STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Randy Scott MEYERS, Appellant.
No. 08-1524.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
June 24, 2011.
132-148
There may have been some good reasons why the parties accepted the framework of
Given the posture of the case, I see no alternative other than to answer the question posed by the parties. I would simply hold that under
IV. Conclusion.
I would hold that under
HECHT, J., joins this dissent.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sheryl A. Soich, Assistant Attorney General, Michael J. Walton, County Attorney, and Julie A. Walton, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
CADY, Chief Justice.
Randy Scott Meyers seeks further review of a decision by the court of appeals that affirmed his conviction for sexual abuse in the third degree and lascivious conduct with a minor. Meyers primarily challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the convictions. On our review, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals and affirm the judgment and sentence of the district court.
I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.
In the fall of 1993, Randy Scott Meyers met and began dating Patricia, a single mother of two children. Meyers was thirty years old. Patricia and her children lived in Davenport. The oldest child, Mindy, was six years old at the timе. Meyers moved in with Patricia and her two children in the spring of 1994. The couple had one child together later that year.
In June 1995, Meyers was convicted of the crime of lascivious acts with a child
Patricia suffered from bipolar disorder during the course of their marriage. She threatened and attempted suicide while the children were present and was hospitalized. Meyers was the “controlling figure” to the children. At times, Meyers physically and mentally abused Mindy, as well as her younger brother. In September 2004, the Department of Human Services (DHS) investigated an injury inflicted on Mindy by Meyers.
After the incident of physical abuse, the already contentious familial circumstances deteriorated rapidly. Meyers, Patricia, and Mindy had started to smoke crack cocaine together. Meyers supplied the cocaine. Mindy quickly developed an addiction to the drug, which caused her to drop out of high school. She was seventeen years old. In late 2004, Patricia sought and received a protective order against Meyers that required him to move out of their Davenport home. Disharmony also developed between Mindy and Patricia, which caused Mindy to leave the home. She began living with Meyers in his trailer outside Davenport.
On New Year‘s Eve 2004, Meyers and Mindy had a party at the trailer. Mindy consumed alcohol at the party. On at least two occasions, guests observed Mindy and Meyers go into Meyers’ bedroom or the bathroom together for thirty minutes оr more. On a separate occasion, Meyers was observed touching Mindy‘s face and hair in a romantic way while telling her she was beautiful.
Mindy lived with Meyers until January 2005, when Patricia sought and obtained a court order for her involuntary commitment for drug treatment. Mindy was initially admitted to a hospital in Davenport for treatment. In the spring of 2005, she was transferred to Youth Shelter Services, a residential treatment facility in Ames.
After Mindy was placed at Youth Shelter Services, Meyers moved to Ames to be closer to her. He was subsequently convicted of lascivious conduct with a minor and was sentenced to one year in jail. Mindy was the victim of the crime. While in jail, Meyers sent Mindy a series of letters. Many of the letters professed love for Mindy and revealed she was the object of his sexual and romantic desires. In one letter dated March 8, 2006, Meyers wrote:
All I want is to buy you things (hold you) and make little ones with you. Please be mine.... It‘s been over 60 days since I‘ve had sex. It has been with this one beautiful blonde.1 She is so gorgouse [sic] so careing [sic] and everything I‘ve ever wanted. I love this beautiful blond! (Her p— taste great) The best I‘ve ever tasted. The best in bed also and she treats me like a king....
In another letter to Mindy dated March 12, 2006, Meyers wrote: “I must have you soon. I must hold you soon.... Remember our shower. I love memories... I‘d give anything to have you again and again and again. You no [sic] what I mean.” Meyers also described Mindy‘s physical attributes in a letter dated March 11, in which he stated:
Your legs are awesome your hips are perfect your chest is more woman than I can handle your lips are thin and hot
These letters were signed “Love, Randy.” In other letters, Meyers signed “Love, Dad.” In onе such letter, Meyers advised Mindy to sell his truck and keep the money to live on and to “be a good kid.” Mindy gave the letters to her Alcoholics Anonymous sponsor and friend, Johnna Folkmann-Ask. Folkmann-Ask confronted Meyers about the letters over the phone and told Meyers to stop calling Mindy.
The DHS child protection worker, who had been initially involved with the family in 2004, Kim Cronkleton Fish, continued working with the family‘s case in 2005. In June 2005, Fish visited Mindy at the Ames shelter to follow up on a report of sexual abuse between Meyers and Mindy. Fish also interviewed Meyers, who admitted he and Mindy had “crossed the line” and that he knew it was wrong. Meyers further admitted to Fish that the sexual activity with Mindy he described in the letters had actually taken place.
The State charged Meyers with two counts of sexual abuse in the third degree, one count of lascivious conduct with a minor, and one count of distributing a controlled substance to a minor for his conduct with Mindy while they resided together in Meyers’ trailer between September 2004 and January 2005. The State offered two alternative theories of sexual abuse under
At trial, the State introduced evidence consistent with the background facts set forth in this opinion. Additionally, the State offered the testimony of an expert witness, Dr. Richard Hutchison, a board-certified clinical psychologist who specializes in the mental health treatment of children and families. Dr. Hutchison opined that Mindy did not have the ability to consent to a sex act with Meyers under all the circumstances of the case. The State asked Dr. Hutchison a series of hypothetical questions about the psychological state of a girl in Mindy‘s circumstances from the time she was sexually abused as a young child by her stepfather to when she moved in with her stepfather and began a romantic relationship with him involving sex.2 Dr. Hutchison generally opined that a girl in Mindy‘s situation would not be psychologically able to effectively consent to sex with her stepfather. He testified that Meyer‘s past abuse of Mindy in their home as her father figure, along with Patricia‘s support of Meyers following the abuse, would confuse a child‘s boundaries and freeze the child‘s emotions at the age of the trauma if left untreated. Dr. Hutchison also testified a child witnessing and experiencing physical violence in the home by Meyers would fear resisting him. He
The district court found Meyers guilty of all charges against him. The court concluded there was insufficient evidence Mindy was “mentally incapacitated” under
Meyers appealed from his conviction for lascivious conduct with a minor and sex abuse in the third degree.3 He primarily challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. The thrust of the challenge targets the absence of testimony from Mindy that the sex acts with him were by force or against her will. Meyers asserts Mindy‘s consent cannot be negated without expert evidence that she suffered from a recognized mental defect. He claims the expert testimony presented by the State that she was psychologically unable to consent is insufficient to vitiate consent under the statute. We transferred the case to the court of appeals. A divided court affirmed the judgment and sentence of the district court. We granted Meyers’ request for further review.
II. Scope of Review.
We review challenges to the sufficiency of evidence presented at trial for correction of errors at law. State v. Hennings, 791 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Iowa 2010). In doing so, we examine whether, taken in the light most favorable to the State, the finding of guilt is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Id. at 832-33. We find evidence substantial if it would convince a rational fact finder the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. McCullah, 787 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Iowa 2010). We draw all fair and reasonable inferences that may be deduced from the evidence in the record. Hennings, 791 N.W.2d at 832-33. In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we find circumstantial evidence equally as probative as direct. State v. Liggins, 524 N.W.2d 181, 186 (Iowa 1994).
III. Evidence of Sexual Abuse.
The State alleges two separate occasions of sexual abuse between September 2004 and January 2005. To sustain the conviction, there must be sufficient
A. Sufficient Evidence of Sex Act.
Our law on the admissibility of confessions has been substantively unchanged since its inception in 1860. See
Although there is no confession by Meyers in this case to any of the charges, there were numerous admissions. Admissions can constitute a confession when thеy “amount to an acknowledgement of the guilt of the offense charged.” Capper, 539 N.W.2d at 364. As a result, admissions are treated with the same evidentiary precautions as confessions. See State v. Polly, 657 N.W.2d 462, 466 n. 1 (Iowa 2003). Thus, admissions of essential facts or elements of the crime made after the alleged crime must be supported with sufficient corroborating evidence. Id.
Corroborating evidence is sufficient to support a conviction based on a confession when it tends to “confirm[] some material fact connecting the defendant with the crime.” State v. Robertson, 351 N.W.2d 790, 793 (Iowa 1984). It is sufficient as long as it supports the content of the confession and if, together with the confession, proves the elements of the charge against the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Wescott, 130 Iowa 1, 8, 104 N.W. 341, 344 (1905). Corroborating evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. See Liggins, 524 N.W.2d at 187. It need not be strong evidence, “nor need it go to the whole of the case so lоng as it confirms some material fact connecting the defendant with the crime.” Id. Circumstantial corroborating evidence may include several facts that, when combined, support the admission. Id.
Meyers admitted to instances of oral sex and sexual intercourse with Mindy in letters he wrote in jail in the spring of 2005. Meyers specifically recounted at least two instances of oral sex and sexual intercourse with Mindy in these letters. At trial, the State also presented evidence that Meyers indicated the relationship and activity described in his letters to Mindy were “her choice.” Finally, the child protective worker testified that Meyers told her he and Mindy had “crossed the line,” and that he “knew it was wrong, but it happened.”
The State also offered additional facts that corroborated these admissions. Aside from the testimony of the child protective
B. Sufficient Evidence Sex Acts Were “By Force or Against the Will of” Mindy.
Meyers next claims there was insufficient evidence the sex acts were done “against the will of” Mindy to support a conviction for sexual abuse in the third degree. See
Structurally, Meyers argues his conduct in this case did not fall within any specific statutory category of
At the outset, it is unnecessary for us to address Meyers’ argument that the “mental defect” standard under
We begin our resolution of the sufficiency-of-the-evidence issue by first examining the applicable statutory language. We recognize it is the respon-
In our search for legislative intent in this case, we first examine the legal history of the statute because it may shed light on whether the particular facts before us were intended to be governed by the current law. See 2B Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes & Statutory Construction § 50:1, at 156 (7th ed.2008) [hereinafter Singer]. As with many other early criminal statutes, Iowa‘s sexual abuse statute was based on the common law. The common law declared it unlawful for a man to engage in sexual intercourse with a woman by force and against her will. Torcia, § 283, at 1. Over the years, statutes have expanded the common law crime to include additional specific circumstances or categories of nonconsensual conduct. Model Penal Code & Commentaries § 213.1 cmt. 1, at 276-77 (1980) [hereinafter Model Penal Code]. The first expansion was to specifically include children viewed by the law to be too young to effectively consent.
Iowa followed the common law approach when it enacted its rape statute in 1851. See
Since that time, the Iowa legislature has built on the common law approach by expanding the crime to add more specific categories of offensive conduct. These categories have been aligned with those circumstances commonly recognized in other states and generally involve sexual intercourse with individuals who are unconscious, drugged, or mentally incompetent. See
Iowa‘s sexual abuse statute then defines six additional categories of third-degree sexual abuse. See 4 Robert R. Rigg, Iowa Practice: Criminal Law § 6.24, at 224 (2010). The first category captures the circumstance when the other person “is suffering from a mental defect or incapacity which precludes giving consent.”
sent remains the lynchpin of the crime, and the legislature has sought over the years to identify more specifiс circumstances of nonconsent while leaving the broader “against the will” standard in place to capture all circumstances of actual nonconsent. See 2A Singer § 47:17, at 378-79 (noting that, unless a contrary intention is apparent, when specific terms follow general terms, the general terms include everything embraced by the specific terms that follow along with things beyond the specific terms that are similar in nature though not expressly mentioned); see also 2A Singer § 47:25, at 429-35 (stating maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius applies in narrow circumstances and is to be disregarded when its application would “thwart the legislative intent made apparent by the entire act“). The structure of the statute does not foreclose psychological circumstances that could work to establish nonconsent.
Further evidence of the legislative intent for psychological circumstances to be included in “аgainst the will” language of
Additionally,
The overall purpose of Iowa‘s sexual abuse statute is to protect the freedom of choice to engage in sex acts. See State v. Sullivan, 298 N.W.2d 267, 271 (Iowa 1980). The sex abuse statute exists to protect a person‘s freedom of choice and to punish “unwanted and coerced intimacy.”
This statutory approach to nonconsent under
Importantly, Bauer illustrates that the mental state of the victim is a proper circumstance to consider in determining if a sex act is nonconsensual. The paralysis felt by the victim in Bauer is compatible with the evidence of the fragile and frozen emotional state of Mindy brought about by her unique and traumatizing history with Meyers as described by the expert witness in this case.
More directly, we recently observed the legislature never intended to limit the circumstances that could be used to vitiate consent under the “by force or against the will” standard of
Additionally, other states have considered whether the statutory element of “force” required to support sexual abuse can include psychological force. In Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 Pa. 537, 510 A.2d 1217, 1226 (1986), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held the state‘s rape statute‘s reference to “forcible compulsion” includes “not only physical force or violence but also moral, psychological, or intellectual force used to compel a person to engage in sexual intercourse against that person‘s will.” The analysis of force by the Pennsylvania court focused on “the totality of the circumstances.” Id. The court cited various factors for the analysis, including
the respective ages of the victim and the accused, the resрective mental and physical conditions of the victim and the accused, the atmosphere and physical setting in which the incident was alleged to have taken place, the extent to which the accused may have been in a position of authority, domination or custodial control over the victim, and whether the victim was under duress.
Id. The Pennsylvania legislature codified the court‘s definition of “forcible compulsion” soon after the court‘s decision.
Similarly, Ohio courts consider the relative age and relationship of the parties to determine whether psychological force is sufficient. See State v. Eskridge, 38 Ohio St.3d 56, 526 N.E.2d 304, 306 (1988). However, Ohio‘s approach to psychological force was limited in a subsequent case, State v. Schaim, 65 Ohio St.3d 51, 600 N.E.2d 661, 665 (1992). In Schaim, the court determined that a father who had a history of sexual acts with his adoptive daughter was not guilty of raping her when she became a twenty-year-old adult. Schaim, 600 N.E.2d at 665-66. The court held the distinction between psychological force and physical force was apparent when the victim was an adult child because an adult child “is not compelled to submit to her father in the same manner as is a four-year-old girl. She is no longer completely dependent on her parents, and is more nearly their equal in size, strength, and mental resources.” Id. at 665. The court firmly held the age of the victim child was significant because
a child of tender years has no real power to resist his or her parent‘s command, and every command contains an implicit threat of punishment for failure to obey. Under these circumstances, a minimal degree of force will satisfy the elements of forcible rape....
... [A] pattern of incest will not substitute for the element of force where the state introduces no evidence that an adult victim believed that the defendant might use physical force against her.
Finally, the consideration of psychological circumstances is consistent with academic commentary examining the issue. Some scholаrs have opined the definition of “force” should include psychological force akin to parameters set out in contract law. Ann T. Spence, A Contract Reading of Rape Law: Redefining Force to Include Coercion, 37 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 57, 57 (2003) [hereinafter Spence] (suggesting contract theory be extended to criminal law definition of “force“); see also James T. McHugh, Interpreting the “Sexual Contract” in Pennsylvania: The Motivations and Legacy of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Robert A. Berkowitz, 60 Alb. L.Rev. 1677, 1686 (1997). In Bolsinger, we held “[f]raud in fact vitiates consent” to sex. Bolsinger, 709 N.W.2d at 564. Similarly, contract principles applicable to finding adequate agreement between people in other situations may aid in understanding whether there has been an equal agreement to sex. Spence, 37 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. at 57; see also Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 Yale L.J. 1087, 1120 (1986) (urging adoption of standard that prohibits fraud to procure sex as contract law forbids fraud to procure money). For example, “the doctrine of undue influence proscribes the use of emotional or psychological force as a means of unfair persuasion in a close relationship.... [and] [t]he doctrine of unconscionability can void contracts that are unfair or reflect an imbalance in bargaining power.” Spence, 37 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. at 70. While there are also significant differences between rape and illegal contracts, the doctrines may be nevertheless helpful as a guide for conceptualizing the important freedom of each individual to consent to sex that is protected by
Considering the legislative history of Iowa‘s sexual abuse statute, the language and purpose of the statute, our prior cases interpreting the statute, and the per-
In assessing the evidence in this case, we note
In this case, the State‘s expert, Dr. Hutchison, rendered an opinion based on the facts and inferences from the evidence established at trial that a person in Mindy‘s situation would have been unable to consent to a sex act with Meyers. Expert testimony may be used to assist a fact finder in determining a victim‘s state of mind as long as the expert does not testify to the ultimate fact of the defendant‘s guilt or innocence. See State v. Griffin, 564 N.W.2d 370, 374-75 (Iowa 1997) (recognizing evidence of battered women‘s syndrome from expert is admissible to show psychological reason for victim‘s recanting of accusation and refusal to testify against defendant); see also State v. Allen, 565 N.W.2d 333, 338 (Iowa 1997) (holding expert witnesses “may express opinions on matters explaining the pertinent mental and physical symptoms of the victims of abuse” if expert testified about the effects of the victim‘s mental condition on her ability to tell the truth); State v. Gettier, 438 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Iowa 1989) (approving expert testimony linked to an explanation of PTSD and the typical reaction of a rape victim); State v. Chancy, 391 N.W.2d 231, 234 (Iowa 1986) (noting in third-degree sex abuse trial that “there seems to be no question about the potential of psychological evidence in the present case to assist the trier of fact[, and] [t]he victim‘s lack of mental capacity is ... key element in the crime charged“). We give the district court‘s assessment of the credibility of Dr. Hutchison‘s opinion regarding Mindy‘s mental state considerable deference. In re Det. of Barnes, 689 N.W.2d 455, 457 (Iowa 2004).
Based on the history between Meyers and Mindy, together with the expert testimony at trial assessing all the surrounding facts and circumstances in this case, we conclude substantial evidence supports the finding by the district court that the sex acts were performed at a time when Mindy was unable to consent to sex with him. Meyers did not challenge the admissibility of the expert testimony, only that it was insufficient to support a conviction. Yet, all the facts and circumstances presented at trial, including the expert testimony, were sufficient for a fact finder to infer the sex acts were nonconsensual.
There was evidence that Meyers pursued and engaged in a sexual and romantic relationship with his high-school-age stepdaughter while she was in a very vulnerable psychological state. Her vulnerability was not only due to her crack cocaine addiction, her estrangement from her mother, and her need for support and shel-
IV. Sufficient Evidence of Lascivious Conduct with a Minor.
To support the charge of lascivious conduct with a minor, the State must show (1) Meyers was over eighteen years old; (2) Meyers was in a position of authority over Mindy; (3) Mindy was under the age of eighteen; and (4) Meyers forced, persuaded, or coerced Mindy to disrobe or partially disrobe for the purpose of satisfying the sexual desires of either of them.
V. Meyers’ Pro Se Claim.
Meyers has filed a pro se brief in this case, asserting the district court erred by failing to rule on a motion to dismiss in this case. Meyers claims this failure violated his constitutional right to due process. No motion to dismiss appears in the record before us on this case. Issues on appeal not raised in the district court are deemed waived. Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002). Consequently, we do not address a violation of Meyers’ constitutional right to due process.
VI. Conclusion.
After consideration of all the issues presented for our review, we affirm the judg-
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
All justices concur except MANSFIELD, J., who takes no part.