State of Arizona v. Christopher Mathew Payne
233 Ariz. 484
| Ariz. | 2013Background
- Defendant Christopher Mathew Payne and his girlfriend Reina Gonzales kept Payne’s children confined, malnourished, and abused; both children died and Payne was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, three counts of child abuse, and two counts of concealing a dead body; death sentences were imposed for the murders.
- Gonzales cooperated with the State, pled to second-degree murder and testified against Payne; one child’s body was recovered from a storage-tote; the other was not found.
- Trial raised numerous pretrial, evidentiary, and sentencing issues: juror strikes and voir dire, change of venue, admissibility of Payne’s stationhouse statements, exclusion of testimony about Gonzales’s threats, admission of evidence of heroin sales, jurors’ exposure to restraints, theories and unanimity on child-abuse counts, and mitigation evidence excluded at penalty phase (notably "good inmate" evidence).
- The trial court admitted Payne’s post-arrest statements after finding Miranda and voluntariness claims without abuse of discretion; many evidentiary rulings were reviewed for abuse of discretion or fundamental error depending on preservation.
- The jury found three aggravating factors—especially cruel/heinous/depraved, multiple homicides, and victims’ young age—and recommended death; the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed convictions and sentences but one justice dissented on harmlessness of excluding "good inmate" mitigation.
Issues
| Issue | Payne's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Improper juror dismissals (various jurors) | Court excused or failed to rehabilitate some jurors unfairly, denying impartial jury | Excusals and refusals to strike were lawful given questionnaires, under-oath answers, and discretion | No reversible error; standard ranged from fundamental-error to abuse-of-discretion review; excusals upheld except non-prejudicial procedural lapse on one telephonic, unsworn rehabilitation attempt |
| Change of venue / pretrial publicity | Publicity was pervasive and prejudicial; venue should change | Publicity was largely factual, remote in time, and jurors could be admonished; no carnival atmosphere | Denied: Payne failed to show presumed or actual prejudice |
| Post-arrest statements (Miranda, invocation, voluntariness) | Invoked right to counsel and silence; statements involuntary due to withdrawal and promises | Invocation was noncustodial/ineffective; silence ambiguous; statements voluntary | Admission upheld: invocation ineffective (not custody), silence ambiguous, statements voluntary under totality of circumstances |
| Exclusion of testimony about Gonzales’ threats (hearsay/constitutional) | Reyes should testify that Gonzales threatened to kill the children (relevant to blame) | Statements were hearsay, raised collateral issues, and were cumulative and prejudicial | Exclusion affirmed as valid Rule 403 exercise; other testimonial avenues (Gonzales) were available; no constitutional violation |
| Admission of heroin-sales evidence | Prejudicial other-act evidence used to show bad character | Evidence probative of motive/absence from home (explains why children were left) and limited by instruction | Admitted as relevant to motive; court limited detail and instructed jury; no abuse of discretion |
| Jurors seeing Payne in restraints outside courtroom | Brief exposure to shackles created inherent prejudice requiring mistrial/alternate designation | Incidents were brief/inadvertent; jurors said they could be impartial; not the Deck-level courtroom shackling | Denied: no actual prejudice shown; brief exposure outside courtroom not inherently prejudicial |
| Child abuse mens rea and unanimity on multi-act counts | Must prove defendant intended or knew the background "circumstances" were likely to cause death; jury unanimity required on which act | "Circumstances likely to produce death" is an objective element (no separate mens rea); alternative acts within a count are permissible absent reasonable way to distinguish | Court held mens rea applies to actor’s conduct not to objective circumstances; sufficiency and unanimity claims rejected; counts not duplicitous in context |
| Exclusion of mitigation ("good inmate") at penalty phase | Excluding relevant mitigating evidence violated Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and affected sentencing | Evidence was minimal, low-weight mitigation; exclusion harmless given overwhelming aggravation | Majority: exclusion harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and death sentences affirmed; concurrence: would vacate and remand because harmlessness not proved for excluded mitigation |
Key Cases Cited
- Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005) (visible shackling of defendant in front of jury is inherently prejudicial in the courtroom)
- Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (requirement that after invocation of counsel, interrogation must cease until counsel is present or defendant reinitiates)
- McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991) (Miranda rights must be invoked during custodial interrogation; anticipatory invocations outside custody are ineffective)
- Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985) (juror bias standard: strike for cause where views would prevent or substantially impair duties)
- Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (sentencer must be able to consider any relevant mitigating evidence in capital cases)
- Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986) (evidence of good behavior in custody can be relevant mitigating evidence at capital sentencing)
- Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996) (states may preclude voluntary-intoxication evidence for mens rea without violating due process)
- State v. Dann, 205 Ariz. 557 (2003) (procedures and standards for juror challenges and voir dire)
- State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389 (2006) (review standards for admission of confessions and prosecutorial misconduct)
- State v. Gallardo, 225 Ariz. 560 (2010) (standard for abuse-of-discretion review of aggravating-factor findings in capital cases)