State v. Banks
146 A.3d 1
Conn.2016Background
- Mark Banks, convicted of multiple felonies in 1997 and continuously incarcerated, refused Department of Correction requests in 2009–2010 to submit a blood or other biological sample for DNA under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-102g (as amended 2003).
- The state filed a motion in 2010 seeking a court order authorizing the use of reasonable physical force to obtain Banks’ DNA sample; Banks opposed, arguing the statute was punitive and that requiring DNA would violate the ex post facto clause as applied to him.
- The trial court (Mullarkey, J.) granted the state’s motion, concluding § 54-102g is regulatory not punitive and that authorization to use reasonable force was implicit in the statute; a later trial court denied Banks’ motion to dismiss a prosecution for refusal and convicted him.
- The Appellate Court affirmed both the trial court’s grant of permission to use reasonable force and Banks’ conviction. The Supreme Court granted certification on two narrow questions about (1) applying § 54-102g to felons convicted before the statute’s expansion and (2) whether courts could authorize reasonable force before the 2011 amendment.
- The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed: it held § 54-102g is regulatory (not punitive), that the trial court had jurisdiction, that reasonable force was implicitly available pre‑2011 to effectuate the statute’s mandatory purpose, and that applying the 2003 expansion did not violate the federal ex post facto clause.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Banks) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court had jurisdiction to authorize reasonable force to obtain DNA | Court had jurisdiction because § 54-102g is regulatory, thus action did not affect original sentence | § 54-102g is punitive; trial court lacked jurisdiction because sentence already in effect | Held: statute is regulatory in law and fact; trial court had jurisdiction |
| Whether § 54-102g is punitive in law or fact | Statute’s text, purposes, safeguards show nonpunitive, regulatory scheme | Penalty provision for refusal and intrusive nature of sampling make statute punitive | Held: Not punitive—Mendoza‑Martinez factors and prior case law support regulatory characterization |
| Whether reasonable physical force was authorized prior to 2011 amendment | Implicit authority to use reasonable force is necessary to effectuate the statute’s mandatory DNA collection; later amendment confirms this reading | Statute is silent; silence prohibits court-authorized force before 2011 | Held: Reasonable force was implicitly available pre‑2011 to prevent frustration of legislative purpose; 2011 amendment merely clarified |
| Whether applying the 2003 expansion to felons convicted earlier violates the ex post facto clause | Regulatory requirement does not punish retroactively; ex post facto clause applies only to penal statutes | 2003 expansion imposed a new burden that is retroactive punishment on those convicted before the law | Held: No ex post facto violation—because statute is regulatory, not penal |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Fowlkes, 283 Conn. 735 (Conn. 2007) (standard for reviewing subject matter jurisdiction and whether post‑sentence actions are punitive)
- State v. Waterman, 264 Conn. 484 (Conn. 2003) (Megan’s Law registration held regulatory; applicable two‑part punitive analysis)
- State v. Kelly, 256 Conn. 23 (Conn. 2001) (registration/notification statutes analyzed under Mendoza‑Martinez; penalty provisions do not necessarily render scheme punitive)
- Kennedy v. Mendoza‑Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (U.S. 1963) (factors for determining whether a civil measure is punitive in fact)
- Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (U.S. 1990) (ex post facto clause applies only to penal statutes)
- Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435 (U.S. 2013) (DNA collection from arrestees advances legitimate law enforcement interests and underscores the regulatory investigative purpose of DNA sampling)