, unless a thorough and proper inquiry and adjudication calls for prosecution in the adult system." The State properly responds that Mr. Angi-lau "ignores the myriad of other purposes behind the juvenile system" and that the "section is no less well met by the State's interest in protecting society from violent juvenile offenders." The legislature, in creating a "well-developed juvenile court," has opted to exclude the oldest minors charged with murder from its jurisdiction, and that choice is consistent with the fundamental principle of protecting society.
139 This court has repeatedly observed that "[al juvenile has no right to treatment in the juvenile system." State v. Bell,
CONCLUSION
1 40 Mr. Angilau has not met the burden of demonstrating that the automatic waiver statute is unconstitutional. See State v. Mohi,
Notes
. The parties have referred to this statute, Utah Code § 78A-6-701 (Supp.2010), as "direct-file," a term generally used when the prosecutor has discretion regarding filing in adult or juvenile court. However, as the statute now stands, a prosecutor has no discretion: if the juvenile meets the criteria outlined in this statute, the prosecutor can only file in adult criminal court. *748 We refer to the statute as an "automatic waiver" to be consistent with the vocabulary used in juvenile justice literature nationwide. Such provisions are also referred to as "legislative waiver" or "statutory exclusion" statutes.
. Much of the district court's decision was devoted to statutory issues later rendered moot by a significant revision of the code during the 2010 legislative session. See 2010 Utah Laws 38. We need not review that part of the district court's decision, because both parties have stipulated that those statutory issues are now moot. We do note that before the revisions there was some ambiguity regarding the automatic waiver statute, as manifested by the different interpretations proffered by the State and Mr. Angilau. However, the legislative history resolves the ambiguity clearly in favor of the State's interpretation that the statute was not meant to allow prosecutorial discretion of whether to file in an adult or juvenile court where a defendant met the outlined criteria. See Audio Recording: Senate Debate on SB 111, 51st Leg. Gen. Sess. (Feb. 9, 1995) (comment of Senator Hillyard). The changes in the statutory scheme regarding the automatic waiver statute are therefore merely clarifying, and the new version is retroactively applicable to Mr. Angilau. See Salt Lake Cnty. v. Holliday Water Co.,
. Because changes to this statute since the time of Mr. Angilau's offense have merely been clarifying, we refer to the present version throughout this opinion. See supra note 2.
. We do not address arguments mooted by the revisions to the Utah Code that occurred after oral arguments in this case. See Reply to State's Concurrence with Suggestion of Mootness, filed April 5, 2010; 2010 Utah Laws 38; supra note 2.
. Mr. Angilau argues multiple bases for recognition of a fundamental or critical right that are addressed in Parts LB, ILC and IV of this opinion.
. Besides providing the district court exclusive original jurisdiction over minors sixteen and older who are charged with murder or aggravated murder, the statute also grants the same jurisdiction "over all persons 16 years of age or older charged with ... an offense which would be a felony if committed by an adult if the minor has been previously committed to a secure facility as defined in Section 62A-7-101." Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701(1)(b). This part of the statute is not at issue in this case, and we do not address it.
. That question is pending in a companion case.
. Although the statute at issue in Kelley on its face did not provide the liberty interest for sixteen- and seventeen-year-old males, the statute was the basis for the liberty interest when it was found to violate equal protection. See infra 117.
. We have already held that a child's interest in his or her trial forum is "critical," but we clarify that the interest in remaining under juvenile court jurisdiction only exists where there is an initial legislative right to be included in the juvenile system. See Mohi,
. See supra n. 5.
. This will not be the case if the sixteen- or seventeen-year-olds are charged with felonies and qualify under other conditions of the automatic waiver statute. See supra note 5.
. Some past cases have called the heightened review a "reasonable in relation" test, but since those terms are used in the rational basis test, and not the heightened review as outlined in Gallivan v. Walker,
. Although we find there is a reasonable relationship between the classification and the legislative purpose, we note that there is emerging research showing "higher recidivism rates among offenders who had been transferred to [adult] criminal court, compared with those who were retained in the juvenile system." Richard E. Redding, Juvenile Transfer Laws: An Effective Deterrent to Delinquency?, OJJDP Juv. Just. Bull., June 2010, at 1, 6. Possible explanations include:
@The stigmatization and other negative effects of labeling juveniles as convicted felons.
* The sense of resentment and injustice juveniles feel about being tried and punished as adults.
® The learning of criminal mores and behavior while incarcerated with adult offenders.
@The decreased focus on rehabilitation and family support in the adult system.
A felony conviction also results in the loss of a number of civil rights and privileges, further reducing the opportunities for employment and community reintegration.
Id. at 7 (citation omitted). Thus, there would clearly also be a reasonable basis for keeping these juveniles within the juvenile system should the legislature choose to do so.
. Mr. Angilau cited Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Co. v. Utah Insurance Guaranty Ass'n,
. Mr. Angilau cites Christiansen v. Harris,