State v. Baccala, 163 A.3d 1

Background

On Sept. 30, 2013 Nina C. Baccala went to a grocery store to retrieve a money transfer, became angry when told she could not, and unleashed a 15–20 minute tirade of profane, gendered insults at assistant manager Tara Freeman while gesturing with her cane. Baccala admitted to much of the language at trial.
Baccala was arrested and convicted by a jury of breach of the peace in the second degree (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-181(a)(5)) for using abusive language in a public place; she received 25 days’ incarceration.
On appeal the majority reversed the conviction on First Amendment grounds; Justice Eveleigh (joined by two justices) concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing the speech constituted unprotected "fighting words" and that State v. Szymkiewicz controlled.
Justice Eveleigh analyzed both the federal First Amendment fighting-words doctrine and whether the Connecticut Constitution affords broader protection (Geisler factors), concluding Connecticut does not afford greater protection and that the evidence could support a conviction under the ordinary‑person fighting-words test.
She also found the trial court’s jury instruction on the fighting-words element constitutionally inadequate because it broadened the statute beyond speech likely to provoke imminent violent retaliation, and would reverse and remand for a new trial on that basis.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Baccala)	Held (Eveleigh, J., concurring/dissenting)
Whether the speech at issue falls outside First Amendment protection as "fighting words."	Language was so abusive and personally directed that it would provoke an ordinary person to immediate violence; Szymkiewicz supports conviction.	Denied that her language was unprotected fighting words; originally relied primarily on state-constitutional analysis.	Would uphold conviction under federal fighting-words test: objective "average person" standard applies and evidence was sufficient.
Whether Connecticut Constitution affords broader protection than the federal Constitution for fighting words (Geisler analysis).	State: Connecticut protection is coextensive with federal law for fighting words.	Baccala: Connecticut should be narrower—punishable only when language includes a challenge to fight (historical-exception approach).	Geisler factors favor the state; Connecticut does not provide greater protection here—no requirement of a direct challenge to fight.
Whether the trial court’s jury instruction correctly stated the fighting-words standard.	Instruction adequately described abusive language element.	Instruction was overbroad and failed to require imminence of violent retaliation; preserved or plain‑error review warranted.	Instruction was constitutionally inadequate and overbroad (failed to require imminent violent response); plain error review appropriate; reversal and remand for new trial warranted.
Whether the appeal adequately briefed federal First Amendment sufficiency claim.	n/a (state argued sufficiency under federal standard).	Baccala largely relied on state-constitutional argument and inadequately briefed a federal sufficiency claim.	Federal sufficiency issue was inadequately briefed by defendant (would decline to address), but even if reached, evidence would suffice under Szymkiewicz.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Szymkiewicz, 237 Conn. 613 (Conn. 1996) (affirming breach‑of‑peace conviction where abusive, personally directed language could provoke average addressee to violence)
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (U.S. 1942) (articulating the fighting‑words exception to the First Amendment)
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (U.S. 1972) (requiring that fighting‑words prosecutions be limited to speech likely to provoke immediate violent retaliation)
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (U.S. 1940) (recognizing limits on proselytizing when speech is likely to provoke a breach of the peace)
R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (U.S. 1992) (acknowledging expressive value of some offensive speech while reaffirming narrow categories of unprotected speech)
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (U.S. 1989) (discussing context in free‑speech analysis and reiterating objective ordinary‑person standard)
State v. DeLoreto, 265 Conn. 145 (Conn. 2003) (applying a narrower fighting‑words gloss where the sole addressee was a police officer)
Trusz v. UBS Realty Investors, LLC, 319 Conn. 175 (Conn. 2015) (explaining that federal standards set a floor and Connecticut may afford greater speech protections)
State v. Linares, 232 Conn. 345 (Conn. 1995) (favoring flexible, case‑by‑case state constitutional analysis for speech restrictions)
State v. Buhl, 321 Conn. 688 (Conn. 2016) (emphasizing the need for adequate briefing in complex First Amendment claims)