State of Arizona v. David Lee Green, 459 P.3d 45

David Lee Green had prior convictions: drug paraphernalia (1994) and solicitation to sell a narcotic drug (2006); in 2017 he was convicted of two counts of possession of a narcotic drug and possession of drug paraphernalia.
Green moved for sentencing under A.R.S. § 13-901.01 (Proposition 200), arguing his 2006 solicitation conviction was not a "personal possession or use" conviction (a "strike"), so he remained eligible for mandatory probation with drug treatment.
The trial court treated the 2006 solicitation conviction as a strike (relying on prior appellate decisions) and imposed prison sentences; the court of appeals reversed, holding the solicitation conviction did not qualify as a personal possession/use conviction.
The Arizona Supreme Court granted review to decide (1) whether convictions for possession for sale count as strikes under § 13-901.01 and (2) whether inchoate drug offenses (attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, facilitation) count as strikes.
The Supreme Court affirmed Green’s convictions but vacated his sentences and remanded for resentencing under § 13-901.01, holding possession-for-sale convictions are not strikes and that inchoate personal-possession offenses are treated the same as completed personal-possession offenses (while inchoate sale/trafficking offenses remain excluded).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether convictions for possession of drugs for sale count as "personal possession or use" strikes under § 13-901.01	Green: § 13-901.01(C) expressly excludes "possession for sale," so sale convictions are not strikes	State: prior appellate precedent treated sale convictions as strikes and excluding them yields absurd results	Held: Sale/trafficking convictions are excluded by subsection (C); possession-for-sale convictions are not strikes
Whether inchoate drug offenses (attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, facilitation) count under § 13-901.01	Green: his 2006 solicitation to sell was not a personal-possession strike	State: inchoate offenses should count as strikes consistent with some prior cases; excluding them would frustrate voters' intent	Held: Inchoate personal-possession offenses count like completed personal-possession offenses; inchoate sale/trafficking offenses are excluded. Solicitation to sell is not a strike

Goddard v. Superior Court, 191 Ariz. 402 (App. 1998) (held possession-for-sale convictions count as strikes under § 13-901.01)
Ossana v. Ariz. Dept. of Corr., 199 Ariz. 459 (App. 2001) (refused to count attempted possession as a strike)
Stubblefield v. Trombino, 197 Ariz. 382 (App. 2000) (reasoned attempted possession should count as a strike)
Raney v. Lindberg, 206 Ariz. 193 (App. 2003) (held attempt offenses count as prior convictions for sentencing)
State v. Estrada (Estrada II), 201 Ariz. 247 (2001) (articulated the absurdity standard for statutory interpretation)
State v. Gallagher, 205 Ariz. 267 (App. 2003) (treating multiple possession convictions arising from the same occasion as one conviction for sentencing)
Foster v. Irwin, 196 Ariz. 230 (2000) (noting Proposition 200 distinguishes noncommercial possession from commercial trafficking)