395 P.3d 714
Ariz. Ct. App.2017Background
- In 1996 Congress enacted PRWORA and IIRIRA to limit aliens’ access to state/local public benefits and barred states from granting residence‑based postsecondary benefits (e.g., in‑state tuition) to aliens not "lawfully present."
- In 2012 DHS implemented DACA, deferring removal and authorizing employment (EADs) for certain people brought to the U.S. as children; DACA does not by statute grant lawful immigration status or expressly make recipients eligible for state benefits.
- Maricopa County Community College District (MCCCD) accepted DACA recipients’ EADs as proof of residency for in‑state tuition; Arizona Attorney General (AAG), directed by the Governor, sued for declaratory and injunctive relief; two DACA students intervened.
- The trial court held DACA recipients are "lawfully present" and eligible for in‑state tuition; AAG appealed the denial of its motions and grant of summary judgment to MCCCD and the students.
- The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed: it held Congress’ statutory scheme defines who is "lawfully present" for state/local benefits (limited to "qualified aliens"), DACA recipients are not among those qualified for in‑state tuition, and Arizona law (Prop 300 statutes) conforms to that federal framework.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (AAG) | Defendant's Argument (MCCCD / Students) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing: Did AAG have authority to sue MCCCD? | Governor directed AAG to enforce state law; AAG has authority under A.R.S. §41‑193(A)(2). | MCCCD argued AAG lacked statutory/constitutional power to initiate the suit. | AAG had standing—Governor’s direction authorized prosecution; suit may proceed. |
| Are DACA recipients "lawfully present" for purposes of in‑state tuition under PRWORA/IIRIRA? | "Lawfully present" for benefits is defined by Congress as "qualified aliens"; DACA recipients are deferred action beneficiaries but not "qualified aliens," so ineligible. | DACA plus EADs make recipients "lawfully present"; states may treat them as eligible for residence‑based benefits. | Held: Congress defined eligibility for state/local benefits; "lawfully present" (for those benefits) means the statutorily qualified classes, not DACA deferred‑action recipients; DACA recipients are not eligible. |
| Does Arizona law (Prop 300: A.R.S. §§15‑1803, 15‑1825) conflict with federal law or get preempted? | Prop 300 implements federal restrictions and does not expand eligibility to non‑qualified aliens; thus it is consistent with federal law. | Students argued Prop 300 is preempted or should be read to permit DACA recipients as "lawfully present." | Held: Arizona statutes mirror federal scheme and are not preempted; Prop 300 bars DACA recipients from in‑state tuition. |
| Equal Protection: Did AAG’s enforcement single out DACA recipients in violation of Equal Protection? | Enforcement merely followed federal classifications; no disparate treatment beyond Congress’ classifications. | Students claimed disparate treatment of DACA recipients versus other deferred‑action beneficiaries. | Held: No cognizable equal‑protection violation on this record; classification aligns with Congressional distinctions and is rationally related to legislative objectives. |
Key Cases Cited
- Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012) (federal supremacy and limits on state regulation of immigration enforcement and related domains)
- Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (agency prosecutorial discretion and general unreviewability of enforcement declinations)
- Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (courts must look to Congress when an agency’s authority over a major policy question is unclear)
- Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (Congress may rationally distinguish aliens in determining access to public benefits)
- Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (equal protection principles regarding primary/secondary education for undocumented children)
- Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471 (1999) (deferred action as part of prosecutorial discretion in immigration enforcement)
- Martinez v. Regents of the University of California, 50 Cal.4th 1277 (2010) (state in‑state tuition and interpretation of IIRIRA/PRWORA as covering tuition benefits)