State of Iowa v. Michael Cory Kelso-Christy
911 N.W.2d 663
| Iowa | 2018Background
- Michael Kelso‑Christy created a fake Facebook profile impersonating S.P. and solicited sex from S.G., a woman who knew S.P. from high school.
- Posing as S.P., he arranged a sexual encounter at S.G.’s home, instructed her to be blindfolded and handcuffed, then entered, bound her, had intercourse, and left while she remained restrained.
- Investigation linked Kelso‑Christy to the phone number and a latent thumbprint on a condom wrapper; a list of women’s names including S.G.’s was found in his bedroom.
- Kelso‑Christy was charged; plea negotiations reduced counts but he proceeded to a stipulated‑facts trial on burglary in the second degree based on intent to commit sexual abuse.
- Kelso‑Christy moved to dismiss, arguing S.G. had consented (fraud in the inducement), so he lacked specific intent to commit sexual abuse when entering; the trial court denied the motion and convicted.
- The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding deception as to the identity of the sexual partner vitiates consent and supports an inference of intent to commit sexual abuse at entry.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether consent induced by impersonation vitiates consent to a sexual act | State: impersonation negates meaningful consent; consent was to S.P., not Kelso‑Christy | Kelso‑Christy: deception was fraud in the inducement (collateral), so S.G. consented to the act that occurred | Held: impersonation goes to the core of the act (not collateral); consent vitiated when actor misrepresents identity |
| Whether evidence supports specific intent to commit sexual abuse on entry (burglary element) | State: circumstances (fake profile, blindfold, handcuffs, plan to prevent escape) show intent to commit nonconsensual sex | Defendant: lack of direct evidence of intent; believed he had consent via impersonation | Held: circumstantial evidence sufficient to infer intent to commit sexual abuse when entering |
| Whether existing precedent (Bolsinger) controls vitiation analysis | State: Bolsinger distinguished because it involved deception about motive, not actor identity | Defendant: Bolsinger means fraud in inducement does not vitiate consent; impersonation is inducement | Held: Bolsinger not dispositive; deception as to identity is like fraud in the factum and vitiates consent |
| Whether court can extend statute to cover fraudulently obtained consent | State: sexual abuse statute’s ‘‘against the will’’ language is broad and captures deception vitiating consent | Defendant/dissent: statute does not include deception; courts should not judicially expand statute — legislature must act | Held: Majority reads statute to cover all circumstances of actual failure of consent, including deception as to identity; conviction affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Meyers, 799 N.W.2d 132 (Iowa 2011) (broad ‘‘against the will’’ standard captures varied circumstances that vitiate consent)
- State v. Bolsinger, 709 N.W.2d 560 (Iowa 2006) (distinguishes fraud in fact, which vitiates consent, from fraud in the inducement, which typically does not)
- State v. Casady, 491 N.W.2d 782 (Iowa 1992) (intent may be inferred from modus operandi and similar prior acts)
- State v. Radeke, 444 N.W.2d 476 (Iowa 1989) (planned deception and actions near consummation support inference of intent to commit sexual abuse)
- State v. Ball, 262 N.W.2d 278 (Iowa 1978) (consent to intercourse with one person does not imply consent with another)
- Suliveres v. Commonwealth, 865 N.E.2d 1086 (Mass. 2007) (Massachusetts declined to treat deception as substitute for force in rape statute; court emphasized statutory text and legislative role)