978 F.3d 708
9th Cir.2020Background
- EPA amended municipal solid-waste landfill emissions guidelines in 2016, lowering the emissions threshold and triggering regulatory timelines for state implementation plans and a federal plan if states failed to act.
- Under pre-2019 regulations, EPA had a November 30, 2017 deadline to promulgate a federal plan where states did not submit approvable plans; EPA missed that deadline.
- Several states sued, and the district court enjoined EPA to approve/disapprove state plans and to issue a federal plan by November 6, 2019; EPA complied with the approval/disapproval deadline but not the federal-plan deadline.
- While litigation was pending, EPA amended its timing regulations (finalized August 2019) to extend the federal-plan deadline to August 30, 2021 and made that change applicable to the 2016 guidelines.
- EPA sought relief under Rule 60(b)(5) to modify the injunction in light of the new regulations; the district court denied modification (temporarily stayed), and the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding refusal to modify was an abuse of discretion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rule 60(b)(5) requires modification of an injunction when subsequent law permits what the injunction forbids | States: courts should perform a broad, fact-specific equitable inquiry and may keep injunction in place despite a legal change | EPA: change in law removed the injunction’s legal basis; modification is required | Court: When law now permits previously forbidden conduct, refusal to modify is an abuse of discretion; modification required |
| Whether Rufo’s fact-intensive consent-decree analysis governs modification requests based on superseding law | States: Rufo framework should apply to all Rule 60(b)(5) motions, requiring equitable balancing | EPA: Rufo is aimed at consent decrees or fact-changed cases and is inapposite where law, not facts or party expectations, has changed | Court: Rufo does not control here; changed law alone can require modification of an injunction (non-consent) |
| Whether an agency’s own rulemaking can be the basis for Rule 60(b)(5) relief | States: allowing an agency to evade injunctions by changing its own rules risks abuse | EPA: an agency is the competent authority to change the law and may seek modification when it removes the legal duty | Court: Agency-made regulatory changes are valid bases for modification; separation-of-powers concerns do not bar prospective application of new law |
| Whether an injunction that required a single discrete future act differs from ongoing decrees for modification purposes | States: single-task injunctions are distinguishable and may weigh against modification | EPA: prospective effect, not label, controls—if law removes duty, modification follows | Court: No meaningful distinction; prospective injunctions are amenable to modification when underlying law changes |
Key Cases Cited
- Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. 421 (1855) (change in law that legalizes previously enjoined conduct requires modification)
- Systems Fed’n No. 91, Ry. Emps.’ Dept. v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642 (1961) (statutory change can justify lifting prospective relief)
- Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (courts must modify injunctions when subsequent law/precedent removes their basis)
- Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992) (consent-decree modification requires fact-specific equitable inquiry)
- Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995) (distinguishes final judgments from prospective equitable relief for separation-of-powers analysis)
- Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000) (prospective decrees may be altered by intervening law without violating separation of powers)
- Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994) (injunctive relief is prospective and governed by intervening law affecting future obligations)
- California Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Leavitt, 523 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2008) (change in statute that removes legal basis for order warrants modification)
- Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1986) (changed law authorizing previously forbidden conduct requires modification)
- Bellevue Manor Assocs. v. United States, 165 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 1999) (discussing modification factors; unusual procedural posture led to broader equitable analysis)