State National Insurance v. County of Camden, 824 F.3d 399

Background

Anderson sued Camden County for negligence after a serious car crash; jury awarded $31 million (remitted to $19 million). State National was the County’s excess insurer (policy triggered above $300,000, $10 million limit).
County used in-house counsel Donna Whiteside to defend; State National alleged late notice and inadequate defense by Whiteside, and sued the County and Whiteside after the verdict for declaratory relief and malpractice, among other claims.
District Court dismissed Whiteside under Rule 12(b)(6) (Mar. 17, 2010) as her liability was derivative of the County and because proximate causation was lacking; State National’s timely Rule 59(e) motion was denied and Rule 54(b) certification was refused.
State National later filed a Rule 60(b)(6) motion (Apr. 25, 2014) to renew claims against Whiteside after the court’s March 31, 2014 order on summary judgment against the County; the court considered briefing on that motion.
State National and the County entered a joint Stipulation of Dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) on Oct. 14, 2014; the District Court denied the Rule 60(b) motion and closed the case on Dec. 1, 2014.
State National filed a notice of appeal Dec. 16, 2014 (62 days after the stipulation). The Third Circuit held the appeal untimely and dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction, so it did not address the merits.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over State National’s appeal	State National argued its Rule 60(b) motion tolled the appeal period and/or the District Court’s active consideration made the denial the operative final order, so its Dec. 16 appeal was timely	Whiteside argued the joint stipulation of voluntary dismissal (Oct. 14) was an automatic final judgment that triggered the 30-day appeal clock; State National’s appeal was therefore untimely	Held: No jurisdiction — the stipulation was a final judgment; appeal filed beyond 30 days and tolling rules did not apply, so appeal dismissed
Whether Rule 60(b)(6) was a proper vehicle to revive Whiteside’s interlocutory dismissal	State National contended the Rule 60(b) motion (or the court’s inherent power exercised while motion pending) could revive the interlocutory dismissal and thus permit tolling/appeal from denial	Whiteside contended Rule 60(b) applies only to final judgments; the original dismissal was interlocutory and not subject to Rule 60(b) after lapse of time; any reconsideration power ended upon the stipulation	Held: Rule 60(b) was not a proper route because the March 2010 dismissal was interlocutory at filing and the stipulation later made the case final; the Rule 60 motion did not toll appeal time
Whether any appellate tolling provision applied to State National’s post-judgment motions	State National argued tolling under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A) because its Rule 60(b) (or treated-as-Rule 60) motion was pending	Whiteside argued the motion was neither a timely Rule 59(e) nor a valid Rule 60(b) that met the 28-day filing requirement for tolling; thus no tolling applied	Held: No tolling — motion was not a timely Rule 59(e) and did not qualify under Rule 4(a)(4)(A)(vi) for Rule 60(b) tolling
Whether the District Court retained jurisdiction to reconsider Whiteside’s dismissal after the Rule 41 stipulation	State National (and dissent) argued the District Court retained inherent power or effectively retained jurisdiction by actively considering the motion, so the ruling denying renewal was the first final resolution	Whiteside (and majority) argued the Rule 41 stipulation automatically ended the action and divested the court of jurisdiction over the dismissed matters	Held: Majority held the stipulation ended the action and deprived the court of jurisdiction; the court’s post-stipulation consideration could not create appellate jurisdiction

Key Cases Cited

Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007) (appeal timeliness is jurisdictional; courts cannot excuse jurisdictional filing deadlines)
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994) (district court’s ancillary jurisdiction over settlement enforcement is limited)
Torres v. Chater, 125 F.3d 166 (3d Cir. 1997) (functional approach to Rule 60(b) appeals; denial may be appealable in certain circumstances)
Penn West Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 371 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 2004) (denial of Rule 60(b) may be reviewed where the denial wraps up all matters pending on the docket)
Lizardo v. United States, 619 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2010) (untimely post-judgment motions do not toll appellate deadlines even if considered on the merits)
Versata Software, Inc. v. Callidus Software, Inc., 780 F.3d 1134 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) stipulation is self-executing; voluntary dismissal moots pending appeals)
Meinecke v. H&R Block, 66 F.3d 77 (5th Cir. 1995) (stipulation of dismissal is effective upon filing; subsequent district court actions are superfluous)
First Nat’l Bank of Toms River v. Marine City, Inc., 411 F.2d 674 (3d Cir. 1969) (stipulated dismissal under Rule 41 is automatic)