THE STATE EX REL. LUCAS COUNTY REPUBLICAN PARTY EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE v. BRUNNER, SECY. OF STATE.
No. 2010-0435
Supreme Court of Ohio
April 30, 2010
125 Ohio St.3d 427, 2010-Ohio-1873
Submitted April 27, 2010
Baker & Hostetler, L.L.P., John H. Burtch, Rodger L. Eckelberry, and Robert J. Tucker, for relators New Models and Timothy Crawford.
Axelrod, L.L.C., Brian J. Laliberte, and David F. Axelrod, for relator Norman B. Cummings.
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, and Richard N. Coglianese, Erick D. Gale, and Pearl M. Chin, Assistant Attorneys General, for respondent.
Per Curiam.
{¶ 1} This is an original action for a writ of mandamus to compel respondent, Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner, to appoint Jon Stainbrook to the Lucas
Facts
{¶ 2} On January 9, 2010, the faction that claims to be the Lucas County Republican Party Executive Committee with Jon Stainbrook as its chairperson (“Stainbrook faction“) recommended that Secretary of State Brunner appoint Stainbrook to the Lucas County Board of Elections for the four-year term beginning March 1, 2010. The secretary of state received the recommendation on January 11.
{¶ 3} On January 15, 2010, the faction with Jeffrey Simpson as its chairperson that also claims to be the Lucas County Republican Party Executive Committee (“Simpson faction“) recommended that Secretary of State Brunner appoint David W. Dmytryka to the Lucas County Board of Elections for the same four-year term. The secretary of state received this recommendation on January 19.
{¶ 4} By letter dated January 25, the Stainbrook faction requested that the secretary of state respond to certain legal questions concerning the two factions and stated that the secretary could not permit the board of elections to continue acknowledging the Simpson faction as a lawfully organized group. An elections counsel for the secretary of state replied that the secretary would not give an advisory opinion because
{¶ 5} On February 18, 2010, in Gallagher v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections, Lucas C.P. No. CI-0201001192–00, the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas held that neither competing group had complied with the applicable requirements of
{¶ 6} On March 1, the secretary of state rejected both factions’ recommended appointees for the board of elections. The secretary of state determined that she was unable to accept either recommendation “[u]ntil either the Lucas County Republican Central and Executive Committee is able to organize according to law, or until one of the factions or some other configuration of members is recognized by either a court or the Ohio Republican Party State Central
{¶ 7} On March 9, the Stainbrook faction filed this action for a writ of mandamus to compel the secretary of state to appoint Stainbrook to the board of elections and for a writ of prohibition to invalidate the secretary‘s appointment of Marsh to the board. The Stainbrook faction also requested a peremptory other writ, including an emergency other writ, precluding the appointment of Marsh. A few days later, we granted an alternative writ on the mandamus claim, dismissed the prohibition claim, and denied the requests for an emergency other writ and emergency alternative writ. State ex rel. Lucas Cty. Republican Party Executive Commt. v. Brunner, 124 Ohio St.3d 1513, 2010-Ohio-930, 923 N.E.2d 156. The secretary of state filed an answer, and the parties submitted evidence and briefs.
{¶ 8} This cause is now before the court for our consideration of the merits.
Legal Analysis
{¶ 9} The Stainbrook faction requests a writ of mandamus to compel the secretary of state to appoint Stainbrook to the board of elections. “To be entitled to the requested relief, relator[] must establish a clear legal right to the requested relief, a corresponding clear legal duty on the part of the secretary of state to provide it, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.” State ex rel. Heffelfinger v. Brunner, 116 Ohio St.3d 172, 2007-Ohio-5838, 876 N.E.2d 1231, ¶ 13. In extraordinary-writ actions challenging a decision of the secretary of state, the standard is whether the secretary engaged in fraud, corruption, or abuse of discretion, or acted in clear disregard of applicable law. State ex rel. Owens v. Brunner, 125 Ohio St.3d 130, 2010-Ohio-1374, 926 N.E.2d 617, 2010 WL 1253883, ¶ 26. There is no evidence or argument of fraud or corruption here, so the dispositive issue is whether the secretary of state abused her discretion or clearly disregarded applicable law by rejecting the Stainbrook faction‘s recommended appointee and appointing her own selection.
{¶ 10} The Stainbrook faction asserts that the secretary of state abused her discretion and clearly disregarded
{¶ 11} “At a meeting held not more than sixty nor less than fifteen days before the expiration date of the term of office of a member of the board of elections, or
{¶ 12} “All party committees, the selection of which is provided for in sections
{¶ 13} “If more than one organized group claims to be the rightful county central or executive committee, each such group shall file a list of its officers and members as provided in section
{¶ 14} “Our paramount concern in construing statutes is legislative intent.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Grace, 123 Ohio St.3d 471, 2009-Ohio-5934, 918 N.E.2d 135, ¶ 25. “To discern this intent, we must ‘read words and phrases in context according to the rules of grammar and common usage.‘” State ex rel. Mager v. State Teachers Retirement Sys. of Ohio, 123 Ohio St.3d 195, 2009-Ohio-4908, 915 N.E.2d 320, ¶ 14, quoting State ex rel. Lee v. Karnes, 103 Ohio St.3d 559, 2004-Ohio-5718, 817 N.E.2d 76, ¶ 23. Under the standard for construing statutes in pari materia, statutes relating to the same subject matter must be construed together to give full effect to the provisions. State ex rel. Colvin v. Brunner, 120 Ohio St.3d 110, 2008-Ohio-5041, 896 N.E.2d 979, ¶ 46.
{¶ 15} “The statutory framework [governing appointments to county boards of elections] establishes a bipartisan composition of the state‘s boards of elections, which provides county executive committees of the two major political parties with the right to recommend appointees who shall be appointed by the secretary of state. [Under
{¶ 16} The Stainbrook faction claims that because its recommended appointee was not rejected for incompetence, the secretary of state had a duty under
{¶ 17} We reached a similar conclusion in State ex rel. O‘Neil v. Griffith (1940), 136 Ohio St. 526, 17 O.O. 160, 27 N.E.2d 142, paragraph two of the syllabus, in which we construed different, predecessor versions of
{¶ 18} “If recommendations are made by more than one committee, each claiming to be the rightful executive committee, the secretary of state, before making any such appointment, shall notify the chairman of the state central committee of such political party, which state central committee shall certify which is the rightful committee of such party, and such committee so certified shall be recognized by the secretary of state. If the state central committee fails to make such certification within ten days after the giving of such notice, the Secretary of State shall determine which of the contesting committees is the rightful executive committee, and shall make the appointments as provided in the preceding section.” (Emphasis added.) G.C. 4785-9, 118 Ohio Laws 223.
{¶ 19} This entire paragraph was deleted from the statute in 1941. 119 Ohio Laws 741, 741-742. But the state central committee retains the authority granted in the predecessor to
{¶ 20} We will not adopt the construction advocated by the Stainbrook faction, which would allow the secretary of state to usurp the state central committee‘s authority to resolve the conflicting claims. Instead, as the Stainbrook faction itself readily acknowledges, “[t]he Secretary of State is not concerned with the affairs of any political party or organization and has no part as such official in the political management or control of any party. [The secretary] is concerned only in the functions to be performed by them through their duly constituted committees pursuant to the provisions of the statute in relation to the election machinery of the state.” (Emphasis added.) O‘Neil, 136 Ohio St. at 530. It was unclear which, if any, of the rival executive committees was duly established at the time the secretary had to appoint a person to the board of elections.
{¶ 21} Moreover, when the secretary of state rejected the two competing groups’ recommended appointees, the common pleas court had expressly held that neither group had complied with the applicable requirements of
{¶ 22} Therefore, the secretary of state was authorized to select a different person than those recommended by the competing groups, and she exercised this authority by appointing Marsh to the board of elections. See
{¶ 24} Therefore, based on the plain language of the pertinent statutes and the applicable precedent, the secretary of state neither abused her discretion nor clearly disregarded applicable law by denying the Stainbrook faction‘s recommended appointment of Stainbrook and by appointing Marsh to the board of elections.
Conclusion
{¶ 25} The Stainbrook faction has not established its entitlement to the requested extraordinary relief in mandamus. Moreover, insofar as it still requests relief in the form of an other writ, this relief is inappropriate, and we have previously denied it. See State ex rel. Scioto Downs, Inc. v. Brunner, 123 Ohio St.3d 24, 2009-Ohio-3761, 913 N.E.2d 967, ¶ 24 (denying request for an other writ under
Writ denied.
PFEIFER, Acting C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, FARMER, O‘DONNELL, FRENCH, and CUPP, JJ., concur.
SHEILA G. FARMER, J., of the Fifth Appellate District, sitting for O‘CONNOR, J.
JUDITH L. FRENCH, J., of the Tenth Appellate District, sitting for LANZINGER, J.
The late Chief Justice THOMAS J. MOYER did not participate in the decision in this case.
Anthony J. DeGidio; and Ciolek Ltd. and Scott A. Ciolek, for relator.