284 F. Supp. 3d 1015
N.D. Cal.2018Background
- California enacted the TRUST, TRUTH, and Values Acts plus confidentiality provisions governing (among other things) when local law enforcement may respond to DHS/ICE detainers, when jails must notify detainees about immigration-agent interviews, and limits on sharing personal/juvenile/victim information for immigration-enforcement purposes.
- 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (passed 1996) prohibits government entities from restricting communication of immigration-status information to federal immigration authorities. DOJ/agency guidance tied FY2017 Byrne JAG and certain COPS grants to grantee certifications of compliance with § 1373.
- California applied for COPS (CAMP, AHTF) and Byrne JAG funds and submitted certifications (some with caveats reserving constitutional challenges). DOJ sent letters raising § 1373 compliance concerns about specific provisions of the Values Act (inquiries, notification responses, sharing of "personal information").
- DOJ delayed issuing FY2017 Byrne JAG award documents while it assessed compliance; California sued DOJ and AG seeking a declaration that the § 1373 certification condition (as interpreted by DOJ) is unconstitutional and moved for a preliminary injunction to compel grant funding (or prevent withholding).
- The district court held: California has standing and ripeness to challenge the certification condition, but the State did not show irreparable harm or a likelihood of success on the merits at the preliminary-injunction stage; the motion for preliminary injunction was denied without prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (California) | Defendant's Argument (DOJ/Federal) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Justiciability (standing & ripeness) | California has a well‑founded fear of enforcement and imminent harm from threatened loss/delay of federal grants and interference with sovereign police powers | No live controversy as DOJ has not made final enforcement decisions beyond Values Act; other claims speculative | California has Article III standing and constitutional ripeness; claims may be adjudicated |
| APA challenge to imposition of §1373 certification | Certification as applied is arbitrary and capricious because DOJ gave insufficient reason for the change and failed to consider effects | The certification is final agency action and rationally related to DOJ goals; procedural exemptions apply to grant conditions | Imposition of the certification condition is final agency action, but record is insufficient to find arbitrary and capricious at PI stage |
| Spending Clause/relatedness to JAG purpose | Requiring §1373 compliance is unrelated to Byrne JAG's criminal-justice purposes and thus unconstitutional coercion under spending power | Statutory solicitation requires compliance with applicable federal laws; low-threshold relatedness to grant purpose satisfied | Relatedness is a close call; at low-threshold standard the condition may have sufficient nexus depending on interpretation of §1373 |
| Tenth Amendment/commandeering | DOJ's interpretation of §1373 (forcing disclosure of personal info and release dates) commandeers state functions and exceeds federal power | Condition is a voluntary grant condition, not a direct regulatory mandate; §1373 does not commandeer because it does not compel states to enact or administer federal laws | Novel constitutional question; record insufficient to conclude DOJ's interpretation violates the Tenth Amendment; no likelihood of merits success shown at this stage |
Key Cases Cited
- Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012) (federal plenary power over immigration balanced against state authority)
- Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (preliminary injunction standard)
- Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2011) (serious questions/ balance of hardships standard for injunction)
- Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (final agency action test)
- Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (agency decisionmaking consummation principle)
- Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (arbitrary and capricious review standard)
- New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (anti-commandeering principle)
- Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (federal government may not commandeer state officers)
- National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (limits on federal coercion of states)
- Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) (federal preemption and limits on regulation of states' handling of personal data)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing requirements)
- Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (standing and redressability)
- City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (denying injunction as to §1373 certification; enjoined notice/access conditions)
- City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 579 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (enjoining DOJ conditions including §1373 certification as arbitrary and capricious under APA)