Smith v. Berryhill
139 S. Ct. 1765
| SCOTUS | 2019Background
- Ricky L. Smith applied for Title XVI (SSI) disability benefits; his claim was denied initially, on reconsideration, and by an ALJ after a merits hearing.
- Smith (through counsel) sought Appeals Council review; SSA counted his filing as untimely, found no good cause, and the Appeals Council dismissed the request as untimely.
- SSA regulations treat Appeals Council dismissals for untimeliness as binding and not subject to further agency review.
- Smith sued in federal district court challenging the Appeals Council dismissal; the district court and Sixth Circuit held they lacked jurisdiction because the dismissal was not a "final decision . . . made after a hearing" under 42 U.S.C. §405(g).
- The Government reversed its prior position and agreed the dismissal is reviewable; the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split.
- The Supreme Court considered statutory text, context, the presumption favoring judicial review, and administrative-law principles before ruling for Smith.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an Appeals Council dismissal as untimely (after an ALJ merits hearing) is a “final decision . . . made after a hearing” under §405(g) | The dismissal is a final agency decision tied to an ALJ hearing and therefore reviewable in federal court | Historically SSA and several circuits held such dismissals are not §405(g) final decisions; the phrase should be read to require a merits disposition after exhaustion | Yes. The Court held the dismissal is a §405(g) final decision subject to judicial review because it is the agency’s terminal action and follows the ALJ hearing |
| Proper scope of judicial action on review (go to merits vs. remand) | Court may proceed to the merits if it finds the procedural dismissal erroneous | Ordinarily a remand is appropriate to let the agency address the merits first | Ordinary rule: jurisdiction exists to reach merits, but generally courts should remand to permit the agency to address substantive issues first; exceptions exist where remand is unnecessary |
Key Cases Cited
- Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214 (statutory use of “any” suggests expansive reading)
- Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (denial of petition to reopen is not a §405(g) final decision)
- Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (APA two-part finality test: consummation and legal consequences)
- Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467 (presumption favoring review; Social Security scheme protective of claimants)
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (distinction between jurisdictional and waivable exhaustion requirements)
- Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103 (agency-authorized exhaustion sequence; courts respect agency-defined procedures)
- Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (agency deference framework discussed and limited here)
- Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638 (limits on applying Chevron where agency would define scope of judicial power)
