State ex rel. DeMora v. LaRose (Slip Opinion)
2022 Ohio 2173
Ohio2022Background
- Ohio’s redistricting commission adopted and this court repeatedly invalidated multiple legislative maps in 2021–2022, causing uncertainty about legislative districts and the May 3, 2022 primary ballot for General Assembly and state-central-committee races.
- The General Assembly enacted emergency H.B. 93 preserving the February 2 (90-day) and February 22 (72-day) filing deadlines for the May 3 primary and expressly limited the secretary of state’s authority to change those filing deadlines for that primary.
- A federal three-judge panel ordered (May 27, 2022) that Ohio finish the state-legislative primary on August 2, 2022 and directed use of Map 3; that order took effect May 28, leaving 66 days until the August 2 primary.
- Secretary of State LaRose issued Directive 2022-34 instructing county boards to reject declarations filed after the original February deadlines; several prospective candidates filed declarations in May and June (timed to be 90/72 days before August 2) and were rejected.
- Original relators (six candidates) sued in mandamus asking the Ohio Supreme Court to order the secretary and certain county boards to accept and certify their May filings as timely under R.C. 3513.05 and 3513.041; intervening relators sought either a new 10-day filing period or postponement of the primary to allow new filings.
- The Ohio Supreme Court granted mandamus in part for the original relators (ordering acceptance/certification if otherwise qualified) and denied the intervenors’ requests for relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether declarations filed 90 days (or 72 days for write-ins) before Aug 2 are timely under R.C. 3513.05/3513.041 | Statutory deadlines are measured from the actual day of the primary; because the federal order set Aug 2 as the primary, filing 90/72 days before Aug 2 is timely by operation of law | Filings are void because Aug 2 did not legally exist when filed; the secretary and H.B. 93 constrained changes to filing windows for the May 3 primary | Court: deadlines tie to the primary date; the May filings fell within the 90/72-day windows before Aug 2 and thus were timely for original relators; mandamus granted to require boards to accept/certify them if otherwise qualified. |
| Whether the secretary has a clear legal duty to create a new filing period or reopen filings (intervenors’ request) | Intervenors: secretary should rescind Directive 2022-34 and open a 10-day filing window or postpone the primary to permit filings | LaRose: no statutory duty or authority to create new deadlines; H.B. 93 limited his authority; federal order did not reopen filing windows | Court: no clear legal duty to create a new filing period or postpone the primary; intervenors’ mandamus denied. |
| Whether Directive 2022-34 was issued in clear disregard of law and therefore unlawful for original relators | Original relators: directive unlawfully instructs boards to reject declarations that are timely under the statute as measured from Aug 2 | LaRose: directive reasonable to preserve statutory structure and avoid retroactive/invalid filings; federal order did not address filing windows | Court: directive improperly led boards to reject filings that were timely under R.C. 3513.05/3513.041 measured from Aug 2; ordered Secretary to instruct boards to accept original relators’ filings. |
| Whether equitable/Prucell-based disruption concerns bar mandamus relief close to the election | Relators: remedy enforces statutory rights; adding correctly-filed candidates outweighs administrative burdens | LaRose: adding candidates now will disrupt administration, UOCAVA deadlines, and ballot printing; courts should avoid late election interference (Purcell) | Court: Purcell does not bar mandamus here; enforcing statutory deadlines (not creating new rules) justified relief for original relators despite administrative burdens; but intervenors not entitled to equitable extension absent statutory duty. |
Key Cases Cited
- State ex rel. Linnabary v. Husted, 138 Ohio St.3d 535 (Ohio 2014) (mandamus requires clear legal right, clear legal duty, and no adequate remedy)
- State ex rel. Lucas Cty. Republican Party Exec. Comm. v. Brunner, 125 Ohio St.3d 427 (Ohio 2010) (mandamus review for abuse of discretion or clear disregard of law)
- Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (U.S. 2006) (judicial changes to election rules close to an election risk disruption and should be avoided)
- State ex rel. Stevens v. Fairfield Cty. Bd. of Elections, 152 Ohio St.3d 584 (Ohio 2018) (court may order addition of a wrongly excluded candidate even after UOCAVA-related deadlines in appropriate cases)
- State ex rel. Ferrara v. Trumbull Cty. Bd. of Elections, 166 Ohio St.3d 64 (Ohio 2021) (administrative construction of an ambiguous statute merits deference only when statute is truly ambiguous)
- State ex rel. Grady v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 78 Ohio St.3d 181 (Ohio 1997) (definition of abuse of discretion)
- In re N.M.P., 160 Ohio St.3d 472 (Ohio 2020) (apply plain statutory language as written)
- Wayt v. DHSC, L.L.C., 155 Ohio St.3d 401 (Ohio 2018) (a plain and unambiguous statute must be applied as written)