Singleton v. Clash, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92088

Background

Three plaintiffs (John Doe/S.M., Cecil Singleton, Kevin Kiadii) sued Kevin Clash under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, alleging he violated 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422 (all plaintiffs) and 2423 (Doe) by engaging in sexual acts with them while they were minors.
Alleged misconduct occurred in mid‑1990s–2004 when each plaintiff was a minor; each plaintiff filed suit in 2012–2013, years after reaching majority.
§ 2255(b) then provided a six‑year limitations period from accrual (or three years after a minor reaches majority).
Plaintiffs invoked a discovery rule, arguing accrual was delayed until ~2012 when they realized their psychological injuries and the causal connection to the defendant.
Defendant moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) as time‑barred; court considered whether a discovery rule applies to § 2255 and whether the 2013 extension of the limitations period revives the claims.
Court granted dismissal: held § 2255 does not incorporate a discovery rule, plaintiffs’ claims accrued at victimization, and the 2013 amendments do not revive already‑expired claims.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 2255 accrual is governed by a discovery rule	Plaintiffs: statute is silent; equitable discovery rule should delay accrual until they discovered injury/cause (circa 2012)	Clash: § 2255's text and structure show Congress did not intend a discovery rule; claims accrued at victimization	Discovery rule does not apply; accrual occurs when claim comes into existence (victimization)
Whether plaintiffs’ claims accrued when psychological harm was later recognized	Plaintiffs: accrual should await plaintiff’s ability to connect injury to conduct	Clash: accrual is objective — plaintiffs knew the critical facts at the time of abuse and could have sued then	Court: accrual is objective; plaintiffs were victims upon abuse and could have sought legal advice then; later subjective connection is irrelevant
Whether the statutory exception for minors (3 years after majority) or other textual features imply a discovery rule	Plaintiffs: special minor context supports tolling until discovery	Clash: explicit minor exception counsels against implying additional exceptions; Congress could have included a discovery clause but did not	Court: express statutory exception for disability/minors shows Congress rejected broader discovery tolling; no implied discovery rule
Whether the 2013 amendment extending limitations from 6 to 10 years revives otherwise time‑barred claims	Plaintiffs: (implicitly) amendment might affect timeliness for claims pending or filed after amendment	Clash: amendment is not retroactive and cannot resurrect already‑expired claims	Court: amendment is not retroactive absent clear congressional intent; it does not revive claims that expired under prior law

Key Cases Cited

McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2007) (pleading standard on motion to dismiss)
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (court need not accept legal conclusions)
Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2002) (documents considered on 12(b)(6))
TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001) (statutory silence can permit implication of congressional intent against discovery rule)
Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633 (2010) (discovery rule is exception to standard accrual rule)
Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549 (2000) (accrual and policy reasons favor repose)
United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979) (discovery rule: accrual when plaintiff knows injury and cause)
Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949) (latent disease accrual principles)
In re Enterprise Mortg. Acceptance Co., LLC Sec. Litig., 391 F.3d 401 (2d Cir. 2004) (amendment extending limitations period does not revive expired claims absent clear congressional intent)
Doe v. Boland, 698 F.3d 877 (6th Cir. 2012) (interpretation of § 2255 victim/injury and minimum‑damages rule)