2020 Ohio 63
Ohio2020Background
- S.R. 16 in Licking County was built as a limited-access, four-lane highway; a 1960 centerline plat and 1961 easement conveyances accompanied the project.
- Alice Olmsted granted two easements in 1961: (1) an S.R. 16 highway easement (which included a broad waiver of direct access "as called for by the plans") and (2) a small C.R. 128 easement; the project plans showed a labeled "Point of Access" where County Road 128 (C.R. 128) met S.R. 16.
- New Wen (successor to part of Olmsted’s land) operates a Wendy’s on the NW quadrant of that intersection; its property extends to the centerline of C.R. 128 and includes part of the C.R. 128 easement area.
- In November 2016 ODOT closed the four-way intersection where C.R. 128 met S.R. 16, removed the short stretch of C.R. 128 between Wendy’s access and S.R. 16, and opened an interchange ~0.4 miles east; Wendy’s lost direct ingress/egress to S.R. 16 and access distances from S.R. 16 increased markedly.
- New Wen sued in mandamus to force ODOT to commence appropriation proceedings for a taking; the Supreme Court granted the writ as to New Wen, concluding the closure constituted a compensable taking of a retained access right preserved by the 1961 plans/easement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether closure of the intersection was a compensable taking of property | New Wen: ODOT eliminated a property right of access (a "stick" in the bundle) preserved by the 1961 plans/easement and did not pay compensation for that loss | ODOT: Olmsted waived all direct-access rights when she conveyed the S.R. 16 easement; any closure occurred within preexisting easement scope and was foreseeable/consistent with highway purposes | Held: Yes. The court: New Wen retained an access right by virtue of the plans and easement language; closure deprived New Wen of that right and appropriation proceedings are required |
| Whether Olmsted’s 1961 waiver foreclosed any later takings claim | New Wen: The waiver was conditional on the project plans; those plans explicitly preserved a Point of Access, so the later closure took an interest not compensated in 1961 | ODOT: The statutory limited-access designation and the express waiver extinguished any access right; compensation in 1961 covered access matters | Held: The court rejected a categorical waiver theory—the easement’s waiver was conditioned by the plans that showed a Point of Access, so the 2016 closure deprived a preserved right |
| Whether the 2016 change was a foreseeable use (no additional compensation) | New Wen: The closure imposed a new burden not contemplated by the plans, so additional compensation is owed | ODOT/Dissent: Conversion of an access point to an interchange or other traffic-flow improvement was foreseeable for a limited-access highway; no new use beyond the easement’s purposes | Held: The court concluded the express preservation of the Point of Access undermined a presumption of foreseeability and thus the closure required compensation |
| Whether the taking physically occurred on New Wen’s property | New Wen: The removed segment of C.R. 128 lay partly on New Wen’s property (centerline boundary), so the physical taking occurred on its land | ODOT: Closure occurred within the S.R. 16 easement; compensation was already paid to Olmsted | Held: The court found the removal occurred in part on New Wen’s property (within the C.R. 128 easement portion belonging to New Wen), supporting a physical-taking claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (establishing the principle that government cannot force some people alone to bear public burdens)
- State ex rel. R.T.G., Inc. v. State, 780 N.E.2d 998 (Ohio 2002) (takings jurisprudence overview cited for constitutional principles)
- State ex rel. Merritt v. Linzell, 126 N.E.2d 53 (Ohio 1955) (aborning rule: abutting owner has private easement of ingress/egress)
- Masheter v. Blaisdell, 282 N.E.2d 42 (Ohio 1972) (damages in appropriation must be actual and reasonably foreseeable; plans/specs govern compensable rights)
- Ziegler v. Ohio Water Serv. Co., 247 N.E.2d 728 (Ohio 1969) (installation in existing easement that does not take an additional "stick" generally requires no additional compensation)
- Sears v. Hopley, 132 N.E. 25 (Ohio 1921) (compensation presumed paid for uses consistent with right to travel and road improvement)
- Rothwell v. Linzell, 127 N.E.2d 524 (Ohio 1955) (limited-access designation may require compensation if it extinguishes existing access)