State of Iowa v. Jason Gene Weitzel
16-1112
| Iowa Ct. App. | May 3, 2017Background
- Defendant Jason Weitzel pleaded guilty to one felony (domestic-abuse assault) and three indictable misdemeanors (possession of methamphetamine — 2nd offense, carrying weapons, OWI) as part of a plea agreement; one felony was dismissed.
- During the plea colloquy the district court informed Weitzel of the minimum and maximum fines for each offense and confirmed his understanding, but did not disclose the chapter 911 criminal-penalty surcharges (35% of fines) or determine whether he understood those additional penalties.
- Weitzel did not file a motion in arrest of judgment after the plea; the State concedes the court failed to give the Rule 2.8(2)(d) advisory about the need to file such a motion.
- On appeal Weitzel challenged the adequacy of the plea colloquy under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)(b)(2) (penal consequences disclosure), relying on State v. Fisher which required disclosure of chapter 911 consequences but left open whether omission of surcharges alone defeats substantial compliance.
- The court considered whether the omission was a rule-based defect (objective substantial-compliance inquiry) or a due-process/inducement claim (subjective voluntariness), and what remedy follows for a rule violation presented on direct appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the plea colloquy substantially complied with Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(2)(b)(2) despite failing to disclose chapter 911 surcharges | The State: substantial compliance shown by informing fines and overall financial exposure; Oldham/form assertion of post-plea form may cure advisory | Weitzel: omission of mandatory 35% surcharges meant the court did not inform or determine his understanding of the full penal consequences | Court: No substantial compliance — failure to disclose surcharges and to determine understanding violated Rule 2.8(2)(b) |
| Whether Weitzel is procedurally barred for not filing a motion in arrest of judgment | State: Rule 2.24(3)(a) would normally bar appeal; argues substantial compliance via plea form | Weitzel: court failed to give Rule 2.8(2)(d) advisory, so the bar does not apply | Court: Not barred — State conceded district court did not give required 2.8(2)(d) advisory; direct appeal allowed |
| Standard for remedy when Rule 2.8(2)(b) is not substantially complied with (harmless/material-inducement vs automatic vacatur/remand) | State: urge harmless-error or material-inducement approach (some prior panels applied) | Weitzel: rule-based claim requires vacatur/remand to plead anew | Court: Rejects harmless/material-inducement on direct rule-based claim; follows White/Loye/Fisher — vacate convictions and remand to allow plea anew |
| Relationship between rule-based disclosure claims and due-process (voluntariness) claims | State: omissions may be harmless if defendant actually knew or was not induced | Weitzel: omission undermines knowing/voluntary plea | Court: Distinguishes claims — rule-based inquiry is objective (court conduct); due-process is subjective; remedy for a rule-based violation on direct appeal is vacatur/remand, regardless of post-hoc proof of actual knowledge |
Key Cases Cited
- McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969) (explains prophylactic purpose of plea-colloquy rule and endorses vacatur/remand when Rule 11 not complied with)
- State v. Fisher, 877 N.W.2d 676 (Iowa 2016) (holds chapter 911 consequences are part of punishment and must be disclosed under Rule 2.8(2)(b); vacatur required for noncompliance)
- State v. White, 587 N.W.2d 240 (Iowa 1998) (holds guilty plea void where court failed to ensure defendant was informed of maximum punishments; requires vacatur/remand)
- State v. Loye, 670 N.W.2d 141 (Iowa 2003) (court must inform defendant of penal consequences; defendant’s actual knowledge does not excuse court’s obligation under Rule 2.8(2)(b))
- State v. Meron, 675 N.W.2d 537 (Iowa 2004) (describes substantial-compliance standard: the court must convey the essence of each rule requirement)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (governs ineffective-assistance-of-counsel prejudice standard referenced for alternative remedies)