State v. Barnes
116 A.3d 883
| Del. | 2015Background
- In 1989 the Delaware General Assembly enacted the Truth In Sentencing Act (TIS Act) amending provisions in Titles 11 and 16 to eliminate parole for many felonies; the Act declared it applied to “all crimes” committed after June 30, 1989.
- At enactment, DUI offenses (21 Del. C. § 4177) were misdemeanors in Title 21; in 1995 the legislature created felony DUI offenses and later increased penalties.
- Defendant Jeffrey Barnes pleaded guilty in 2013 to a fifth-offense felony DUI and was sentenced to Level V incarceration; the sentencing form labeled the sentence “non‑TIS.”
- The Board of Parole granted Barnes parole after six months; the State then challenged parole eligibility, arguing the TIS Act removed parole for felony DUIs.
- The Superior Court had historically treated Title 21 DUI felonies as non‑TIS; the Board of Parole, SENTAC, and multiple Superior Court decisions had long applied that interpretation.
- The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, reviewed whether the TIS Act eliminated parole for felony DUI convictions under 21 Del. C. § 4177.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Barnes) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the TIS Act eliminated parole for felony DUIs under 21 Del. C. § 4177 | TIS Act amended only Titles 11 and 16; § 4177 is a largely self‑contained Title 21 statute and remains parole‑eligible; longstanding judicial and administrative practice supports that reading | TIS Act states it applies to “all crimes”; felony DUIs are “crimes” under Title 11 definitions, so parole was abolished for felony DUIs | Court held TIS Act does not apply to felony DUI offenses under § 4177; DUIs remain parole‑eligible (adhering to longstanding practice and stare decisis) |
Key Cases Cited
- Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (discusses stare decisis and when precedent should be retained)
- Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes merit respect based on persuasiveness)
- Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371 (1943) (deference to longstanding administrative construction to avoid hardship and disruption)
- Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994) (protecting reliance interests when statutes have retroactive effect)
- Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940) (long legislative inaction after judicial construction indicates congressional acquiescence)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (agency statutory constructions are entitled to deference when resolving ambiguous statutory schemes)
- Seinfeld v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 909 A.2d 117 (Del. 2006) (stare decisis: settled law should not be overruled without urgent reasons)
- Council 81, Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Delaware, 293 A.2d 567 (Del. 1972) (longstanding administrative interpretation of doubtful statutes is indicative of legislative intent)