State Of Washington v. Alberto Avila-cardenas
74100-4
| Wash. Ct. App. | Aug 21, 2017Background
- Three coworkers (Bejar-Avila, Quezada-Ortiz, Rangel) disappeared on December 12, 2010; their bodies were later found at a nursery.
- Police recovered 9mm shell casings at the murder scene that forensic testing matched to a 9mm gun seized from Alberto Avila-Cardenas's home; blood spatter in the gun matched one victim.
- Cell‑phone records placed Avila-Cardenas and two co‑suspects (Alfredo Velez‑Fombona and Clemente Benitez) traveling from Avila‑Cardenas’s home to the victims’ workplace and then to the recovery site the day of the disappearances.
- Velez‑Fombona pleaded guilty to murder and later provided a plea statement describing his role as a driver; Avila‑Cardenas was tried separately and convicted of three counts of first‑degree murder.
- At trial the State introduced (in part) Velez‑Fombona’s plea statement, testimony that Avila‑Cardenas fired his gun in his yard (a shell casing from that firing was recovered), cell‑tower evidence, and forensic ballistics linking the gun to the scene.
- Avila‑Cardenas challenged multiple rulings on confrontation, juror bias, evidentiary rulings, prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance, and sentencing (including the court’s reference to his lack of remorse).
Issues
| Issue | Avila‑Cardenas' Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Confrontation Clause—admission of co‑defendant Velez‑Fombona’s plea statement | The plea statement facially implicated Avila‑Cardenas and violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights | The plea did not facially name or necessarily refer to Avila‑Cardenas; any incrimination arose only when linked to other trial evidence | Admission did not violate the Confrontation Clause (and any error was harmless given overwhelming untainted evidence) |
| Motion to strike venire after juror (Juror 61) expressed difficulty applying presumption of innocence | Juror 61’s comments tainted the whole panel and prejudice required striking the venire | Trial court screened and struck biased jurors; no evidence others were influenced | Trial court did not abuse discretion; panel need not be stricken |
| Ineffective assistance—defense counsel referenced a voluntary police interview in opening and failed to move for mistrial when promised witness (Bryant) did not appear | Counsel should not have promised or referenced inadmissible testimony and should have moved for mistrial when witness failed to appear | Reference was a strategic choice; evidence against defendant was overwhelming; moving for mistrial was not necessarily sound strategy | No deficient performance shown or, alternatively, no prejudice—ineffective assistance claim rejected |
| Motion for mistrial—testimony that Avila‑Cardenas fired gun “towards my feet” contrary to pretrial limine ruling | Witness’s answer violated the in limine ruling and was highly prejudicial; mistrial required | The testimony did not disclose forbidden details (intent/circumstances) and was clarified; limiting instruction given | Denial of mistrial not an abuse of discretion; evidence was probative and any prejudice cured by instruction |
| Prosecutorial misconduct—closing argument appealing to jurors’ passion and victims’ ethnicity | Prosecutor inflamed jury by suggesting victims (Mexican warehouse workers) were devalued by society and urged conviction to make statement | Argument addressed defendant’s post‑crime behavior and motive (belief he wouldn’t be caught); prosecutor had latitude | Remarks referencing victims’ ethnicity were improper but not so incurable or flagrant to warrant reversal in context of entire case |
| Sentencing—court considered lack of remorse; claim of self‑incrimination violation | Inferring lack of remorse from defendant’s choice to speak (or remain silent) violated Fifth Amendment | Defendant voluntarily spoke at sentencing; court may consider his statements (or lack of remorse) and brutality of crime as aggravators | No constitutional error; sentencing court permissibly considered defendant’s remarks and crime severity |
Key Cases Cited
- Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185 (U.S. 1998) (distinguishes statements that facially incriminate from those that require linkage to other evidence)
- Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (U.S. 1987) (confrontation clause principles for admission of codefendant statements)
- State v. Fisher, 185 Wn.2d 836 (Wash. 2016) (redaction and confrontation‑clause analysis; harmless‑error standard for Confrontation Clause violations)
- State v. Fisher, 165 Wn.2d 727 (Wash. 2009) (standards for prosecutorial misconduct review and undue appeals to passion)
- State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322 (Wash. 1995) (Strickland‑style test in Washington for ineffective assistance: deficiency and prejudice)
- State v. Weber, 99 Wn.2d 158 (Wash. 1983) (test for trial irregularities and whether they influenced jury verdict)
