This appeal requires us to decide whether a plea of guilty was properly entered in a criminal case and whether the challenge to the plea was properly preserved for appellate review. Upon our review, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals, reverse thе judgment and sentence of the district court, and remand the case for further proceedings.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Kathy Meron was arrested for shoplifting at a Younkers store in Black Hawk County. She was charged by trial information with theft in the third degree, an aggravated misdemeanor. Iowa Code § 714.1, .2(3) (2001). During the pendency of the action, Meron was again arrested for shoplifting. This arrest occurred at a Wal-Mart store in Cedar Falls. The police also discovered a controlled substance in her purse, apparently during a search incident to the arrest. She was charged by a second trial information with theft in the third degree and possession of a controlled substance, second offense, an aggravated misdemeanor. Id. §§ 714.1, .2(3), 124.401(5).
A few months later, Meron appeared in district court with her attorney for a dis-positional hearing on two probation revocation proceedings arising from prior criminal convictions. She also requested to enter pleas of guilty to the pending theft and possession of controlled substance charges. After the district court was informed that Meron had not prepared written pleas of guilty, the following exchange occurred:
THE COURT: Ms. Meron, before I proceed with your guilty plea, there are several things that I must first determine on the record. However, because this is an aggravated misdemeanor аnd because you are represented by an attorney, I may somewhat abbreviate these proceedings and the questioning that I must go through in order to make my determinations, if I have your permission to do so. May I have your permission to do so?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Ms. Meron, have you been over with your attorney the nature of the charge which has been made against you as well as the maximum and minimum penalties to which you subject yourself by entering this plea of guilty?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And do you understand what you’re charged with and what the maximum possible penalties are?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Have you also been over with your attorney the constitutional rights that you waive by entering a plea of guilty?
THE DEFENDANT: Pretty much so, yes.
THE COURT: Well, pretty much isn’t good enough.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And do you understand those rights?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: And do you have any questions abоut them at this time?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
THE COURT: Mr. Dubbert, do you believe that you’ve gone over with your client all of her constitutional rights that she waives by entering a plea of guilty?
MR. DUBBERT: I do, Your Honor.
*540 THE COURT: And do you believe she understands those rights and is making a voluntary and intelligent waiver of those rights?
MR. DUBBERT: Yes, Your Honor.
The district court was then informed of a plea agreement concerning concurrent sentencing and recommendations for treatment. These matters were thoroughly discussed with Meron. The district court next inquired into the voluntary nature of the pleas. The district court made this inquiry by asking Meron if she understood that there would be no trial, and by explaining the maximum sentences she faced, as well as the details of the plea agreement. Meron aсknowledged she understood that there would be no trial and understood the sentences she faced. Mer-on also admitted the facts underlying the charges. She again acknowledged that her attorney had explained to her the rights she was forfeiting by pleading guilty. Meron then asked to waive time for sentencing and acknowledged she undеrstood she was waiving her right to file a motion in arrest of judgment. She was not, however, informed by the district court of the purpose of the motion or the consequences of failing to file the motion.
The district court accepted the pleas of guilty and sentenced Meron. She filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, she claims her pleas were not voluntarily or intelligently made because the district court failed to cover all the requirements of Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)(5) before accepting her pleas of guilty.
We transferred the case to the court of appeals. It found the district court failed to substantially сomply with rule 2.8(2)(¾) in accepting the plea, but concluded Meron waived the plea requirements of the rule by agreeing to the abbreviated procedure used by the district court. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment and sentence. We granted further review.
II. Scope of Review.
Our review of a claim of error in a guilty plea proceeding is at law. See Iowa R.App. P. 6.4.
III. Error Preservation.
The State first claims Meron did not preserve error because she failed to file a motion in arrest of judgment as required by rule 2.24(3)(a). Generally, a defendant must file a motion in arrest of judgment to preserve a challenge to a guilty plea on appeal. Iowa R.Crim. P. 2.24(3)(a) (“A defendant’s failure to challenge the adequacy of a guilty plea proceeding by motion in arrest of judgment shall preclude the defendant’s right to assert such challenge on appeal.”);
State v. Worley,
In this case, Meron never filed a motion in arrest of judgment. Nevertheless, she claims her present challenge to her guilty pleas wаs not waived because the district court failed to inform her of the procedure to file the motion and the consequences of failing to follow the procedure. The State argues the district court substantially complied with the notification requirements of rule 2.8(2)(d) when Meron acknowledged in open court that her attornеy had informed her of the right to file the motion and when she expressed her willingness to waive the right.
*541
We recently clarified the procedure trial courts must follow to inform defendants about making challenges to a plea of guilty under rule
2.8(2)(d)
in cases involving serious or aggravated misdemeanors. In
State v. Barnes,
The State asserts the written waiver exception to an in-court colloquy recognized in Barnes should be extended to the situation where the defendant acknowledges in open court, as Meron did in this case, that her right to file a motion in arrest of judgment was explained to her by her attorney. The State argues that Barnes can be broadly read to mean that the required information under rule 2.8(2)(d) can be imparted to the defendant by means other than a personal colloquy with the defendant, including assurances to the court that counsel for the defendant provided the information to the defendant. In other words, the State wants us to treat an in-court assurance of defense counsel the same as a properly drawn written waiver executеd by the defendant. The State suggests this is compatible with the underlying purpose of the rule that the defendant be informed. 1
We need not decide if
Barnes
can be extended as urged by the State. Rule
2.8(2)(d)
clearly imposes two requirements.
See Worley,
IV. Plea Colloquy.
We next address a claim by Meron that the in-court colloquy in support of her guilty plea did not comply with the requirements of rule 2.8(2)(6). The State argues the district сourt substantially complied with the rule, and the failure by the district court to specifically address each specific requirement of the rule was overcome when it confirmed with Meron that *542 her attorney had fully discussed with her the trial rights that were lost by pleading guilty.
A defendant waives a variety of constitutional rights by pleading guilty to a criminal offеnse, and it is fundamental that a plea of guilty is valid only if it is given voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
See State v. Hook,
There was no written plea of guilty filed in this case. Consequently, we look to the in-couit colloquy as the source for determining compliance with the requirements of rule 2.8(2)(b). Substantial compliance is required.
State v. Myers,
In this case, the substantial compliance standard was not satisfied. A number of the requirements of the rule were totally ignored. For example, there was nothing said to Meron that conveyed the concept that she could compel the attendance of witnesses at trial or that she could not be forced to incriminate herself.
See State v. Dowis,
V. Waiver of Plea Colloquy.
The State asserts that the absence in the record of any reference to some of the rights required to be discussed under *543 rule 2.8(2)© is not fatal because Meron affirmatively waived the necessity for the court to explain all the requirements of the rule. The State relies upon the following language of rule 2.8(2)©:
The court may, in its discretion and with the approval of the defendant, waive the above procedures in.a plea of guilty to a serious or aggravated misdemeanor.
The State claims waiver occurred in this case when Meron agreed to abbreviate the proceedings. The court of appeals adopted this claim in affirming the judgment and sentence of the district court.
Prior to our decision in
Kirchoff,
we interpreted rule 2.8(2)© to require the district court to engage in an in-court colloquy with the defendant covering all the requirements of the rule.
See
We recognize that the waiver language of rule 2.8(2)© was a codification of our holding in
Kirchoff. Hook,
This background reveals the flaw in the State’s argument. There are two separate components of rule 2.8(2)©.
See Myers,
We further reject the State’s argument that the defendant’s consent to an abbreviated proceeding at least supports a relaxation of the substantial compliance standard in those cases, like this case, where the defendant is represented by counsel, the charges are misdemeanors, the defendant acknowledges that counsel explained all rights, and the plea is entered pursuant to a plea bargain which is adopted by the court at sentencing. This approach is completely contrary to the purpose of the rule. Rule 2.8(2)© was enacted for the рurpose of ensuring that all “guilty pleas are made voluntarily, intelligently, and with a factual basis.”
Kirchoff,
VI. Conclusion.
We conclude the requirements of rule 2.8(2)(6) were not met. We vacate the decision of the court of appeals, reverse the judgment and sentence of the district court, and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings to allow the defendant to plead anew.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Notes
. In
State
v.
Worley,
. Rule 2.8(2)(&) provides:
b. Pleas of guilty. The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty without first determining that the рlea is made voluntarily and intelligently and has a factual basis. Before accepting a plea of guilty, the court must address the defendant personally in open court and inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands, the following:
(1) The nature of the charge to which the plea is offered.
(2) The mandatory minimum punishment, if any, and the maximum possible punishment provided by the statute dеfining the offense to which the plea is offered.
(3) That a criminal conviction, deferred judgment, or deferred sentence may affect a defendant’s status under federal immigration laws.
(4) That the defendant has the right to be tried by a jury, and at trial has the right to assistance of counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against the defendant, the right not to be compelled to incriminate oneself, and the right to present witnesses in the defendant's own behalf and to have compulsory process in securing their attendance.
(5) That if the defendant pleads guilty there will not be a further trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty the defendant waives the right to a trial.
The court may, in its discretion and with the approval of the defendant, waive the above procedures in a plea of guilty to a serious or aggravated misdemeanor.