State v. Bonds
172 Conn. App. 108
Conn. App. Ct.2017Background
- Victim Denny “Pun” Alcantara was robbed and fatally shot after arranging a marijuana sale on November 4, 2009; victim’s jacket, chain, phone, money and marijuana were taken.
- Defendant Darryl Bonds, with co-defendant Tyrone Tarver and Joshua McNeil, were seen walking toward the victim shortly before the shooting; witnesses observed them flee to a car immediately after gunshots.
- Yvannia Collazo (driver) heard post‑shooting admissions in the car: Tarver saying “we just robbed Pun” and references to possessing the victim’s jacket and chain; defendant and Tarver argued over who gets items; defendant allegedly threw the victim’s phone from the car.
- Prior to the incident, Tarver told Shari Johnson he planned to “set [Pun] up” with a fake weed order; that statement preceded the robbery by one week.
- Alexis Farrow gave a sworn written statement to police recounting a telephone call in which the caller (identified by her as the defendant) said, “Yeah, I killed Pun, you stupid bitch;” she recanted at trial and the written statement was admitted under the Whelan rule.
- Defendant convicted of felony murder, first‑degree robbery, and conspiracy; on appeal he challenged (1) admission of two out‑of‑court statements under the statement‑against‑penal‑interest exception, (2) authentication/admission of Farrow’s out‑of‑court statement and the underlying telephone identification, and (3) denial of a jury instruction on the affirmative defense to felony murder (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a‑54c).
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of Tarver’s pre‑crime statement to Johnson (plan to set up victim) under statement‑against‑penal‑interest | Statement tended to incriminate Tarver and is admissible even if made before the crime; subsequent robbery bolsters trustworthiness | Statement was an unformed future plan that did not subject Tarver to criminal liability when made | Admitted: court applied Bryant and held such pre‑crime admissions may “tend” to incriminate and are admissible; subsequent crime corroborated it |
| Admissibility of Tarver’s immediate post‑crime statement to Batista (“we just robbed Pun”) under statement‑against‑penal‑interest | Statement was spontaneous, shortly after the crime, strongly self‑inculpatory and corroborated by other evidence (calls, sightings, property in car) | Statement untrustworthy because Batista and Tarver lacked a close preexisting relationship | Admitted: trial court did not abuse discretion after weighing timing, corroboration, and degree of self‑incrimination |
| Authentication and admission of Farrow’s written statement recounting the telephone confession | Written Whelan statement showed she knew defendant’s voice (five‑year acquaintance) — minimal proof sufficed to authenticate telephone call; admissible substantively under Whelan despite her trial recantation | Written statement insufficient to authenticate the underlying call (she recanted at trial; voice ID unreliable) | Admitted: Whelan prior written statement admitted; the written statement provided the minimal prima facie evidence to authenticate the call, and credibility was for the jury |
| Denial of requested jury instruction on statutory affirmative defense to felony murder (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a‑54c) | Defense lacked sufficient affirmative evidence on all four statutory elements by a preponderance; speculative challenges to state’s case insufficient | Requested instruction appropriate because evidence (Collazo’s testimony, Tarver’s admissions, defendant’s unarmed appearance and surprised reaction) supported the defense elements | Denied: no sufficient evidence for a rational juror to find all four elements by a preponderance; defendant failed to meet burden for affirmative defense instruction |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Bryant, 202 Conn. 676 (1987) (broadens statement‑against‑penal‑interest to include remarks that "tend" to incriminate and allows subsequent conduct to corroborate)
- State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743 (1986) (permits substantive use of prior written inconsistent statements signed by declarant who testifies and is cross‑examined)
- State v. Miguel C., 305 Conn. 562 (2012) (standard of review: plenary for legal questions; abuse of discretion for evidentiary rulings)
- State v. Camacho, 282 Conn. 328 (2007) (trial court must weigh § 8‑6(4) factors when assessing trustworthiness of statements against penal interest)
- State v. Person, 236 Conn. 342 (1996) (defendant bears burden to prove affirmative defense to felony murder by a preponderance; any‑evidence standard does not apply to affirmative defenses)
- State v. Simpson, 286 Conn. 634 (2008) (explains Whelan’s limited hearsay exception and that jury assesses credibility of prior written statements)