State v. CantonState v. Canton
¶1 Reinaldo Canton was arrested in Utah in April 2007 and indicted on federal charges of coercion and enticement of a fifteen-year-old girl. Canton, a New Mexico resident, was released and returned to New Mexico to await trial. He remained there pending trial for over twо years, though he returned to Utah on a few occasions to attend proceedings in federal court. After the federal charges were dismissed in May 2009, Canton was charged by the State of Utah with enticement of a minor under
¶2 Canton moved to dismiss the charge based on the applicable two-year statute of limitations. In so doing, he disputed the applicability of our criminal tolling statute, which tolls the limita
¶3 We affirm. The criminal tolling statute applies to Canton because its text leaves no room for his notion of “legal presence.” And applying the statute to Canton does not run afoul of the Uniform Operation Clause, as Canton fails to show how any classification under the statute discriminates against him in an impermissible manner.
I
¶4 In March 2007, Rеinaldo Canton, a New Mexico resident, began corresponding online with an undercover federal agent posing as a fifteen-year-old girl. Canton engaged the agent in sexually-explicit conversation and ultimately arranged to meet the “girl” for sex at the Layton Hills Mall in Utah. When Canton arrived at the mall on April 11, 2007, FBI agents and representatives of the Utah Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force arrested Canton. Soon thereafter, federal officials charged Canton with coercion and enticement for illegal sexual activity under
¶5 During the course of the next fifteen months, federal officials in New Mexico monitored Canton and reported to their counterparts in Utah. Canton cooperated with the investigation against him and traveled several times from New Mexico to Utah to attend proceedings in federal district court. On July 29, 2008, Canton suffered an aortic dissection (a tear in a large blood vessel branching off of the heart), which required surgical intervention. Thereafter, Canton claimed he was too ill to continue traveling to Utah and filed a motion to dismiss based on his deteriorating health. The federal court granted this motion without prejudice on May 14, 2009.
¶7 Canton moved to dismiss under the two-year statute of limitations applicable to the enticement charge,
II
¶8 Canton contends that the district court erred in applying our criminal tolling provision, which tolls the statute of limitations while a criminal defendant is “out of the state,” see
¶9 Both points turn on questions of law, which we review for correctness. See Manzanares v. Byington (In re Adoption of Baby B.), 2012 UT 35, ¶ 41, 308 P.3d 382. We reject both of Canton‘s arguments and accordingly affirm.
A. Statutory Construction of “Out of the State”
¶10 Under our criminal tolling statute, “[t]he period of limitation does not run against any defendant during any period of time in which the defendant is out of the state following the commission of an offense.”
¶11 For the State, Canton‘s physical presence in New Mexico is dispositive, as it reads “out of the state” to refer to a defendant‘s absence from the state‘s territorial boundaries. Canton sees the matter differently. He interprets “out of the state” to refer to a more abstract construct. In his view a person is not “out of the state” if he is subject to its legal authority—in the sense of cooperating with fеderal officials investigating criminal charges in Utah and appearing at federal court proceedings there. Thus, for Canton the notion of “out of the state” refers not to the state‘s physical boundaries but its sovereign power. For him a person is not “out of the state” if he remains subject to its sovereign authority.
¶12 We read the statute as the State does. We interpret “out of the state” to focus on the question of a person‘s physical presence within the state‘s territorial boundaries. Thus, we reject Canton‘s abstract construct of legal presence, both as a matter of (a) the “ordinary meaning” of statutory language consisting of “сommon, daily, nontechnical speech,” Olsen v. Eagle Mountain City, 2011 UT 10, ¶ 9, 248 P.3d 465 (internal quotation marks omitted), and (b) under the possibility that the statute may employ a “legal term of art . . . with a settled meaning in the law,” Hansen v. Hansen, 2012 UT 9, ¶ 19, 270 P.3d 531.
1. Ordinary Meaning of “Out of the State”
¶13 In determining the ordinary meaning of nontechnical terms of a statute, our “starting point” is the dictionary. See Hi-Country Prop. Rights Grp. v. Emmer, 2013 UT 33, ¶ 19, __ P.3d __. “A dictionary is useful in cataloging a range of possible meanings that a statutory term may bear.” Id. (citing
¶14 This is one of those cases where the dictionary fails to dictate the meaning that the statutory terms “must bear” in this context. The operative phrase has two component parts—a function term (“out of“) and its object (“the state“). And dictionary definitions of both sets of terms leave the statute semantically open to both parties’ interpretations.
¶15 The phrase “out of” is used “as a function word” in a range of different senses.
¶16 That said, this definition does not exclude the possibility of a metaphysical “space” or “starting point” from which something moves “out of.” And some common uses of the phrase unquestionably have an abstract referent. An argument can be “out of bounds” by dint of its exceeding the governing rules of propriety and not any physical boundary, just as a technical advancement can be “out of this world” in a figurative sense without the assistance of space travel. So this dictionary meaning of “out of” is itself insufficient to resolve the interpretive question before us.
¶17 And the dictionary also includes another definition that is more clearly in line with Canton‘s position. “Out of” is also used “as a function word to indicate removal or situation away from the effective action of some faculty or agency.” Id. Here, moreover, the listed examples expressly encompass “removal” from an abstract “faculty or agency,” as in “the ships fled out of range,” “he was soon out of sight,” аnd “out of hearing.” Id. Thus, the dictionary‘s range of meanings for “out of” give no basis for limiting the statutory phrase to either physical or abstract absence; both constructs fall within standard dictionary definitions.
¶19 The State‘s notion of “out of the state” partakes of the first definition listed above. A person can be said to be “out of the state” in the sense of being physically outside of its territorial boundaries. But the latter definitions are in line with Canton‘s construction. A person could be said to be “out of the state” in the sense of being removed from its political power or sphere of influence.
¶20 Dictionaries are accordingly insufficient by themselves to resolve the interpretive task before us. We must look elsewhere to determine thе ordinary meaning of the language of the tolling statute. Specifically, we must look beyond the dictionary definitions of the component terms of the statute to consider the ordinary meaning of the complete statutory phrase, “out of the state.”1
¶21 A first resort for selecting among a range of meanings left open by the dictionary is the structure and context of the statutory language. See Olsen, 2011 UT 10, ¶ 12. In Olsen we interpreted the
¶22 Canton purports to find a parallel ground for his construction of our criminal tolling statute. He insists that the State‘s notion of physical presence “contradicts the legislative purpose of the statute,” which in his view is to preserve the “balance between an individual‘s interest in repose and the State‘s interest in having sufficient time to build its case.” And in light of his full cooperation with federal authorities during the pendency of the federal case against him here, Canton insists that the State‘s side of thе ledger was a null set, as the State had “sufficient time to investigate its case and file charges, notwithstanding [his] absence from the state.” Thus, Canton asks us to dismiss the State‘s construction as incompatible with the purpose of the criminal tolling provision as he sees it.
¶23 Canton‘s position falters in its premise. The tolling statute,
¶24 Certainty is at a premium in this area. The time-preclusive effect of a statute of limitations is strong medicine. It cuts off a presumptively viable claim on the sole basis of the passage of time. Thus, our statute of limitations jurisprudence is aimed not only at balancing repose on one hand and an opportunity to prepare a case for filing on the other, but also at fostering certainty and avoiding unfair surprise.3 The tolling statute must also be understood to advance that concern. And that concern is advanced by the State‘s objective notion of physical presence—and undercut by Canton‘s more abstract construct—in that the latter approach would require subjective, case-by-case weighing of factors informing the degree to which an individual may be “present” in the state in the sense of being subject to its authority. For these and other reasons,4 we cannot properly reject the State‘s po
¶25 We must accordingly look elsewhere to select from the range of meanings left open by the dictionary. Here we can do so by moving beyond the component terms of the statute—“out of” and “state“—and considering the full phrase in its entirety. See FCC v. AT&T, Inc., 131 S.Ct. 1177, 1183 (2011) (noting that “two words together may assume a more particular meaning than those words in isolation“).
¶26 Dictionaries typically define only individual words, not extended phrases. So we cannot look up “out of the state” in a dictionary. But that does not foreclose the possibility of identifying its ordinary meaning. We can do so by considering the way the full phrase is typically used in common parlance.5
¶27 Here that inquiry confirms the State‘s construction of the
2. “Out of the State” as a Legal Term of Art?
¶28 That leaves the question whether the tolling statute‘s language may consist of a legal term of art. The legislature is entitled to invoke specialized legal terms that carry an extra-ordinary meaning. And when it does so we credit the legal term of art, not the common understanding of the words. See Hansen, 2012 UT 9, ¶ 19. Thus, “when a word or phrase is ‘transplanted from another legal source, whether the common law or other legislation, it brings the old soil with it.‘” Maxfield v. Herbert, 2012 UT 44, ¶ 31, 284 P.3d 647 (quoting Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47
¶29 Canton reads too much into Snyder and Lund—and not enough into the operative text of the criminal tolling statute. Snyder, to be sure, interpreted the text of the civil tolling provisiоn in light of the “objective of the statute“—of “prevent[ing] a defendant from depriving a plaintiff of the opportunity of suing him by absenting himself from the state during the period of limitation.” 390 P.2d at 916. And in light of that purpose the Snyder court held that a nonresident motorist defendant who had by law appointed the Secretary of State as his agent for service of process was “not ‘absent’ from the state in the sense contemplated” by the civil tolling statute. Id. (quoting the 1953 version of the civil tolling provision,
¶30 Olseth considered a question certified to us by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals: “Is the statute of limitations tolled under [the general civil tolling statute] when a person against whom a claim has accrued has left the state of Utah and has no agent within the state of Utah upon whom service of process can be made instead, but the person is amenable to service pursuant to Utah‘s long arm statute[?]” Id. ¶ 1. We held that the statute was tolled, and in so doing rejected the invitation to adopt a broad reading of Snyder and Lund.
¶31 Our Olseth opinion emphasized that Snyder and Lund were driven by the terms of the Nonresident Motor Vehicle Act—specifically, by the provision calling fоr appointment of the Secretary of State as agent of a nonresident motorist for service of process. Id. ¶¶ 29–36. Thus, in Olseth we explained that “the defendants in th[o]se cases [were] not ‘absent’ from the state because their agent [was] present and service [could] be effected within the state.” Id. ¶ 29 (emphasis added). At the same time, we declined
¶32 Olseth thus disproves the term-of-art notion of legal presence advocated by Canton. It indicates that we do not have an omnibus rule tying tolling to a person‘s susceptibility to service of process. And it also defeats Canton‘s position in this case, as Canton does not and cannot contend that he had an agent for service of process in Utah—only that he was loosely subject to the authority of the State as evidenced by his cooperation in the federal proceedings against him. That is insufficient under our law, which leaves no room for the construction that Canton attributes to the criminal tolling provision.
B. Constitutionality of the Tolling Statute
¶33 Our only remaining task is to consider Canton‘s challenge to the constitutionality of the tolling statute‘s application in this case. His challenge arises under
¶34 That clause requires that “[a]ll laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.”
¶35 The modern formulation of uniform operation is different. It treats the requirement of uniform operation as a state-law counterpart to the federal Equal Protection Clause. Our cases articulate a three-step test for enforcing this guarantee. First we assess “what classifications the statute creates.” See State v. Angilau, 2011 UT 3, ¶ 21, 245 P.3d 745. We then assess “whether different classes . . . are treated disparately.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). And finally, “if there is disparate treatment between classes,” we assess “whether the legislature had any reasonable objective that warrants the disparity.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
¶36 This last step incorporates varying standards of scrutiny. See State v. Robinson, 2011 UT 30, ¶ 22, 254 P.3d 183. Those standards recognize that most classifications are presumptively permissible, and thus subject only to “rational basis review.” Id. Our
¶37 Canton presents no viable constitutional challenge to the application of the tolling provision to this case. The historical requirement of consistent application or enforcement (or its concomitant bar on special privileges or exemptions) is not at all implicated here, as Canton‘s gripe is that the statute sweeps too broadly—in encompassing defendants who are “out of the state” physically but still subject to its authority (and thus purportedly outside the rational reach of the tolling statute). That concern, in fact, runs precisely сounter to that of the historical domain of uniform operation, which was to prescribe broad, uniform application across the entirety of a legislative class, or in other words to foreclose special privileges or exemptions from enforcement. And Canton‘s claim is similarly deficient under the modern formulation of uniform operation set forth in our caselaw, as he fails to
¶38 Canton‘s gripe is with thе legislature‘s failure to sub-classify—to draw further distinctions between compliant and non-compliant out-of-state defendants. He asserts that these two sub-classes are fundamentally different, and thus that it is unconstitutional to treat them similarly.
¶39 That is not a viable, standalone basis for a uniform operation challenge. Our uniform operation standards are focused on examining the rationality of the classifications that were made by the legislature. See Angilau, 2011 UT 3, ¶ 21 (explaining that we begin by asking “what classifications the statute creates“). And concerns of over-inclusiveness, like the one raised by Canton, are relevant only insofar as they bear on the question whether the classification that was made clears the applicable standard of scrutiny.10 Thus, even those litigants whose gripe is that the legislature has impermissibly grouped them into a category with other dissimilar individuals must demonstrate that the classification that put them there fails constitutional muster. Canton fails to do so, opting to question only what further sub-classifications the legislature might have made.
¶40 In any event, the viability of the classification drawn by the