State v. Barton, 181 Wash. 2d 148

Background

Peter Barton was charged with first-degree child rape; bail set at $500,000 and the trial court ordered he deposit 10% ($50,000) "in cash or other security" with the court registry.
The trial court’s initial order and later modification tracked CrR 3.2(b)(4); the court’s practice and verbal statements suggested exclusion of execution of a bond with "sufficient sureties."
Barton appealed, arguing the order violated article I, § 20 of the Washington Constitution guaranteeing defendants be "bailable by sufficient sureties."
The State sought to justify the cash-deposit requirement as a means to ensure appearance and to limit abuses of commercial sureties; Barton argued the constitution guarantees the option to use a third‑party surety distinct from cash deposit.
The Washington Supreme Court reviewed statutory history, rule history (CrR 3.2), and comparative state decisions to determine whether the constitutional phrase requires access to surety arrangements.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether art. I, § 20's phrase "bailable by sufficient sureties" guarantees the option to post bail via a third‑party surety (distinct from cash/property).	Barton: "sufficient sureties" means a defendant must have the option to use a third‑party surety (personal or commercial), not be limited to cash deposit.	State: The clause means bail must be sufficient to assure appearance; cash deposit serves that function and the constitution does not guarantee access to commercial sureties.	Held: Art. I, § 20 guarantees the option to access a surety arrangement (a third‑party promise), distinct from cash/property deposit.
Whether CrR 3.2(b)(4) ("deposit in registry … in cash or other security" up to 10%) satisfies the constitutional surety guarantee.	Barton: The court’s order, by requiring cash/other security posted with the court and excluding "sufficient sureties," violated the constitution.	State: CrR 3.2(b)(4) and the court’s order legitimately require posted security with the court to assure appearance; rule is constitutional.	Held: CrR 3.2(b)(4) read alone does not guarantee access to a third‑party surety; but CrR 3.2(b) as a whole (esp. b(5)) must allow surety unless court makes particularized findings otherwise. The trial court’s order excluding access to sureties violated art. I, § 20; order vacated and remanded.
Whether commercial sureties are categorically excluded by art. I, § 20.	Barton: The constitutional guarantee covers sureties generally (third‑party guarantors), without categorically excluding commercial sureties.	State: Commercial sureties undermine the purpose of bail deterrence; some cases have rejected commercial sureties.	Held: The court rejected a categorical ban on commercial sureties; the constitution requires access to a surety option but courts may assess sufficiency case‑by‑case.
Whether the trial court’s October 18, 2012 order was more restrictive than CrR 3.2 permits.	Barton: Order excluded execution of a bond with sufficient sureties (CrR 3.2(b)(5)), making it more restrictive than the rule and unconstitutional.	State: The order tracked CrR 3.2(b)(4) and required posted security; the rule permits courts to require that form of security.	Held: The order improperly excluded the CrR 3.2(b)(5) surety option and thus violated the constitutional guarantee; vacated and remanded.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d 345 (Minn. 2000) (historical background and holding that cash‑only bail violates "sufficient sureties" language)
State v. Parker, 546 So. 2d 186 (La. 1989) (interpreting identical constitutional phrasing to require surety option)
State ex rel. Jones v. Hendon, 609 N.E.2d 541 (Ohio 1993) (discussing constitutional right to sureties)
People ex rel. Gendron v. Ingram, 217 N.E.2d 803 (Ill. 1966) (holding court may restrict commercial sureties; rejected by Washington Court here)
State v. Briggs, 666 N.W.2d 573 (Iowa 2003) (recognizing surety option is core purpose of clause; cash‑only permissible only if surety access not precluded)
Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971) (federal context on limiting commercial bail bondsmen influenced CrR 3.2 drafting)
In re Marriage of Bralley, 70 Wn. App. 646 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (distinguishing cash bail and bail bonds; discussed in opinion)