*1 URIE v. THOMPSON, TRUSTEE. Argued January
No. 129. May 31, 1949. Decided *2 Guy W. argued Green the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Louis N. Wolf.
Lyman 3. Bishop argued the cause for respondent. With him on brief were Thomas 3. Cole-and D. C. Chastain.
Daniel W. Knowlton Stanley and 3. Payne filed brief the Interstate Commerce Commission as amicus curiae. Rutledge
Mr. Justice delivered opinion *3 Court. primary
The question is whether coverage the the of Employers’ Federal Liability Act Inspec- and the Boiler tion Act1 injuries includes in occupational nature of the disease, here silicosis, or is exclusively in- confined juries by inflicted accident. After having béen twice the, before Supreme Missouri, Court of the case is here'on certiorari, 335 review of its final decision for, on the second appeal that recovery may not be had for other than accidental injuries; A the statement/of course taken by the in proceedings courts, hs well as state of the facts, becomes for necessary resolving the issues presented.
In 1941 petitioner Tom filed Urie suit under the Federal Employers’ Liability against respondent Act Thompson, trustee of the According Missouri Railroad. Pacific petitioner’s a fire- allegations', had been as h§ eimplQyed man on steam of locomotives the’ Missouri interstate lt)40 Pacific for roughly thirty In years. had been he forced, to cease work aby pulmonary diagnosed disease
1 Respectively and 45 U. S. C. seq, seq. § (cid:127)§ 45 U. S. 51 et et C. disabling had affliction permanently This silicosis.. inhalation dust of silica blown continuous by caused been he of locomotives on which into the cabs or sucked dust concentration of silica injurious had The worked. rail- petitioner arose from the by the air breathed ma- boxes of sanding sand road’s use its locomotives’ per of silica or silicon containing 80 to cent terials ad- by faultily the locomotives’ dioxide and the emission of materials in excessive “sanders”2 such sand justed provide traction for beyond those needed amounts Respondent Thompson, of locomotive wheels. trustee the exercise due 1933, “knew, since of railroad arising known,” danger should have silicosis care petitioner’s employment.3 the conditions respondent’s court demurrer trial sustained complaint. appeal Supreme On Court held the Missouri the action not be maintained virtue could Liability alone, Federal reason respondent “anticipated plaintiff’s could not have . injury-, petition . . therefore . . does facts sufficient to constitute cause of action for stat'e Act.” Employers Liability Federal 211, 219. felt, however, 352 Mo.- The court malfunctioning the locomotives’ sanders claimed allegation an of breach of the Boiler § substance that, proof Inspection Act since breach support recovery would under the Federal latter Act *4 2 given' by is, men colloquially, the name railroad “Sander” appurtenant to a locomotive which stores sand and apparatus entire needed, apparatus rails, provide The pipes it traction. to the as commerce, 120,- mandatory equipment I. C.'Rule in interstate C. 235, 49 For 91.120;. I.' Rule C. F. R. 91.235. 49 C. F. R. C. C. § § powered apparatus, descriptions compressed-air sanding of a succinct Co., opinions & O. R. the successive in Anderson Baltimore see 2d 2d F. 629 and 96 F. 796. 89 3 note 9. See
Employers’ Liability regard Act without respondent’s Trunk negligence, Lilly 481, v. Grand 317 U. S. 485-486, petitioner had stated cause of action. Fur- thermore, Federal the court held Employers’ Liability three-year limitations, 45 Act’s statute of U. C.S. petitioner’s did not bar claim his § since “cause May, .1940, action accrued in he incapaci- when became . tated . . .” 352 at 222. Accordingly Mo. the court judgment reversed the and remanded the cause trial. On remand petitioner complaint charge his amended specifically violations of the Boiler Act. Sec- Act, tion 2 of that amended, as it “unlawful for makes any permit carrier to use or any to be used on its line said boiler, tender, locomotive unless its and locomotive, all parts appurtenances and are in proper thereof condi- .operate tion and safe to the service to which the same may put, employed are the same be in the active of such carrier without to life unnecessary peril (cid:127)service or limb . . . .” 45 U. C. 23.4 The violations al- § S. (1) faultily leged were were broken sanders adjusted so as (2) to release too much and sand that the locomotive decks and in a repair, cabs were bad state of continues, The section locomotive, bouei, “and unless said its tender, parts all appurtenances and inspected thereof have been from time to time . . and able are to withstand test or tests may prescribed regulations in the pro rules and hereinafter §23, vided for.” 45 U. C. S. Stat. 38 Stat. 43 Stat. 659.
Section was first enacted in 1911 to cover the locomotive boiler appurtenances, and its Stat. It was broadened 1915 to 1192; include the tender, entire locomotive 38 Stat. see the 1924 amendment. 43 Stat. 659. complaint, second amended to which the demurrer involved appeal applied, specifically the first did not mention either the.
Federal Liability Inspection Act, Act or the Boiler but generally set supreme forth facts from which the court’s state con-. concerning drawn, applicability elusions of those acts were *5 openings and through various cracks admitting dust have ought which been and elsewhere iloor the cab’s off. sealed instructions that jury, under tried to
.The' case was petitioner should and that was not iss.ue he had contracted silicosis proved that prevail if he and continu- of an “absolute respondent’s breach reason all their and engines duty locomotive to have such ing proper condition thereof, parts appurtenances safe, life peril to the unnecessary . . without operate . in the petitioner jury . . .” Tom Urie found $30,000. amount of Court Supreme Missouri respondent’s appeal the
Upon Mo. this verdict. judgment entered.on reversed did not “treat on the review it Noting that 738. former an at is not evil .which 'silicosis’ contention aimed,” id. at 746, the court concluded the Act is safety Inspection promoting “is aimed Boiler due injury, distinguished from accidental Id. at 749r of harmful .dusts.” gradual .the inhalation successive supreme the state court’s It was to review Liability Employers’ of the Federal constructions Acts our writ was issued. Boiler
I. attention. engage contentions first our preliminary Two whether, by the question outset are met at We claim sufficiency petitioner’s legal regard without barred, Acts as to both Act, that either claim Act’s Liability of the Federal operation of limitations. statute (cid:127) , 25, 1941. Under terms qxi November filed suit Urie thrq limitations,5 -year statute' of' prevailing of the then limitations, The former statute 45 U. C. 56. S. § two-year years by the lengthened three 1939*.amendment'. 35 Stat. to ' ' 53 Stat. 1404.
the court could not entertain claim if Urie’s the. “jsause of action accrued” before Respond- November *6 Urie, ent having exposed contends been to silica dust approximately 1910, since must unwittingly have con- 1938, long tracted silicosis before and hence that his “cause of action” be deemed have “accrued” than' longer must years three before the institution of this action. Alier-C natively argued it be that each may of inhalation silica/ separate dust a giving was tort to a fresh rise “cause of action,” and that is therefore limited to a forj Urie claim inhalations between November spring day 1940 when he incapacitated.6 became however, In our view, neither of the outlined construc- tions of the statute of limitations can For, be sustained. if Congress we assume that intended to occupa- include tional diseases thé category injuries of compensable under the Employers’ Liability Inspec- Federal and Boiler tion Acts, süch mechanical of 'the analysis “accrual” of petitioner’s injury by breath, breath or at one —whether- unrecorded progress moment in the of disease —can only serve to thwart the' congressional purpose.
If Urie were held prosecuting barréd this action said, because he a law, must be matter have con- tracted prior 25, 1938, it would silicosis November be clear that legislation only the federal -afforded Urie remedy. delusive It past would mean that some moment, in time, unknown and unknowablé inherently in retrospect, with charged knowledge Urie even tragic disintegration slow and lungs; his under this view diagnose Urie’s within the applicable failure to; of limitations a symptoms statute disease whose had yet obtruded on his would constitute waiver consciousness right his to compensation at day the ultimate of dis- covery-and disability. Pullman Pieczonka Cf. 89 F. 2d 356-357. dusty that each intake accept we the theory
Nor can case, In present of action.” a"fresh “cause breath arguably, would, of such rule application example, pro- of his damages aggravation to that petitioner’s limit months eighteen to the last gressive traceable would have been employment. petitioner Moreóver his merely railroad, or had wholly from suit left the barred he exposure silica involving no transferred to work been the disease discovering dust, more than three before years with which he was afflicted.7 legislative plan intended think humane
We do not Nor ignorance. consequences to attach to blameless can reconciled consequences do we those think limitations, which statutes of purposes traditional *7 a within conventionally claims require the assertion of of of after notice of the specified period time invasion The clear that Urie be- rights. record before us is legal that May diagnosis ill to work in of 1940 and too came following weeks. accomplished was of his condition he known suggestion no that. should have There is Urie no any date. “It follows that had silicosis earlier charged of with can be date contact the substance specific injurious of inasmuch as the being injury, the date with a period consequences exposure product of the are the point time; consequéhtly than a of time rather only when ‘injured’ can to be employee be held afflicted mani- deleterious substance the accumulated effects Indemnity Corp. .” . . . Associated fest themselves Commission, App. Cal. Industrial Accident workmen’s in a state com- quoted used language, every relevant us case, applicable seems to pensation federal statute particular to the construction here, Accord- with concerned. which we are limitations Missouri expressed by the with the view ingly agree we Co., v. Pullman 2d See Pieczonka F. 356-357. on Supreme appeal case, the first of this that Court Urie’s claim, if not maintainable, otherwise barred statute of limitations.8 may readily dispose of ques-
We another preliminary tion concerning issues which are now before properly Respondent argues, us. somewhat surprisingly, that the sufficiency original for petitioner’s in- negligence claim appeal volved in first is not properly here, it. since was neither nor appeal raised considered on second Supreme to the Missouri Court. The short answer is petitioner that has the claim to this brought Court at' his first it was opportunity; not for necessary him second, claim relitigate through time state preserve courts order to it for our consideration judgment review of the final rendered in the cause. From opinions supreme of the state court we know judicially9 judgment its negating general claim for coupled was its repudi- subsequently petitioner conclusion had ated stated cause action Boiler under the conse- that, Act and quently, the court remanded the for not trial, cause judgment dismissal. The therefore not it was final; interlocutory and reviewable here within the meaning 8 Compare, the New York Appeals’ Court of application, similar claim, a silicosis of the Federal Liability Act’s statute Long Sadowski Island R. limitations. 292 N. Y. 457 *8 .8 -45 9 Mo; opinion The appeal, rendered on 211, extensively the first 352 quotes original complaint’s allegations- concerning negligence, id. 215-216; and copy complaint present appearing that in the quotations shows comprehend that substantially of the record all allegations respect. in present that record does not include a copy of the judgment text of the appeal; rendered on the first but deficiency merely deficiency sense, formal, any is if it is a in opinions since the appeals supply on full us with b.oth knowledge the nature and effect of judgment. 172 (b) 344 S. C. jurisdictional § statute. 28 U.
of our (3)].10 1257 § [now disposition Supreme Court’s the Missouri
Although time of review here at that appeal precluded the first did not waive petitioner, Urie ruling adverse- complaint, conformity in his question by amending specifically his more mandate, to state claim the court’s by proceeding Act or Boiler terms stood, this As then theory. the case with trial on that he was unless remaining his chance for success only was against entered judgment ask final it; to waive fof solely upon negligence issue, and.rely general him bn the reversal this judgment and securing review of that Court: ruling supreme court’s of the state the effect
Whatever courts,11it could not state proceedings for further Local rules upon petitioner. an alternative impose such consid Court’s-independent bar this cannot practice actually federal questions all- substantial eration of- court stages litigation in earlier determined here adjudication brought review. whose final for. Messenger Steinfeld, 445, 454; 225 U. v. S. Zeckendorf Anderson, so, Even Wethink sound U. v. S. ex questions were it that such would see to
practice But, as stages in the later of review. preserved pressly. its observe; heretofore to has had occasion this -Court prior to disposed of power probe appeals issues “necessary is", analysis, the one under review the last examination limits it to the of the rule which correlative” merely ot upon for a reversal judgment its the first writ “As final, being trial, judgment, not '. the court below and for a . . subject from this cburt.” of a writ. .... could not be made 93. See Coe v. R. G. R. U. S. States Denver & United Army Works, 413, 418-419; Gospel 237 U. S. v. Armour Fertilizer Los Angeles, and authorities cited. Harding, 452, 463-464. 344 Mo. Cf. Creason
173' Navigation v. Oyster Louisiana Co. judgments. final Commission, 226 U. S. 102.12 if petitioner it should be held that
Accordingly, even has the Inspection stated no claim Boilér Act, under judgment now in review starid cannot unless the Missouri n Supreme on rightly concluded, 'Court the first appeal, that petitioner’s original complaint stated no cause of Lia-, action for negligence Employers’ under Federal bility Act, apart any considered effect of Boiler That is question properly presented Act. and- to'it now turn. we
II. Section Federal Liability Act the. provides:'
“Every by common carrier railroad while engaging5 . commerce . . shall in damages liable any' be otherwise, 12 If were stayed it ovt corrective by any hand could be procedure local which chose to resolve ques all substantial federal ' litigation. phase tions in an present intermediate case lends point language by used this .Court dismissing a writ error to judgment: litigation state court for of a lack final “When the in the brought conclusion, state may is to a brought courts case here . upon already questions any may federal raised as well ás the- hereafter; although raised state'.courts,in proceedings' rbe taken, still presumably to be feel by will themselves bound the deci sion Supreme heretofore laying1 made Court . as [state] ' bound;” case, down ürays the law of this will court not be thus Coats-Fordney Co., Harbor Co. 256-257. Accord ingly, question even if it were assumed that.no of substance, federal secpnd appeal juris-' decided and that the'“basis for'our apd' found, diction all, opinion must be if the decision casé,” upon-a prior appeal petitioner state court in-the same supreme jurisdiction oppor Urie has “invoked the this court at the first' tunity open [him], hávirig question, to' been and the federal con supreme court, sidered properly state is here.” Gant City, Boskey, Finality See, generally, Oklahoma 289 U. S. Judgments Code, State Court the Federal Judicial Col. L, 1002,1007,1016. Rev. employed by he injury while suffering person *10 or . .' . such in such commerce carrier for negli the part from, or in resulting whole death of agents, employees or officers, the gence any of of by any'defect carrier, or reason insuffi cars, engines, in its ciency, to its negligence, due works, boats, roadbed, track, appliances, machinery, U. S. C. 51.§ equipment.” or other wharves, added.) (Emphasis leaving that negligence, not does define
The section Supreme Court the Missouri determined, as be question established principles law as “by the common said, Erie at 218. 352 Mo. federal courts.” applied application. S. has v. 304 U. Tompkins, R. Co. no. purposes for the negligence statute’s constitutes What varying in accordance with question, is á federal applicable under conceptions negligence differing purposes. Federal deci laws fór other state local concept formuláting gove law applying sional- Supreme Court’s decision Hence the Missouri rns.13 complaint did not state a cause appeal, first that the independent subject to our negligence, action for governed conclusively review and not to taken ^s were which alone cited decisions by state court support the determination. employment
. is not by Of course if silicosis caused coverage, intended “injury” within statute’s no an injury under the be stated for that cause action could of fault and causation statute, though allegations even Co., 352; Chesapeake Bailey v. Vermont R. 319 U. Central S. Kuhn, 44, 46-47; I. M. R. St. Louis & & Ohio Co. v. 284 U. S. Liability McWhirter, 277; Second Co. U. S. Cases, 1, 54-55, Buffalo, R. & U. 57-58. Cf. Schlemmer S. P. R. 1 wholly Supreme
were
sufficient.
The Missouri
Court’s
decision, however, assumed that
silicosis fell within
firs/
“injury,”
the statute’s broad term
and held
it
would
hold,
not “be reasonable
under
the facts- admitted
demurrer,
anticipated
that defendant
should have
plaintiff’s
injury . . . .”
Upon assumption silicosis when caused the employment’is compensable employee “injury,” the adequacy petitioner’s claim solely turns on whether complaint his original alleged facts raising a triable issue We think that under negligence. the standards here *11 by tofore set and followed this alleged facts Court14 in the and taken as complaint admitted by the demurrer clearly of stated cause action for negligence.
Those facts been briefly, though only partially, have They summarized above. charged respondent that used in the locomotives’ sanders a sand material containing very high percentage of silica or silicon dioxide; that material often the would come to the rails from the sanders in excessive and unnecessary quantities and would ground there be to dust; that containing the dust “such usual and unusual quantity of silican dioxide would [sic] come” into the engine and, cabs of “frequently .unusual that, would quantity,” by breathed and petitioner; respondent “knew, by exercise due care should have known,” that the sand high percent- contained the age of dioxide; silicon that “the dust would form and frequently quantity excessive because of sanders,” said 14See, g., e. Ellis v. Co., 649; Union R. S. Wester U. Pacific Atl. Hughes, Brady & Railroad v. 278 U. 496. Cf. Southern S. 476; Co., Chicago, Coogan, S.U. M. P. R. & St. U. S. 472. and by petitioner; and be into the cab
come breathed that, “dangerous was breathing period over a time plain- to the likely and-life and would cause to the health resulting plaintiff.” to the com- tiff the condition in allegations further set forth plaint then stated the following paragraph: margin,15 together with sanding devices alleges “Plaintiff further customary all engines on were of the usual said customary purpose’ and used for the usual and type ordinary, keeping if in them care was exercised quantities sandy adjusted large such of such silica not escape; plaintiff would not does material containing same of sand know whether kind high such other-rail- quality used silica was operating parts over or through roads such country sanding op- devices Missouri-; in erated the same manner the same means as railroads, kept if devices of other locomotives , regular normal and working condition would large quantities allow such of silica dust to form as stated.” above
(cid:127) allegations and other sufficiently charged.re- These spondent knowingly having used, quan- excessive 15“(2) negligently plaintiff Defendant failed furnish a reason that, ably place in safe which to work oh which locomotives - plaintiff supplied to work as- fireman wefe with sand required high a'-very percentage, for -the Sanders thereof which contained *12 above, or silica silican dioxide- as and defendant knew such fact [sic] engines and still defendant used “same and used said the con ditions above described. “(3) gubstance Although using sandy the containing defendant was
such, quantity silica, using of- and said locomotives that would cause large quantities containing and-allow of silica dust silica to be created inhaled, yet' negligently and come -into the cab and be defendant plaintiff negligently failed to warn the failed to furnish him with respirator device to a or the of said inhalation silica dust.” . prevent adjustment in pait to of the sanders faulty
title's due and' due'¿are adjusting use in them, failure to respondent’s likely sand material to cause ánd. dangerous silicosis petitioner per- to it and become causing in fact contract clearly would disabled. seem be manently This ade- stating negligence resulting for of action cause quate nieaning within and the injury ap- in the the statute judicial standards to which we have referred. All plicable comprehended, including want usual elements are of the care, proximate, injury, or ordinary due causation assumption present purposes within our fqr ' (cid:127) , statutory coverage. view, however, sustain contrary
To. Missouri a matter of law Supreme Court to have ruled- as seems customary adhered to standards respondent that had coin- petitioner’s admission-in tra,de, stressing been fault- alleged to have plaint sanding that the devices throughout used ordinarily kind adjusted were of the ily apparent court’s Contrary industry. the railroad was not admission re- conclusion, obviously this ap with the usual standards complied had spondent by petitioner nor There neither trade. admission more, respondent’s than that sand- anything evidence customary type” which, “all of ers were the usual ordinary would care, if kept properly adjusted have dust large quantities of silica allowed such and excessive )and- cab, be breathed escape, concentrate no admission other railroads petitioner. There was high sil- customarily used suo'h generally region or if that, they sanding purposes ica materials for content harm- did, they steps potentially did not minimize take mainte- assuming premise ful effects. Moreover, negatives negligence, nance of trade we cannot standards context, indication significance any its grasp this absent *13 rule rather adjusted sanding devices are the faultily locomotives. exception on steam than the American reject’the negli for-we think premise, But wé-also - Employers’ meaning within the of the Federal gence, “knew, if or Liability Act, respondent attached known,” prevalent of due care should have exercise protect. peti inadequate standards of conduct were to similarly situated Cf. Hill v. employees. tioner Co., reversing Coast Line R. 336 U. S. Atlantic Long Co., R. C. 236. See also Sadowski Island N. Respondent’s knowledge, N. 456-457.16 actual Y. constructive, alleged inadequacies or the sand ing question. petitioner was a Whether equipment jury was then or now would able shoulder the burden be proving respondent’s knowledge surmise, we not need by petitioner the evidence adduced trial though at indicating that the Boiler others besides Act— petitioner reported defects in respond- had observed .decision, Long Island Y. Sadowski 292 N. sustaining recovery for silicosis under the Federal Liability Act, statements, relevant contained the which are following respect apparent ruling Supreme Court with to the of the Missouri customary “Evidence that some compliance trade standards: plaintiff no contrivances as claimed were railroads furnished’ necessary working conditions or for the use of men under similar places doing work similar to that furnished similar work for men tp establish, dpes law, required plaintiff that no such as matter .of or no different contrivances no different in which to work place appliances carry, required in the case bar on the were work question in the exercise of of fact ordinary care. The ultimate n protective was not someone else used particular what means particular1 not, similar wbrk. It the’ condi was whether or .under plaintiff a rea case, tions described in this defendant furnished sonably place protection in connection safe which work and such expected against with his work of silica dust as would the inhalation person ordinary those in the exercise of care under conditions.” (cid:127) 292 Y.’N. at 456-457. equipment
ent’s locomotive our insistence —underscores *14 jury.17 that issues of fact are matters for the Accordingly ruling we think the state court’s that the in original complaint facts stated the were insufficient a of charge negligence respondent’s .part, to constitute Employers’ Liability within the of meaning the Federal from In- apart considered effect the Boiler the. spection Act, wrong was and must be overruled. What by the York in Appeals was said New Court Sadowski Long v. Island R. in supra 455-456, sustaining recovery very closely a for fits the the,Act, silicosis of this and in the represents, opinion, facts case our correct view:
“Ordinary proportion danger care must be to the in consequences might be and rea- the avoided anticipated neglect (Railroad from Co. sonably the Jones, 439; Bailey U. S. Central Vermont Ry., supra 350]). It must be commen- [319 dangers. surate with known Defendant created the quoting petitioner’s above, After admission referred to the Mis Supreme opinion implication souri Court’s “The from stated: this allegation defective, is that the sanders as such were not but that the maladjustment. wrong adjust trouble Just what was with the was alleged, plaintiff does ment is not and not claim that situation is ipsa loquitur one for the res rule.” 352 Moi at 219. was, effect, in
The inference drawn the court- either a rule maladjusted negligence using sanders could not be even law that though caused, petitioner expressly alleged, by respondent’s want law, care; alternatively ruling, of due a as matter showing allegation of malad (cid:127)constitute a sufficient it.; justment types specifically must “and causes Neither state in such applicable conclusion accords with federal standards cases. intention, If the latter was the the matter was at most one court’s former, permitting by proof; if the the con for amendment or cure generally accepted ran in and of the teeth both of federal clusion. showing negligence. standards for supervised done the work was and
place which a was aware for by plaintiff work doing years of conditions of at least sixteen period plaintiff required to work and of under which which its work was ac- means methods knowledge It of common complished. is matter injurious lungs dangerous it is to the dust, work silica fact which defendant health to was bound to know.”18 an “injury” question remains whether silicosis is meaning
within of that term as used Federal It a novel Liability Act. one this Court. within coverage But think silicosis is the statute’s w.e employer’s negligence. it results Con- when *15 arising statutory the breadth the siderations from accepted its language, purposes, Act’s humanitarian the liberal in accomplish standard of construction order to the in objects, anything legislative those absence of the Urie, prior respondent’s do we find merit in contention that Nor abolishing assumption to the 1939 amendment of risk as a defense to ordinary negligence Liability Act; suits under the Federal assumed, 1404, amending C. 53 Stat. Stat. § sug injury. Nothing original complaint remotely in risk Urie’s knowledge contracting gests part likelihood of such his of the “anticipated justify silicosis as would the conclusion that Urie particular chance the risk . . . .” Owens decided to Union Accordingly Co., we ’are not called' R. 319 U. S. 723. Pacific whether, given any is to be on to determine retroactive effect requiring amendment, described as which this has Court though no be handled “cases tried the Federal Act ... ” v. Atlantic assumption existed. Tiller doctrine of of risk had ever Co., Specifically we need con 54, Coast 318 U. S. Line R. whether, assuming was not intended sider even the amendment injuries accruing on thereafter cover enactment but'sued before its (an open question Court, v. Union in this see Owens Pacific which, supra 725), injuries like' nonetheless covers the amendment beginning Urie’s, 'the accrued and -were sued on but where thereafter alleged may amendment. assumption of the have antedated the risk
181' history indicating congressional intent to require a re- interpretation expressly occupa- stricted to exclude such disease, existing tional trend authorities dealing question, support with the combine to this conclusion.' that, We of course when recognize the statute was en- acted, Congress’ primarily upon attention was focused injuries resulting from and death accidents on interstate Obviously major railroads.19 these were causes of- resulting operations. and death from But injury railroad injuries only likely were not the ones to occur. accidental' nothing language legislative And either the or the his- tory .expressly any from discloses intent exclude coverage injury part Act’s .“in or in any resulting whole If an negligence” of the intent carrier. found, can .by it must be read into sheer inference.
The language “any is as broad as could be framed: person suffering injury employed”; while he is “such part or in resulting or death whole from the negligence any. officers, agents, employees .or carrier”; “by any insufficiency, of such reason defect or negligence, cars, due to its its engines, áppliancés,” face, every injury etc. On its suffered any employee employed negligence while reason of carrier’s compensable. wording was not made restrictive'as' covered; employees injury, except the cause carrier;, must it. constitute attributable *16 particular, injury resulting. or the kind of this all-inclusive wording To read a restriction as into employees covered, degree negli- to the kinds of gence particular inflicted, or the required, sorts of harms contradictory would be the remedial and wording, purpose, humanitarian the constant and established Cóng..Rec. 4265, 4426-4439, 4526-4551, 4755; 42 19 See H. 460, Cong., Rep. 1386, Cong., Sess.; Rep. 60th 1st 60th No! S. No. 1st Sess.
182 followed this liberal course of construction Court.20 Em- respondent, the Federal recognize,
We Liability Act is founded common-law con- ployers’ (cid:127) (cid:127) subject injury, qualifi- to such cepts If imported has into those terms.' Congress cations as suggesting were the common respondent right disease recognize occupational category law does not as a lend compensable injury, he would substance “injury” use of the word argument Congress’ than word’s surface connotation indicates. less broad contrary advanced,21 has However, although the view been which have we are satisfied that the difficulties attached recovery occupational to tort for disease inhere not wrong difficulty proving negli- nature of the but in the Supreme Court gence. For, as the Ohio observed with early period “In silicosis, of industrial reference development knowledge regard- there was little medical ing origin peculiar of diseases to the various employ- v. National Bronze & Aluminum . . .” ments Triff Co., Foundry 135 191, Ohio St. We do not doubt incurring that at “common law the of a disease or harm to a personal health is wrong as warrant recovery 22 if the liability present.” other elements of for tort are 20 reasoning “The Act is not to be narrowed refined .... It liberally is to purposes be construed to fulfill the for which it was Encarnacion, enacted . . . .” Jamison v. 281 U. S. 640. Simi larly, Inspection Act, Safety Appliance the Boiler “like the Act, is liberally light prime purpose, to be construed in the of its pro employees by requiring tection of and others equip use safe Lilly Co., 481, 486. ment.” Trunk R. S. Grand U. 21See, g., Mfg. Co., 564, 566; e. Cell v. Yale & Towne 281 Mich. but cf. id. at 567-568. Case, 223, 224; Maryland Hurle’s 217 Mass. see & Sons v. Hood
Casualty Gentry 223; Co., cf. Mass. Swann Chemical Banks, Employer’s Occupa Liability Ala. 317-318. See Diseases, Rocky tional Mt. L. 61-64. Rev.
183
Liability Act as
Viewing
the Federal
arguments
think
drawn
statute, we
occupational
work
coverage
diseases
state
accorded
present,
compensation statutes cannot control the
men’s
yet
may
passing
And
we
note in
that decisions
inquiry.
may be
statutes,
they
extent
under such
whatever
respondent’s nar
relevant,
support
offer little
thought
True it
before us.
legislation
row view
the federal
1897;
Compensation
Act of
is that
British Workmen’s
Viet, c;
covering
contracted
37, although
60 & 61
anthrax
particular
processing
identifiable
by claimant from a
wool, Turvey
v.
Brintons, Ltd.,
[1904]
1
K. B.
affirmed
[1905]
A.
C.
was held to exclude
gradual
lead
poisoning.
Steel
v.
Cammell,
Laird
&
Co.,
[1905]
2
B.
true that
the statute
equally
K.
232. But-it
only in cases
provided
compensation
there construed
for
accident,”
by
(emphasis added),
“personal
v.
opinions
in Steel
by
limitation much stressed
Cammell,
Lille
& Co.,
And
v.
supra.
Laird
see Walker
shall
Coal
Co.,
[1900]
Q.
B.
488. Decisions
in this
early
rule
uniformly followed the
British
country have
.in
such terms as “accident”
“accidental
construing
“personal injury
as
accident.”23
injury,”
well
“personal
injury”
construing
decisions
But
—more
Em-
the Federal
nearly
simple “injury”
akin
Supreme
Thus the
ployers’ Liability
conflict.
Act—-are.in
Sager
See,
Jeffreyes
App.
affirmed
g.,
e.
Div.
Commission,
535;
Industrial Accident
233 N. Y.
State
Iwanicki
the term
Court of Ohio excluded
diseases in view of
*18
special legislative
and constitutional context of the
statute
while
recognizing
otherwise it
considered/
would be
bring
purview
“no difficult matter to
within the
of
'personal injuries
the'words
sustained in the course of
occupational
employment’-
diseases
in course of
incurred
Brown,
Industrial
employment.”
Commission 92
Ohio
Roth,
cf. Industrial Commission 309,
313;
St.
98
312 -
Ohio
Supreme
St. 34.
Court, relying on
Connecticut
its
“typical”
common-law view that
occupational diseases
were not compensable,
occupational
likewise excluded
dis
statute;
Miller v. Amer
“personal
eases from
-injury”
its
ican Steel & Wire
24 Edmonds, 23, 1913, Solicitor, Opinions Claim of Edward June Department .(1915) U. S. of Labor 259. 25 Solicitor, Jule, July 28, 1913, Opinions Claim of Willard E. (1915) 261; Arata, Department U. S. of Labor cf. Claim of C. M. id. 31,1913, (lead bronchitis). poisoning Dec. ether,26 caused inhalation hypertrophy
cardiac In aggravated by poisoning.27 tuberculosis brass throat , compensation offer short, the workmen’s cases little com- Clark, 11, Apr. 1914, Opinions Solicitor, of Basil E. Claim (1915) Department of 270. U. S. Labor Devine, 9, 1915,. Opinions Solicitor, Feb. Claim of Edward (1915) Department of Labor Whether earlier decision U. S. compensable, Sheeran, pneumonia Apr. was not Claim of John foregoing 1910, Op. Atty. 254, is with the 25, Gen. consistent bends,” cases, awarding compensation “the or cases Claim 3,1911, Opinions Solicitor, Department Murray, Nov. of Wm. (1915) 239, Walsh, Mar. sunstroke, Claim J. of Labor- of J. determine; Congress’ dissatisfaction with id. at we need not legislation: subsequent is clear from the course the distinction *19 30, 1908, Compensation May Employees’ the Federal When general by. extant superseded in 1916 the broader and still federal was seq., C. ei the statute employee compensation system, 5 S. 751 U. § compensation “disability” “per- or originally provided enacted as injury” qualification 39 Stat. or definition. sonal without further occupational rejected, at include disease were Proposals specifically to hearings the comlhittee “there part, in for the reasons that at least disease’; ‘occupational defining difficulty in the term Wasconsiderable quite our in a number of to attention it was also called "language this the court held we in a number States which cases in occupational diseases certain cases— have in the would cover bill Cong. .,. 1924 Rec. 10899." In . at least number of them 389, rulings two amended, “to 1916"Act 43 Stat. was correct Rep. .” No. Comptroller the United States . . Hi R. General of rulings 280, remedied was that Cong., 1. One 68th 1st Sess. Act; occupational not within the 1916 diseases included were power to review Comptroller had "ruling General other was Compensation Commission. Employees’ decisions the United States Judiciary Committee, in errors, House As to of these first n reporting out the 1924 its 1916 to amendment, expressly referred 7, show that 678, Cong., Rep.- H. 1st Sess. report, R. No. 64th remedy the drafting the 1916 Act “the intended committee ‘occupational 30,1908, May act with reference inadequacy of the ” 280, Cong., 3. See 65 1st Sess. Rep. H. R. No. 68th diseases.’ Cong. Rec. 8154. respondent’s
fort to view Employers’ of the Federal Lia- bility Act.
While no of this involving decision Court the Federal Act has Liability specifically dealt with sili cosis, the New York Court of as we have Appeals, indi cated above, has sustained under the recovery Act for that disease from resulting negligence. when the carrier’s This was done in substantially circumstances not different alleged petitioner’s those original complaint, ex cept application involved possible facts no the Boiler Long v. Act. Sadowski Island R. Co., supra. Moreover, other state and federal decisions have recovery authorized injuries the Act for caused accidental violent means. These include Thomson, Shelton v. 2d 1; 148 F. 2d F. where recovery permitted was for carbon monoxide poisoning; Branson, B. & O. R. Co. 128 Md. reversed on other grounds,- recovery which paint allowed for poisoning. Cf: P. I. & Co. C. R. Cheek, Okla. 91. Not all of these decisions could held, be sustained if statutory term “injury” were , require that the harm suffered employer’s from the neg ligence must be confined to that “external, inflicted violent and accidental” mearis or be an “accidental in jury,” respondent’s narrow view of the statute’s cov (cid:127) erage contemplate. seems to. *20 would be adopt We most hesitant to a construction of ,
“injúry”. as used in this Act overrule which would the or seriously' impair decisions last cited their authority. they spirit We think were made in the the statute con- That, templated application. for its administration and spirit conformity is in importing one not nice dis- tinctions in the applying general Act’s broad and terms or scope cutting by down their full or implication. inference In our the view, employer’s when negligence impairs destroys an by or health work him to employee’s requiring bring about such harmful con- likely
under conditions just the injury employee great as when sequences, the negligent from a inevitably, often carrier’s follows, it period an as pursued over extended time when course lightning. Silicosis is with the suddenness it comes leading per- in time “injury,” certainly as much as explosion. from a disability, scalding boiler’s manent time required mere difference the do think the We not to take acts of effect disclose for different consequences justify disabling ex- harmful, their would from coverage the Act’s injury one cluding type the , with an would be consistent its exclusion or that such of con- unvarying purposes, language, standards struction.
, Supreme Court follows, it as the Missouri Accordingly com- petitioner’s original appeal, that on the first assumed action stating fail in did not cause plaint allegation want of Liability Employers’ Federal to trial go was entitled to injury. Petitioner sufficient him show requiring without restriction at that time Inspection Act. violation of Boiler. all in the if it is involved conclusion,
This were supreme court’s compel- state case,-would reversal upon original complaint. for trial and remand decision Boiler However, it to consider effect remains for pe- rendered Inspection Act and whether the verdict Act, conjunction with the Federal titioner under that Act, stand. Liability be allowed to should
III. state By case virtue of the course taken hold courts, squarely Court did not Supreme the Missouri coverage of that silicosis was not-an within apart Employers’ Liability Act considered Federal shape As took Boiler Act. the case And question appeal. did on the first arise *21 188 ruling for trial, only-
virtue the remand that the arising cause of action was that stated under Boiler Act, Inspection the court on the appeal second treated question a compensable whether silicosis was injury Inspection ifas the Boiler was a "substantially wholly Act independent statute, scope unrelated of its cov- erage, purposes employees’ suits for breach of its e., provisions, Employers’ Liability terms, i. Act’s ifas question arose tinder the Inspection Boiler solely Act. by Act,
But
its. own terms
Boiler Inspection
the'
like
Safety
Appliance
does
Acts,28
purport
to confer
any
action
right
upon injured
employees.
merely
It
makes violation of its prohibitions “unlawful.”29 Yet it
been
has
held
that the Boiler
consistently
supplements
Employers’ Liability
the Federal
Act by
imposing on interstate
“an absolute and
railroads
con-
tinuing duty”
provide
equipment. Lilly
safe
v. Grand
Co., supra
Trunk R.
Lunsford,
v.
485; Southern R. Co.
398, 401;
Groeger,
297
S.
U.
cf. Baltimore & O. R. Co.
This conclusion stems, any not from express statutory language, implication but from 3 4 of §§ and the Fed Emplqyers’ eral Liability 45 Act, 53, 54, U. S. C.-§§ which of, bar pleadings respectively, negligence and contributory assumption risk “in any case where violation such common carrier of any safety enacted for the statute of employees contributed to' the of such death 30 employee.” But 1 it is Employers’ § of the Federal seq. 45 U. 1 et S. C. § note 4 See and text. ordinary negligence In claims Federal Lia bility Act, contributory negligence while not a bar to the action is available in of damages, diminution 45 U. S. C. 35 Stat. § Assumption' claims, complete of. risk defense to was. Air Horton, Line Seaboard 492, 503, S. its abolition U. until *22 4, and Liability Act, expressly and not 3 which creates §§ it by a for the token negligence; action same cause of for employee’s the of an suit violation which is basis § Safety For Inspection Appliance or Acts. .of the Boiler insufficiency, or to its to defect due ‘any where 1 “refers § clearly negligence, cars, engines, appliances,’ etc., in its it Safety of intent to treat violation the legislative is the is sometimes called Appliance as ‘negligence’ Act —what Wag- R. v. Antonio A. P. Co. negligence per se.” San & ner, 476, 241 U. S. 484. with Appliance Acts, together In view-the Safety this (cid:127) if substantively in form Act, Inspection
the Boiler are Liability Act. Employers’ to the Federal amendments employees’ suits, of They dispense, purposes the safety of that’ violations of-the stat- necessity proving vio- negligence; making proof utes constitute of law. negligence to as matter lations is effective show Boiler consistent'practice; has taken, Thus been the regarded Inspection and cannot be Appliance Acts Safety wholly separate as statutes and ^dependent Liability They are' Employers’ Act. tatherl Federal supplemental it, having purpose and effect restricting such employee recovery, not of facilitating recovery making impossible-. or it S, amending 35 66. C.§54, in 1939. Stat. 45 U. 53 Stat. Co., See Tiller Coast Line R. Atlantic S. 54. 318 U. acknowledge quoted statutory phrase held creation Liability Act” for Employers’ a cause of Federal action “under the Safety Appli personal injury employee to an due to -violation seq., since, phrase ‘any statute S. C. 1 et Acts, “By ance U. § evidently intended safety Congress enacted employees’ for the C. Moore v. & O. Safety Appliance-Acts.” embrace its alleging injury viola employee suit Similarly U. S. 210. an Em brought the Federal Inspection tion of “under the Boner Act is Co., Lilly Trunk R. Grand ployers’' Liability Act . . .” Safety- light, Regarded this the Boiler highly incongruous Acts would char- Appliance take if, very they expediting employee acter time were Liability recovery Employers’ under the Act substitut- light proving burden of violation of ing comparatively prohibitions proving negli- for the heavier one their contracting scope compensable were gence, also they injuries defeating recovery altogether. and to that extent do not think that so Congress We intended act incon- sistently that, by dispensing employee’s with the bur- of proving den certain classes of it Liability suits, any purpose had to withdraw from any coverage employment Act’s caused *23 by which was covered its In the terms. absence of any re-, specific showing Congress that had such a in mind object, strictive and inconsistent we are not to create free by inference, especially one more it is from when derived approaching problem Inspection the as if the Boiler and Safety Appliance wholly independent Acts and were of separate design purpose from the Lia- Employers’ bility Act.
The congressional purpose underlying Boiler In- the spection basically Act is underlying the same as that the Safety Appliance Acts and Employers’ Liability the Act. In requiring and, the boiler, long after, not that the entire locomotive, be “in maintained proper condition safe to operate,” Congress by own its was at- statement tempting to insure that such equipment employed “be- . . . active . . . unnecessary peril service without or life limb . . .” 45 require- 23. Certain §C. ments of the Safety Appliance example -for Acts, as the of use the coupler, automatic U. S. C. are made § mandatory by express statutory like language. Others, those'of Inspection the Boiler Act, simply gen- outline a eral standard which may be more specifically articulated approval rules enunciated the carriers by subject to the Commission, 28,§ Commerce 45 U. S. C.
of the Interstate
directly
Commission, Napier
the
promulgated
by
Co.,
611-613, on
Atlantic
Line R.
This last-quoted merely recognized sentence that there tofore the Interstate had not reg Commission Commerce ulated with an eye employee it did health; not does support the view that health was employee thought not compass Act, to be within the other language in makes Napier, 611-613, S. at 272 U. amply clear':
"The requirements their question are, here in nature, within scope authority delegated ¿nd An Commission. firedoor an automatic the. curtain may promote safety. Keeping effective cab engineers firemen and in good health, preventing like fatigue excessive serv- through limiting hours of , ice,' clearly so, indirectly does .'. . . although *25 protection “If the now afforded the Commis- inadequate, application rules deemed for sion’s power to -The must be made it. Commission’s' relief - is ample.” Inspection Act vests in the Thus the Boiler Interstate rule-making power adequate Commission to Commerce well against disease as- as protect employees against for power employee to make rules and the accident; health has been exercised.32 considerations, it
In of cannot be said that view these power is confined to safe- the Commission’s rqle-iqaking closing "unnecessary open g., requirement for excessive E. 116(g),’ cabs,” imposed I. iHgS in C. C.’Rule locomotive was, opinion Napier decision, as (g), after the C. F. R. 91.116 § n designed protect plain, the health of "announcing rule makes to R. R. engineers wind, snow and rain. Wisconsin firemen rule, squarely 199. The R. 142 I. C. v. A. & R. C. Comm’n months, present since limited to the winter applicable case to the hearings, proceeding in a in which the was after extended formulated’ Anajor railroad, every Pacific, like other American Missouri almost A. Wisconsin R. Comm’n v. & party a named defendant. was Record, Complaint Railroad Co., supra, Transcript of R.R. case, light it is Wisconsin, In the instant p. 17. Commission Engineers’ Firemen’s Brotherhood and the note that interest rule, alleged need support proposed Brotherhood, of the interveners alia, storms.” from, . . and dust ptotection inter “excessive . sand of Al supra, ..Transcript of.Record, Petition of Intervention Joint Johnston, p. Robertson, 3; Amended Joint Peti-. vafiley B.D. Robertson, p. Alvanley and D. B. tion of Johnston Intervention support been adduced No evidence have seéms.to substantial Intervening Transcript'of Record, Broth- allegation, supra, Brief for ’ wind 14-15, although winter érhoods, pp. there evidence severe 2056, parts supra, Missouri; Transcript Record, iii other 5005, 6088, Inter 6350. The country, id. at opinion amend in its Commerce Commission noted state “The. regarded which minimum requirements 116 should ments rule b.e conditions.” 142 care of most are intended take extreme not. 199,-210 I. C. C. *26 guarding. against injury; accidental nor are we free to lay down a rule of law which would so restrict the Com- authority. mission’s Since we are unable to find in the Inspection Boiler terms, purposes Act’s legislative his- tory explicit provision either or any sufficient basis for one inferring cutting scope down the of recovery allowed under 1 of Employers’ Liability § Act, we conclude recovery for which may be had for vio- Inspection lation of the Boiler isAct no narrower in scope than the injury for recovery which is authorized 1 under of the Employers’ § Liability Act.
'We petitioner’s hold that injury is compensable one Inspection the Boiler further, Act. We hold in light of the trial instructions and such evidence as appears in the record us,33 before jury jus- that the tified finding (1) respondent breached Boiler only partial summary evidence peti before us is the tioner’s case Supreme the Missouri appeal: Court the second Brill, “Bruce plaintiff, witness for testified he had at the .worked Missouri Pacific Joplin years roundhouse at for about 18 and until 4, 1942; ‘engines November say that the that came in .... I would them, five, most at least three out of would have sanders reported in maybe bad order nipple, something . . . it was a broken dome, in the or a nipple loose connection.’ A broken would cause the sand to dribble 'on drivers, to the ‘speed rails under the and the up would suck ground it into the cab after it was under the wheels.’ The dust would ‘through be sucked in the deck and around the boiler openings grate head or in the shakers.’ When the witness cleaned particles out the cabs he found sand and roadbed dust. . . . Plain (sand) tiff testified the dust up through openings would ‘come floors, grate in the riggings cab around the shaker and the stoker the,,engine in the against deck on each side of the fire door Lead the boiler . . . head. Sometimes there would be wide cracks between the boiler head and the deck floor where the bolts off were broken and it was worn and loose. The deck boards would cracked out, through any sometimes slivered like openings and it would come that; lights; get clothing . . . would collect on the . . . would our ” very dusty; your very dry.’ 357 Mo. . . . make mouth and nose at 744-745. (as specifically more articulated I. C. C. sanders)34 120, governing (2)
Rule breach proximate petitioner’s was a cause of injury. 91.120, applicable
34 1. Rule C. C. C. F. to steam loco § motives, provides: equipped proper “Locomotives shall be sand ing apparatus, which shall be maintained safe and suitable con service, dition for trip. pipes and tested before each Sand must be securely fastened in line with the rails.” consequence may
It specifically is of no that Rule have been jury’s Lilly called to the attention. Grand Trunk R. urged upon designed 488-489. It is us that 120 was Rule adequate braking auxiliary system to insure an pro rather than to against employees silicosis, that, tect notwithstanding and hence re *27 spondent’s governing statute, petitioner breach of the rule the and complain flowing injury cannot of an from the which breach injury sought not the guard the Interstate Commerce Commission to against.. dispute do scope 120; We not narrow the of Rule nor do imposes liability we doubt that conventional tort doctrine absolute statutory duty only injury for of a violation where the is one the designed prevent. See, g., DiCaprio statute was to e. v. York New Co., 94; Central R. N. but cf. the of Mr. 231 Y. Justice remarks Atchison, Reesman, 370, Brewer in T. R. v. 60 & S. F. Co. F. 373. liability imposed by But we think the the is Boiler of broader character and that the correct rule is the one laid down 621, Layton, in & N. Louisville R. Co. v. 243 which this U. S. repeated apply Court has had to in with the occasion connection Safety Appliance language of the Acts: “The the acts and authorities damages entirely liability we have in cited make it clear that the employees springs being from its comply for failure to with the law equipped required, from the made unlawful to use cars not —not may position employee may doing in or the work which he be given injured. when This effect can be to the the moment he is only by purpose accomplished acts and wise and humane can be their do, employees damages holding, liable to as we that carriers are obey safety appliance laws is whenever failure to these engaged discharge proximate injury when in the cause to them Coray duty.” 239, 243; Wolfe, Davis v. U. S. Southern See 263 Assn., 522-523; Brady Co., R. Terminal U. S. Pacific 10, 16; Chicago, P., O. R. Swinson v. St. M. & U. S. 531; Meredith, 292 Fairport, R. Co. v. U. S. P. & E. 66; Gotschall, S. St. Minneapolis Cf. Co. v. 244 U. & St. Louis R. Conarty, Louis S. 243. & S. F. Co. v. U. for a valid claim petitioner stated conclude
We Liability under the Federal negligent injury stated on both petitioner appeal first Act on his for a valid claim proved.on his second appeals and Inspection Act. The of the Boiler from violation flowing verdict us reveals no error before record jury’s theory of the second which was based on for petitioner, with either damages awarded consistent case; are disposed of the considered and various theory. We have respondent; not urged by grounds of affirmance grounds sup- us or on such on the record before urged, whether respondent state court record as plemental portions review, Accordingly us are waived. have asked might is and the cause is remanded judgment reversed judgment the verdict instructions reinstate petitioner. for
Reversed. concurring part. Frankfurter, Justice Mr. it relevant the risk of reiteration is
At wearisome concept the common-law say again rights antiquated working ait for out uncivilized basis inevitably due to disabilities deaths and duties In the industry. of modern conscious conduct in- the human cost of unconscious endeavor to have *28 injustice upon with workers and their dustry fall cruel families, gives to the law rise endless heavy of an occasional casuistry. long gamble So as the a security system is of modern replaced by verdict apply the notion of .insurance, must continue to courts it was never intended. pegligence in situations for which causally an is Therefore,' injury if a is made that claim care a failure to maintain standards of related to carrier’s railroad, Federal appropriate employment for on.a employee to estab- Liability Act an Employers’ entitles re- Damages are jury lish that claim to s satisfaction. coverable under that Act for suffering “injury.” That it seems term, me, is sufficiently broad to bodily include nowadays which is specifically more characterised “occupational as disease.” I agree re- Accordingly, covery may had under the be Federal Liability facts, Act for silicosis, where sustain a claim, such as Long of Sadowski is illustrated case Island R. Co., 292 N. Y. N. E. 2d 497. I hand,
On the other agree Supreme with the Missouri that occupational Court diseases cannot be fitted into category of “accidents” for Inspec- which the Boiler tion Act regulation scheme of and a devised.a basis of liability. amended, Stat. 45 U. S. C. 22-34. §§ I ‘think I appreciate impulse the humane which seeks bring occupational within a regime. diseases regard judicial interpretation But due for the limits of precludes application such free-handed a statute to of. situations outside language purpose. its and its To so, do moreover, I is, believe, disservice to the humane ends .a sought promoted. which are is Legislation needed will effectively which meet the which obligations social underlie the of occupational incidence See Na- disease. tional (Industrial Injuries) 1946, .9 & 10 Act, Insurance 6, 488, Geo. particularly Part IY. The for such need legislation becomes obscured and drive for it retarded if encouragement given thought to the there are adequate occupational now for remedies diseases call- subject ings Congressional control. The result present petitioner judg- decision secure the' is to for this ment awarded him. It does not jury which secure proper system dealing occupational with diseases.
I would the case judgment reverse and remand this Supreme to the proceedings of Missouri for con- Court sistent this opinion. Reed, Jackson, Justice Mr. Justice
Mr.'; Mr. join opinion. this Burton Justice