Simpson v. Miller ex rel. County of Maricopa
241 Ariz. 341
| Ariz. | 2017Background
- Arizona Constitution art. 2, § 22(A)(1) (via Prop 103) and A.R.S. § 13-3961(A)(3) bar bail for defendants charged with sexual conduct with a minor under 15 when “the proof is evident or the presumption great.”
- Joe Paul Martinez was charged under § 13-1405(B) (sexual conduct with a minor under 15) and held without bail after a trial court found the statutory “proof is evident or presumption great.”
- Martinez challenged the constitutionality of the categorical no-bail provision; the court of appeals (2–1) held it unconstitutional for lack of individualized dangerousness findings.
- The issue reached the Arizona Supreme Court to determine whether the constitutional and statutory categorical denial of bail violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process protection against pretrial detention.
- The Court compared Arizona’s scheme to the federal Bail Reform Act upheld in United States v. Salerno and considered whether Arizona’s statute is narrowly focused to protect public safety.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a categorical ban on bail for those charged with sexual conduct with a minor under 15 violates due process | Martinez: categorical denial without individualized dangerousness inquiry is unconstitutional | State: offense-based categorical denial is permissible; Sanction serves compelling public-safety interest and may be constitutional in many cases | Held unconstitutional on its face: statute is not narrowly focused because the offense is not inherently predictive of future dangerousness |
| Whether Salerno requires individualized dangerousness findings for all pretrial detention statutes | Martinez: Salerno requires individualized dangerousness or equivalent safeguards | State: Salerno does not mandate the exact procedures; Salerno’s factors are indicia, not prerequisites | Court: Salerno’s factors are informative but not absolute; however, where offense does not inherently predict dangerousness, case-specific inquiry is required |
| Whether the statute is punitive or regulatory for due-process analysis | Martinez: pretrial detention must be regulatory to pass due process; statute functions as regulatory public-safety measure | State: Prop 103 and §13-3961 are regulatory, aimed at preventing future crimes | Court: statute is regulatory, not punitive; legitimate and compelling state interest acknowledged |
| Availability of less restrictive alternatives that preserve liberty while protecting public safety | Martinez: alternatives (e.g., A.R.S. §13-3961(D) procedures, conditions of release, GPS) make categorical denial unnecessary | State: categorical denial justified by seriousness of crime and historical practice | Court: less-restrictive, case-specific procedures exist (and are upheld in other provisions), demonstrating the categorical ban is not narrowly focused |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (upholding Bail Reform Act; individualized dangerousness showing supported pretrial detention)
- Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (right to reasonable bail pre-conviction; bail serves to prevent punishment prior to conviction)
- Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio, 770 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. en banc) (struck down Arizona categorical no-bail provision for certain immigrants; applied heightened scrutiny)
- Simpson v. Owens, 207 Ariz. 261 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (interpreting “proof is evident or presumption great” standard and hearing protections)
- Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (discussing liberty interest and limits on involuntary confinement)
- Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (upholding certain mandatory detention regimes in immigration context)
- Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (probable cause judicial determination prerequisite to pretrial detention)