State of Iowa v. Robert Dale Lowe, Jr., 2012 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 8

Detective team entered Audsley’s mobile home with Audsley’s initial consent to enter and question her about Cindy’s overdose at a hospital.
Lowe was present; officers observed Audsley place items in a kitchen cabinet and Lowe flee to the back; marijuana and a pipe were later found in a Del Monte can with a false bottom during a fruit-can search with Audsley’s consent.
Audsley later refused broader consent to search; in the meantime, a search warrant based on marijuana evidence was obtained and executed while Lowe and Audsley were present.
Lowe invoked his right to counsel after Miranda warnings were given during the warrant-based interview; Jenkins then questioned Lowe about dangerous substances, including anhydrous ammonia.
The district court ruled, and the Iowa Supreme Court reviews de novo the Fourth Amendment issues, with mixed holdings on (a) voluntariness of Audsley’s consent and (b) the public-safety exception to Miranda after counsel was invoked.
The court ultimately affirmed the trial court on the search issue but suppressed Lowe’s statements made after his request for counsel; the search evidence was admitted.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was Audsley’s consent to search voluntary?	Lowe argues consent was fruit of prior illegality or involuntary.	State argues consent was voluntary under totality of circumstances.	Consent voluntary; not tainted; evidence admissible.
Did Audsley’s consent bind Lowe to the fruit-can search?	Lowe contends consent by Audsley to search the can should not bind him.	Audsley’s actual and apparent authority bound Lowe to the shared-area search.	Audsley’s consent bound Lowe; search of the fruit can valid; evidence admissible.
Did reinitiation of questioning after Lowe invoked counsel violate Miranda?	Public safety exception could justify reinterrogation after invocation.	Edwards/Edwards principle prohibits interrogation after counsel request; public safety exception not sufficient here.	Reinitiation violated Miranda; Lowe’s statements suppressed.
Did the public safety exception apply to Lowe after he invoked counsel?	Public safety exception should extend to post-invocation inquiries if exigent.	No exigency sufficient; exception narrow.	Public safety exception not satisfied; no exemption; statements suppressed.
Was the marijuana evidence connected to Audsley’s consent valid for the search warrant?	If consent invalid, warrant should fail; but marijuana supplied probable cause.	Consent valid; warrant based on valid evidence; evidence admissible.	Warrant valid; physical evidence admissible.

State v. Lane, 726 N.W.2d 371 (Iowa 2007) (de novo review of constitutional issues; totality of circumstances)
State v. Reinier, 628 N.W.2d 460 (Iowa 2001) (consent voluntariness; deception factors; suppression framework)
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (U.S. Supreme Court 1973) (totality-of-the-circumstances standard for voluntariness of consent)
Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (U.S. Supreme Court 2006) (co-occupant consent; Randoph narrowing for cotenant objections)
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (U.S. Supreme Court 1984) (public safety exception to Miranda)
State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d 767 (Iowa 2011) (rigor in voluntariness analysis under Iowa Constitution; knock-and-talk)
State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260 (Iowa 2010) (sanctity of the home; independent state constitutional analysis)
State v. Ferrier, 960 P.2d 927 (Wash. 1998) (state-level warning requirements in consent cases)
State v. Howard, 509 N.W.2d 764 (Iowa 1993) (promise of leniency vitiates consent to search)
State v. Simmons, 714 N.W.2d 264 (Iowa 2006) (public safety exception in meth lab scenario)
State v. Welch, 801 N.W.2d 590 (Iowa 2011) (written warnings and implied consent approach precedence)
U.S. v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (U.S. Supreme Court 1984) (home privacy and warrants framework context)